Large language models produce assertion-shaped outputs that often bring their users to true belief. I argue for two conclusions of different strengths: that on the best current evidence, these systems do not transmit testimonial knowledge and that hearers are not now positioned to accord their outputs testimonial uptake, which does not wait on the first. From Burge, Williamson, Goldberg, Faulkner, and Lackey, I derive a Tracking Minimum: a source transmits testimonial knowledge that p only if th…
Read moreLarge language models produce assertion-shaped outputs that often bring their users to true belief. I argue for two conclusions of different strengths: that on the best current evidence, these systems do not transmit testimonial knowledge and that hearers are not now positioned to accord their outputs testimonial uptake, which does not wait on the first. From Burge, Williamson, Goldberg, Faulkner, and Lackey, I derive a Tracking Minimum: a source transmits testimonial knowledge that p only if the truth of p, or the evidential support for p, figures in the explanation of its producing that assertion, and does so in virtue of the source’s own production process rather than of a proxy on which that process depends. It is this endogeneity requirement, not any modal profile, that the five accounts share and current systems fail. The argument engages Burge’s extension of his framework to computational sources, the interpretability literature, and the published case for AI testimony, whose dispute with mine turns on an empirically decidable question, for which an experiment is specified. The positive proposal places LLM outputs within an extended epistemology of instruments, with a result that has gone unremarked: a working barometer satisfies the condition these systems fail.
