Abhishek Yadav

This study examined how and why extension workers shared farming videos with farmers, revealing divergent appropriation patterns and their implications for digitization in agriculture. 294 extension workers in Bihar (India) were asked to circulate three wheat agronomy videos with farmers. Extension workers’ circulation of these videos was observed using link tracking, phone surveys, and follow-up interviews. Results were analyzed using a novel analytic framework based in affordance theory. Extension workers varied widely in how much, how, and why they shared the farming videos. This variation was underpinned by extension workers’ differing incentives and goals. In other words, extension workers heterogeneously appropriated—rather than homogeneously deployed—the practice of sharing farming videos. Some but not all of these appropriations were desirable from the perspective of service managers. For theory, extension workers’ appropriations of farming videos demonstrate that prevalent conceptualizations of digital agricultural technologies do not account for the adaptation of these technologies by farmers and other actors in agricultural innovation systems. For digital agriculture evaluators, the findings caution against the prevalent focus on averaging effects of interventions and highlight the need to examine the variability of these effects within and across interventions. For extension service managers, the findings emphasize the importance of engaging extension actors with farmer-aligned incentives and goals. This study was limited in focusing on the video-sharing behaviors of human extension actors and not on algorithmic extension actors, like YouTube or farming advisory chatbots powered by large language models. However, the findings have implications for both: just as human actors variably appropriate digital tools, algorithmic extension actors also embed implicit goals that shape how agricultural information circulates. Future research should examine the goals and behaviors of these algorithmic actors that have increasing influence in agricultural innovation systems.

Today’s VUCA business environment has compelled organizations to resort to corporate layoffs and downsizing to become ‘lean and mean’. In the wake of downsizing, employees are psychologically disengaged and are experiencing a lack of meaning and compassion at work. Furthermore, both academia and industry are replete with instances of power abuse and exploitation, revealing a trend of leaders and subordinates prioritizing self-interest over stakeholder welfare, reflecting a concerning rise in unbridled greed and unethical behaviour. The responsibility rests with leaders to take charge and cultivate work environments that foster compassion and a sense of meaning at work by working for the greater good. We position this study as a response to an impending call for a leadership approach that motivates the employees to experience meaningful work and transcend the walls of self-centric, organizational-centric lenses and contribute to the greater good. Drawing our grounding from social learning theory and broaden-and-build theory, we examine whether spiritual leadership can effectively motivate employees to experience meaningful work and contribute to the greater good. Based on time-lagged two-wave data collected from 355 employees, our findings highlight that spiritual leadership fosters employees’ experience of meaningful work and inspires them to work for the greater good. Moreover, psychological compassion climate serves as a boundary condition for assessing the impact of spiritual leadership on inspiring employees to work for the common good. This study elaborates on the theoretical and practical implications of our findings and offers avenues for future research.

This paper is an attempt to formulate a criticism of the ability hypothesis (Lewis 1983, 1988) (Nemirow 1990, 2007), which itself has been forwarded as a criticism of the knowledge argument presented by Jackson (1982). I start by explicating the knowledge argument by discussing the import its premises have, followed by a brief discussion of some of the major objections raised against the knowledge argument. Thereafter, I discuss the ability hypothesis and the reason why it seems like a valid criticism to the knowledge argument. I further discuss in brief the major objections that have been raised against the ability hypothesis. In the penultimate section of the paper, I argue by making a case for ‘know-how-that’ that the analogy on which the ability hypothesis rests as a criticism to the knowledge argument does not hold.

This study provides a bibliometric analysis of the DESIDOC journal of library and information technology during 2012–2022. Research data for this study has been exported from the SCOPUS database. A total of 638 articles published during the study period were analyzed to determine the most cited articles, most prolific author, growth of publication, occurrence of keywords, citation pattern, and authorship pattern. To visualize the occurrence of keywords and the co-citation of the author network, Vosviewer software was used. This study also reveals that bibliometric, scientometrics, e-resource, and citation analysis are the most prolific research areas.

Dennett (_Synthese,_ _53_(2), 159–180, 1982, 1991, _Journal of Consciousness Studies,_ _10_(9–10), 19–30, 2003, _Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences,_ _6_, 247–270, 2007 ) proposes and defends a method called _heterophenomenology_. Heterophenomenology is a method to study consciousness _from a third-person objective point of view_ as opposed to a first-person subjective point of view or (auto)-phenomenology. The method of heterophenomenology serves a necessary role in Dennett’s schema of bridging the gap between the manifest and the scientific image of the world. In this paper, I attempt to present a limited critique of the method of heterophenomenology. The objection raised in this paper is limited to one of the steps involved in the method, i.e., the interpretation of the heterophenomenological text as analogous to novelist fiction. I attempt to show that the assumptions made by Dennett about the interpretation of fiction are contradictory in nature and therefore the same cannot be applied to the interpretation of a heterophenomenological text. The assumptions fail in justifying the interpretation of fiction itself and hence exporting them by analogy to interpret a heterophenomenological text is a mistake.