Abraham Lim

I think, therefore I was born, I suffer, and I will die. This is called the 'Buddha's Cogito' in this paper. This paper argues that dependent origination, the central thesis of the Buddha's teachings, is essentially encapsulated by the Buddha's cogito. This argument is a transcendental argument. In a way, we can say that by teaching dependent origination, the Buddha has put forth the conclusion of a transcendental argument without giving the argument itself. As a result, dependent origination inevitably strikes us as difficult, or even cryptic. The transcendental argument discussed in this paper has been subsequently developed by philosophers such as Hilary Putnam, James Conant, and Tim Button. This paper explains what a transcendental argument is, and how it enables us to clarify and gain insight into dependent origination, thereby making it possible to achieve a deeper understanding of the interrelations among dependent origination, the act of holding a belief, the world, and right mindfulness—the key practice in the Buddha’s teachings aimed at reducing or ending suffering.

I have developed transcendental arguments to refute several versions of Nick Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis. I called some of these arguments the SIM-style argument. In this paper, I have four main aims. First, I employ the SIM-style argument to remedy a defect in Hilary Putnam’s Brain-in-vat argument. Second, I show that the most radical skepticism, which Tim Button called the nightmarish Cartesian skepticism, can be refuted by the SIM-style argument or by another transcendental argument I develop here. Third, I compare my approach to radical skepticisms with Donald Davidson’s, as it is often regarded as an exemplar of transcendental arguments. Fourth, I explain how the prominent objections, mainly developed by Barry Stroud, to transcendental arguments can incur two undesirable results: psychologism and Kantian skepticism.

Nick Bostrom considered a number of simulations and contended that the probability that we are living in one of them is high or at least nonzero. I present arguments to refute the claim that we are or might be in any one of them. Here is a highly dense reasoning why we are not in the simulation: Suppose Simon is in the simulation, and he entertains the idea that he is in the simulation. And he thinks about the word 'apple'. But since he is always in the simulation, he has never interacted with an actual apple, which the word 'apple' refers to. Then Simon must think that "if I am in the simulation, then I never interact with an actual apple, and my understanding about the word 'apple' can only be given by the simulator. And this means I never exercise my reason to gain the understanding about the word 'apple', and never exercise my reason to apply the word 'apple'. Consequently, since what I am thinking right now (namely, this entire thought within the double quotation marks) involves the word 'apple', I am not using reason to think what I am thinking." By denying he is using reason to think, Simon is being incoherent in thinking the preceding thought. To avoid being incoherent, Simon must reject the idea that he is in the simulation. For the similar reason, if we think we are in the simulation, we are being incoherent. More simply, to think that we are in the simulation is to be incoherent. Therefore we cannot actually think that we are in the simulation. Hence, we are not in the simulation. The whole paper is to flesh out the reasoning above.

The aim of this paper is to undermine or even refute the notion of predictability, especially the predictability of mind by examining three scenarios presupposing predictability. The first scenario is developed by Stefan Rummens and Stefaan E. Cuypers whose aim was to show that the general notion of predictability is self-defeating by indicating that there is a paradox in this scenario. I will point out that some restrictions must be made for the paradox to hold. By analyzing the second scenario, I will introduce my own argument to show that, if actualized, the predictability of mind would contradict two common senses about knowledge. The third scenario will show that, if actualized, predictability of mind would yield some oddity. I will also discuss how the predictability of mind would meet the problem of individuating thoughts.