Abraham Mounitz

On the Rational Basis of Revelation in Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption Abraham Mounitz Zefat Academic College Israel Abstract The present study focuses on ‘revelation,’ one of the three constitutive concepts, and possibly the most central such concept, in Rosenzweig’s philosophy. As opposed to its ostensibly religious meaning, the article offers a view of the rational element enfolded within this concept in Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption. By employing a textual exegesis based on a close reading of Rosenzweig’s language, the article seeks to show that Rosenzweig’s conception of revelation does not refer to an intuitive, Kabbalistic-mystical or esoteric concept. As a central pillar of Rosenzweig’s star-shaped method, revelation is the mediator between God’s love of people to a person’s love of others – which, in turn, is the basis for global redemption. The exposure of the rational-intellectual aspect of revelation thus advances the desired objective of Rosenzweig’s method, and accords with Rosenzweig’s own words when he suggested that “neither does it make the claim to be a philosophy of religion – how could it do that when the word ‘religion’ does not occur in it at all! Rather, it is merely a system of philosophy.” (see Franz Rosenzweig’s The New Thinking (1998), A. Udoff and B.E. Galli, eds., New York: Syracuse University Press, p. 69).

This exegetical article seeks to offer a close reading of Ecclesiastes that would allow us to surmount the difficulties associated with its exegesis. The book’s text is widely known to be replete with contrasts and antinomies that introduce a certain vagueness to its writer’s intentions. The article suggests that the reader should approach the book as if it was written as a first-person logbook which appears, superficially, to have been written in no logical order, at random, and at different times according to the order of the writer’s experiences and meditations. Such an approach would reduce the readers’ expectations for a logical order and would direct them to a deeper examination of the logical contexts scattered throughout the book. The article also presents the determinist con­texts of reality and their association with a wise person’s perspective as opposed to the randomness associated with a fool’s perspective. The writer’s sceptical descriptions of his encounter with reality and his first-person thoughts about this reality express an explicitly critical view of reality. The writ­er’s pre-reflexive doubt is thus nothing but a methodical doubt akin to Descartes’ pre-cogito doubts. An attentive reader will identify that the book’s text encompasses a reflexive/critical perspective on a sceptical view of reality. As such, the writer’s critical view voids the fool’s non-reflexive sceptical perspective (which is reflected in a superficial reading of the book’s text). The article’s close read­ing of the book thus posits a fool’s vanity which is a “vexation of spirit” (KJV) [re‘ut ruah․] among those who view reality as being coincidental. Conversely, it also posits a wise person’s vanity, which is a “vexation of spirit” [ra‘ayon ruah․], which critiques the fool’s pre-reflexive random view of reality as vanity and as a vexation of spirit [re‘ut ruah․]. This view of the wise person, whose “eyes are in his head” (2:14), is the true free will the writer is alluding to.