Abraham Sapien

**Abstract** This encyclopedia entry examines the philosophical nature of pain through three central problems: its epistemological status, its metaphysical constitution, and its motivational character. Drawing on phantom limb pain, pain asymbolia, and masochism, it discusses representationalist theories, evaluativism, imperativism, and desire-based accounts of unpleasantness. It explores how pain can misrepresent bodily states, whether pain is necessarily unpleasant, and why we sometimes desire experiences that hurt. The entry offers a critical overview of contemporary analytic philosophy of pain, emphasizing the relationships between perception, affect, motivation, and normativity.

In this article, we critically examine the implementation of what Carlos Montemayor calls Humanitarian Artificial Intelligence from a decolonizing perspective. We highlight the dichot- omy of optimism and fear surrounding AI, elucidating its potential to address fundamental human problems and the risks of monopolistic control. We critique Montemayor’s proposal to align AI with a human rights framework, arguing that it insufficiently addresses global inequalities. Our tripartite analysis focuses on the distribution of AI resources, language inclusion, and content diversity to ensure AI benefits all humanity. We emphasize the need for equitable access to AI, linguistic diversity in AI training data, and the preservation of marginalized epistemologies. We advocate for strategies to mitigate environmental impacts and avoid cultural imperialism disguised as altruism, calling for a balanced approach between private sector innovation and state regulation to foster a truly humanitarian AI.

Pain is unpleasant. Given that pain is the paradigmatic example of an unpleasant experience, I aim to shed light on what pain and unpleasantness are by trying to understand what it means for a pain to be unpleasant, what the structure of unpleasantness is, and by tackling several problematic aspects of the relation between pain and unpleasantness. By doing this, I will also provide a general account of what it means for an experience that might not be a pain to be unpleasant. The thesis is organised into seven chapters and divided by three main themes: i) what the unpleasantness of pain consists in, ii) how we can account for the great phenomenal diversity among experiences of unpleasantness, and iii) which cases suggest that there could be pains that are not unpleasant. Broadly, the first two chapters deal with the first theme, the third and fourth chapter with the second theme, and the fifth and sixth chapter focus on the third theme. In the final chapter I offer a conclusion of the three main themes by providing my own view on the unpleasantness of pain. According to this account, an unpleasant experience is something felt, it is a phenomenal property of mental states, and this property should be understood using the determinable determinate distinction. By doing all of this, this thesis will provide a detailed understanding of the nature of pain and unpleasantness.

This text proposes carnalidad as a new political principle, a possibility between solidarity and fraternity. While solidarity promotes support for those who are different, and fraternity is based on equality among members of the same group, carnalidad is understood as recognizing similarities among different people. These affinities are established across various dimensions that shape our social interactions: class, gender, group affiliation, preferences, values, existential conditions, among others. Carnalidad provides guides for more horizontal and realistic cooperation in contexts of inequality and injustice. The text draws on Mexican colloquial language and Latin American philosophy to offer a political conceptualization “from below”, anchored in contemporary urban popular experience. Finally, it argues that philosophical dialogue, as an educational practice, can foster dispositions of carnalidad, promoting an empathic and pluralistic form of citizenship.

Pain is unpleasant. Given that pain is the paradigmatic example of an unpleasant experience, I aim to shed light on what pain and unpleasantness are by trying to understand what it means for a pain to be unpleasant, what the structure of unpleasantness is, and by tackling several problematic aspects of the relation between pain and unpleasantness. By doing this, I will also provide a general account of what it means for an experience that might not be a pain to be unpleasant. The thesis is organised into seven chapters and divided by three main themes: i) what the unpleasantness of pain consists in, ii) how we can account for the great phenomenal diversity among experiences of unpleasantness, and iii) which cases suggest that there could be pains that are not unpleasant. Broadly, the first two chapters deal with the first theme, the third and fourth chapter with the second theme, and the fifth and sixth chapter focus on the third theme. In the final chapter I offer a conclusion of the three main themes by providing my own view on the unpleasantness of pain. According to this account, an unpleasant experience is something felt, it is a phenomenal property of mental states, and this property should be understood using the determinable determinate distinction. By doing all of this, this thesis will provide a detailed understanding of the nature of pain and unpleasantness.

You and I are going to die. We are aware that it is going to happen, but not exactly when—in which there is relief, but also anxiety. What happens to us when we know with some precision what our last day will be? In this text, we discern the process of our own death, once we have reliable information about the approximate moment of the cessation of our life. Tú y yo vamos a morir. Estamos al tanto de que va a ocurrir, pero no exactamente cuándo —en lo cual hay alivio, pero también angustia—. ¿Qué nos ocurre al saber con cierta precisión cuál será nuestro último día? En este texto, discernimos el proceso de nuestra propia muerte, una vez que tenemos información confiable sobre el momento aproximado del cese de nuestra vida.

Todos somos masoquistas. Esta afirmación puede ser entendida de dos maneras. En un sentido benigno o patológico. Según el primero, se trata de un hábito motivado por deseos masoquistas sin que éste constituya un perjuicio para la salud de las personas. En este sentido, todos, o casi todos, somos masoquistas. Este tipo de masoquismo puede constituir prácticas culturales, como comer comida picante, practicar deportes de contacto o participar en grupos BDSM. Por el contrario, el masoquismo patológico es aquel que, también incentivado por deseos masoquistas, resulta en daños para la salud de las personas, ya sea a nivel biológico, psicológico o sociológico. Un deseo masoquista está constituido por la actitud en favor de experimentar algo desagradable, como un dolor, en virtud de la relación, ya sea causal o mereológica, que se le atribuye a esta experiencia con algo más. Es decir, podemos desear sentir dolor ya sea porque este es el medio para un fin que también queremos o porque es deseado en tanto que una parte constitutiva de un todo anhelado. Una taxonomía del masoquismo nos permite dar cuenta de la intrincada interacción que tenemos con experiencias desagradables.

Varios teóricos han defendido que lo desagradable se puede explicar apelando a los deseos acerca de que ciertas experiencias no ocurran. En pocas palabras, las experiencias son desagradables porque no las queremos, y no al revés. Una crítica común para este enfoque toma la forma de un dilema de Eutifrón. Incluso si hay una solución para esta crítica, sostengo que este tipo de enfoque está limitado de dos maneras importantes. No puede proporcionar una explicación para: i) la motivación, desde el punto de vista psicológico del que se es consciente, ni ii) una justificación no instrumental, para tener los deseos relevantes. La falta de estas explicaciones es relevante ya que estas son precisamente el tipo de aclaraciones que esperaríamos de una teoría sobre lo desagradable.

In this thesis I provide an account of the unpleasantness of pain. In doing this, I shed light on the nature of pain and unpleasantness. I propose to understand the unpleasantness of pain based on the determinable-determinate distinction. Unpleasantness is a determinable phenomenal property of mental states that entails badness. I propose that an unpleasant pain experience has two phenomenal properties: i) the phenomenal property of being a pain, and ii) a phenomenal determinate property (u1, u2, u3, etc.) of the unpleasantness determinable. According to this theory unpleasant pains feel bad, and this explains why we are motivated and justified in avoiding them. This explains, for example, why we are motivated and justified to take painkillers. This theory allows us to account for the heterogeneity of unpleasantness, i.e., we can explain how different unpleasant experiences feel unpleasant even if they feel so different. The thesis is organised into seven chapters and divided by three main themes: i) what the unpleasantness of pain consists in, ii) how we can account for the great phenomenal diversity among experiences of unpleasantness, and iii) which cases suggest that there could be pains that are not unpleasant. Broadly, the first two chapters deal with the first theme, where I analyse two reductive accounts of unpleasantness: the content theories and the desire theories. I deal with the second theme in the third and fourth chapter, where I analyse different theories that try to account for the phenomenal property of unpleasantness. In the fifth and sixth chapter, I focus on the third theme, where I consider different cases that suggest the existence of pains that are not unpleasant. In the final chapter, I offer a conclusion of the three main themes by providing my own view on the unpleasantness of pain.

Several theorists have defended that unpleasantness can be explained by appealing to (intrinsic, simultaneous, de re) desires for certain experiences not to be occurring. In a nutshell, experiences are unpleasant because we do not want them, and not vice versa. A common criticism for this approach takes the form of a Euthyphro dilemma. Even if there is a solution for this criticism, I argue that this type of approach is limited in two important ways. It cannot provide an explanation for: i) the motivation, from a psychological conscious point of view, nor ii) a non-instrumental justification, for having the relevant desires. The lack of these explanations is relevant since these are precisely the type clarifications that we would expect from a theory about unpleasantness.

A fair amount of the philosophical discussion about pain and unpleasantness has focused on providing a constitutive account of unpleasantness. These theories provide a more fundamental description of what unpleasantness is by appealing to other well-established notions in the architecture of the mind. In contrast, I address the nature of unpleasantness from a structural account. I will argue for how unpleasantness is built, rather than what unpleasantness is made of, as it were. I focus on the heterogeneity of experience, which has been a somewhat neglected issue in the literature about unpleasantness: after careful introspection, there seems to be nothing phenomenal that all and only unpleasant experiences share. In order to address the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences, I propose that the structure of the rich phenomenology of unpleasantness should be understood as a determinable property constituted by multiple essential dimensions.