Ada Charlotte Bronowski

According to the work of Pierre Hadot, ancient philosophy is unique in that, unlike modern and contemporary philosophy defined as a speculative discipline constituting a system of truths (a wisdom sophia, or a science epistêmê), it is instead set out in terms of a spiritual training, a practice (a praxis) based on a form of asceticism (askêsis). It aims to transform its reader’s mind to put it in a different disposition. And this is done by exercises in self-transformation. Philosophy conceived of in this manner would be a “way of life (bios),” that is, the object of an initial choice experienced as a true conversion, an “existential choice.” The philosopher, first described by Pythagoras as the one who observes (theôreô), chooses the contemplative life (bios theôrêtikos), taking care of his soul rather than of his body. He is, however, the one who, being a scholar and a wise man, eventually has the vocation to take charge of political life and to show how the path he has chosen to take (hodos) is also an entrance on the world stage (parodos), by which he assumes his exemplary character. The chapter shows how, from this Pythagorean setting, Plato, Aristotle, and then the Cynics, Stoics, and Epicureans reformulate the scheme of the way of life, until the final reinterpretation of it by the Skeptics. It also proposes to show why the reduction of ancient philosophy to a way of life, or to a transformative experience, is nevertheless contested by the ancient philosophers themselves.

How can philosophy promise happiness through knowledge when the knowledge it provides shows us mostly how senseless and often horrible human life and society is? Is optimism ineluctably detached from reality? The paper examines the challenge of the optimistic outlook, first adumbrated by Plato, complexified by Epicurus, reaching its apogee in the eighteenth century, most famously with Voltaire’s derision of the view and his ironic reframing of optimism as a form of gardening. Stephen Gaukroger’s books are amongst other things, also contributions to the philosophical complexity of optimism.

Chrysippus says that if we do not make mistakes, we cannot philosophise. He thereby conceives of the activity of philosophising as diametrically opposed to the Platonic view: one that is uniquely accessible to ordinary people, leading ordinary lives full of error and vice. This has two consequences, that philosophising is not what turns a vicious subject into a virtuous one, and that the wise do not philosophise. If philosophy feeds on vice and difficulty, it is its pursuit which should deter us from giving up on life despite the hopeless sea of error we all, apart from the wise, are drowning in. Suicide is only for the supremely happy.

The article places Game of Thrones within a tradition of pessimism, reaching back to Blaise Pascal and coloured by Nabokov’s vision of birth as a separation between two voids. This lineage provides a philosophical thread to analyse the motivations and actions of the protagonists of Game of Thrones, in particular their relation to child-killing. The void looms large in the world of Game of Thrones as the unchartered space beyond the wall. It is the awareness of the reality of this void and the horrors it harbours which is shown to propel those who have it, to go to the greatest lengths to preserve the life of a child.

In this paper, Stoic epistemology is analysed in terms of how to achieve a stable grasping of reality through katalepsis. The paper argues that for the Stoics, this is a state accessible to any rational being because it is the upshot of a mental capacity we are necessarily bound to put into operation, namely that of experiencing and mentally ordering objects from the sensible world. The paper puts forward an original interpretation relying on a reconsidered notion of Stoic empeiria or experience. It connects the Stoic theory of the development of reason and formation of conceptions with a more fluid oscillation between belief and knowledge so as to establish a peculiar relation between reason and the Stoic notion of experience, articulating a form of rational empiricism.

On examinera la théorie stoïcienne des lekta en suivant les critiques formulées contre elle provenant de trois perspectives différentes : celle des Péripatéticiens, de Sextus Empiricus et celle formulée au sein même de l’école par Sénèque. Ces critiques se concentrent sur des questions relatives à une théorie du langage, mais une lecture minutieuse révèle que le cœur du problème réside dans un rejet profond de l’ontologie stoïcienne, constituée en partie, par les lekta. Les réactions des critiques tendent toutes à confirmer leurs propres positions, soit en rejetant la possibilité de présence réelle des lekta, soit en considérant cette présence comme négligeable. Ces confirmations de la validité de ses propres convictions se font par le biais de déformations ou de raccourcis faits à la théorie stoïcienne. En dévoilant ces mécanismes d’escamotage, c’est pourtant bien l’importance de la théorie des lekta qui est percée à jour, et les sérieux défis qu’elle pose aux théories rivales, en remettant en question le contrôle supposé de l’homme sur ses pratiques linguistiques, et en complexifiant la relation de la logique à l’éthique.