Adam Brownstein

We suggest that dual-aspect monism has a flaw in suggesting that there is an object or substance. A model of two types of nothing which intersect on a boundary recreates dual aspect monism. Taking the measurement problem seriously in light of logical positivism, the only possible explanation for the material side of the boundary is the existence of the material nothing. Likewise, reports on consciousness indicate that there is nothing behind experience, only the experience itself. Taking both elements into consideration; the material nothing and the non-material nothing; it is highly likely that matter is formed out of the intersection of these two types of nothing. We suggest that this model of two types of nothing answers the "why" component of the hard problem of consciousness, "Why does conscious experience necessarily exist?", but not the "how" component. We furthermore suggest that in rightly rejecting a conscious experiencer of experience, materialism has made the mistake of assuming there is a material experiencer of experience; whereas we point out that there is a third option, an experiencer of experience composed of two types of nothing.

We suggest that dual-aspect monism has a flaw in suggesting that there is an object or substance. A model of two types of nothing which intersect on a boundary recreates dual-aspect monism. Taking the measurement problem seriously in light of logical positivism, the only possible explanation for the material side of the boundary is the existence of the material nothing. Likewise, reports on consciousness indicate that there is nothing behind experience, only the experience itself. Taking both elements into consideration; the material nothing and the non-material nothing; it is highly likely that matter is formed out of the intersection of these two types of nothing. We suggest that this model of two types of nothing answers the "why" component of the hard problem of consciousness, "Why does conscious experience necessarily exist?", but not the "how" component. We furthermore suggest that in rightly rejecting a conscious experiencer of experience, materialism has made the mistake of assuming there is a material experiencer of experience; whereas we point out that there is a third option, an experiencer of experience composed of two types of nothing.

The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation is known to make the vagueness of the Copenhagen interpretation precise. What this actually means is that it offers a purely materialist framework for understanding quantum mechanics, as opposed to a dualist or idealist framework. The Copenhagen interpretation introduces conscious observers into its ontology and therefore lacks the precision of a materialist scientific theory expressible in terms of mathematics. The corollary of this is that using the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation as a proof by contradiction, it can be shown that if consciousness is not epiphenomenal but instead has causal efficacy, then the Born rule probabilities must be incomplete, and both the de Broglie-Bohm and Copenhagen interpretations are incomplete.

We suggest that the question of why is there something rather than nothing can be answered by the existence of two types of nothing. We propose that matter occurs at the boundaries of intersection of both nothings. This accords with the common view that there are three worlds; the platonic world of concepts, the material world (i.e. of matter), and the non-material world (i.e. of consciousness). Both the material and non-material worlds have their own type of nothing, thus leading to the proposal. The interpretation provides an alternative type of duality distinct from property or substance dualism, and may unify the two. The interpretation also has implications for the understanding of physical causation, and Mach's principle as the boundary of intersection provides a return to the aether concept.