Adam Chmielewski

Preview: /Adam Chmielewski interviewed by Eli Kramer / AC: In the nineteenth century, some people thought that the sciences should free themselves from the philosophical speculations from which they originated, and that philosophy itself, as obsolete, should be replaced by strict science. Gradually, however, the strict and uncontestable sciences resorted back again to the allegedly obsolete philosophy to understand what they are, what they are actually doing, and why. In other words, not only did science not replace philosophy but returned to it. That is why there emerged the philosophy of science and philosophies of individual sciences, e.g. mathematics, biology, etc. This applies also to urban studies pursued by a great number of specialized disciplines, but a need for a general, philosophical view of the nature of the city is increasingly felt by many people, urban specialists included. The role of philosophy in today’s urban studies cannot mirror the ancient one, which was much more foundational, as in Protagoras, Plato, Aristotle, or Zeno. But it does resemble it. A philosopher cannot pretend to be an architect, urbanist, or city planner. But he or she is particularly qualified to address the problems of how contemporary cities allow their inhabitants to satisfy their needs and ambitions; in other words, to what extent the city is an environment in which human life may flourish. Such questions may profitably be addressed by moral and political philosophy, as well as philosophical anthropology.

The global lockdown following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to generate all sorts of consequences: psychological, social, economic, and political. To hypothesize about what will emerge from the present situation is at this point both premature and impossible. The impossibility comes primarily from the gravity and vastness of this emergency and from the lack of intellectual resources to deal with the challenge. At the same time, however, the need to get a grasp of the condition in which we have found ourselves is both understandable and irresistible. One way of responding, at least partially, to the demand and its possible consequences may be to refer to the concept of abstract society, an idea formulated 75 years ago by the Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popper.

The aim of this paper is to submit the doctrine of methodological individualism to a reconsideration from the point of view of the arguments formulated by contemporary communitarian philosophy. I propose to approach the opposition between the individual and the community, constitutive for the liberal– communitarian debate, by means of two concepts, i.e. those of recognition and order. I argue that for the individualists a social order emerges through a process of mutual recognition of the pre-existing individuals and their interests, while the communitarians claim that the task of individuals is to recognize values and norms of a pre-existing social order which is to become their own. The difference between them thus resides primarily in the ontological distinction between the respective objects of these two divergent concepts of recognition. The argument is developed through an analysis of David Hume’s concept of the individual. In opposition to some communitarian claims, I maintain that his approach may be interpreted as an antecedent of the communitarian views on the subject. I also outline a view of moral rules as neither universal, absolutist, nor purely emotivist in character, but as social constructions endowed with the status of “contingent permanence.”

There are two competing pictures of science. One considers science as a system of inferences, whereas another looks at science as a system of actions. The essays included in this collection offer a view which intends to combine both pictures. This compromise is well illustrated by Szaniawski's analysis of statistical inferences. It is shown that traditional approaches to the foundations of statistics do not need to be regarded as conflicting with each other. Thus, statistical rules can be treated as rules of behaviour as well as rules of inference. Szaniawski's uniform approach relies on the concept of rationality, analyzed from the point of view of decision theory. Applications of formal tools to the problem of justice and division of goods shows that the concept of rationality has a wider significance. Audience: The book will be of interest to philosophers of science, logicians, ethicists and mathematicians.