•  7
    Dangerous Work, Intention, and the Ethics of Hazard Pay
    Business Ethics Quarterly 30 (4): 591-602. 2020.
    ABSTRACTIs offering hazard pay ethically permissible when the pay premium is the only reason that a dangerous job is accepted? Robert C. Hughes argues that it is not. Central to his argument is the claim that in such cases, workers intend the foreseeable risks of harm as a means to the pay premium. Herein I question the plausibility of this claim and then develop a conception of the concept of means sufficient to make it plausible. By so doing, I provide support for Hughes’s stringent position.
  •  6
    The Principle of Double Effect, Permissiveness, and Intention
    International Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3): 277-288. 2019.
    While some believe that the principle of double effect provides sound ethical guidance, others believe that it does not and have leveled various types of argument against it. One type of argument leveled against it proceeds by applying it to hypothetical “closeness” cases. This objection seeks to show that in such cases the principle permits what patently should not be permitted, and thus is unacceptable because it is too permissive. In this essay, I critically evaluate an argument of this type …Read more
  •  7
    The Principle of Double Effect, Permissiveness, and Intention in advance
    International Philosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.
  •  15
    Shared Intention and Cooperation with Evil
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4): 669-700. 2018.
    In a recent essay, Charles F. Capps takes issue with a permissive interpretation of St. Alphonsus Liguori’s influential understanding of cooperation with evil, and develops a more stringent interpretation. In response, I argue that Capps relies on a particular conception of what it is for a cooperator to share a wrongdoer’s bad intention, that this conception of intention sharing is not plausible because it is overly inclusive, and, that on account of this over-inclusiveness, it yields mistaken …Read more
  •  17
    Shared Intention and Cooperation with Evil in advance
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.
  •  19
    Autonomy and the Ethical Status of Comprehensive Education
    Educational Theory 64 (4): 393-408. 2014.
    On grounds of autonomy, is comprehensive education — an approach to education that attempts to facilitate the acceptance of certain beliefs and ways of life as being correct, and refuses to sympathetically expose students to contrary beliefs and ways of life — ethically suspect? Recently, Bryan R. Warnick has argued that it is. In this essay, Adam D. Bailey critically evaluates Warnick's argument, and contends that it is unsuccessful. In particular, he argues that Warnick's argument from necessi…Read more
  •  33
    Reconciling Traditional Morality and the Morality of Competition
    Business and Society Review 119 (2): 207-219. 2014.
    It is commonly believed that the moral norms of “everyday” or “traditional” morality apply uniformly in all business contexts. However, Joseph Heath has recently argued that this is not the case. According to Heath, the norms of everyday morality apply with respect to “administered” transactions, but not “market” transactions. Market transactions are, he argues, governed by a distinct, “adversarial” morality. In this essay, I argue that Heath’s attempt to show that competitive contexts are gover…Read more
  •  24
    On the Morality of Choosing Directly Against Basic Goods
    Heythrop Journal 56 (4): 643-649. 2015.
    A claim that is widely accepted and often invoked by philosophers working within ‘new classical natural law theory’ is that choosing directly against ‘basic goods’ is never morally permissible. In this essay, I address the question of whether one can coherently accept the fundamental commitments of new classical natural law theory and yet reject this absolutist claim. I argue that one can.
  •  64
    What grounds the moral significance of the intend/foresee distinction? To put the question another way, what reason do we have for believing that moral absolutes apply with respect to intended effects, but not foreseeable but unintended (bad) effects? Joseph Boyle has provided an answer that relies on the idea that persons can find themselves in situations of “moral impossibility”—situations in which every available option foreseeably will give rise to bad effects. However, Robert Anderson has p…Read more
  •  16
  •  26
    Anti-Discrimination Law, Religious Organizations, and Justice
    New Blackfriars 95 (1060): 727-738. 2014.
    In many jurisdictions the list of factors for which anti-discrimination law applies has been expanded to include sexual orientation. As a result, moral and legal difficulties have arisen for religious organizations whose basic beliefs include the belief that sexual acts between persons of the same sex are immoral. In light of these difficulties, is anti-discrimination law of this sort unjust? Recently John Finnis has argued that, as commonly applied, such anti-discrimination law is disproportion…Read more
  •  109
    Grounded in what Alan Wertheimer terms the nonworseness claim, it is thought by some philosophers that what will be referred to herein as better-than-permissible acts —acts that, if undertaken, would make another or others better off than they would be were an alternative but morally permissible act to be undertaken—are necessarily morally permissible. What, other than a bout of irrationality, it may be thought, would lead one to hold that an act (such as outsourcing production to a sweatshop in…Read more
  •  27
    Political Perfectionism and the Moral Acceptability of Pure Paternalism
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1): 95-112. 2017.
    In this essay, I argue against an important position in contemporary perfectionist political philosophy, which holds both that the state is instrumental in nature and that there are principled, rather than merely prudential, limits on the scope of state authority such that pure paternalism is not morally acceptable. By so doing, I provide a conditional defense of the moral acceptability of pure paternalism.
  •  16
    Confucianism-Based Rights Skepticism and Rights in the Workplace
    Business Ethics Quarterly 21 (4): 661-672. 2011.
    Must even Confucian rights skeptics—those who are, on account of their Confucian beliefs, skeptical of the existence of human rights, and believe that asserting or recognizing rights is morally wrong—concede that in the workplace, they are morally obligated to recognize rights? Alan Strudler has recently argued that such is the case. In this article, I argue that because Confucian rights skeptics locate wrongness in inconsistency with the idea of “Confucian community,” Confucian community should…Read more