Adam Katwan

Thought about the world is interwoven with thought about ourselves and about others. If, interrelations notwithstanding, self, world, and other are three topics, then the judgments p, I think p, and A thinks p differ in determinate content. A Realist, who affirms the antecedent, faces a set of puzzles as to how to understand the transition from p to I think p, or from A thinks p and p to A correctly thinks p. An Eleatic maintains, by contrast, that we can only make sense of these transitions if we treat p, I think p, and A thinks p as displaying the same thought in three different ways. The Eleatic, however, faces a corresponding puzzle about how to make sense of the transition from A thinks p and A is F to someone F thinks p. Resolving the difficulty, I conclude, requires articulating a conception of human singularity.