Adam Martin

ABSTRACT This article explores the relevance of classical Theravāda Buddhist doctrine to the present-day development of artificial general intelligence. Specifically, it addresses the interconnected possibilities of machine consciousness and machine agency. The first section consists of a philosophical exploration of the notion of artificial consciousness in light of ordinary language considerations. This is followed by a Buddhist theoretical account of the conditions necessary for the arising of consciousness, relying in good part upon the medieval Abhidhamma commentary, the Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha. Serious doubts are raised as to whether consciousness could ever be created in a machine environment. The final section examines the possibility of machine agency in relation to Buddhist understandings of action (kamma). Here, it is argued that if conscious machines ever were developed, whatever agency they might demonstrate would be amoral in nature and reflective of the values of their corporate and state programmers. Their development would pose considerable dangers to living beings. While the main argument of the article is made in Buddhist terms, it is supported throughout by more general philosophical considerations and with reference to some of the relevant scientific literature.

We endorse policymakers’ efforts to address the negative consequences of the attention economy’s technology but add that these approaches are often limited in their criticism of the systemic context of human attention. Starting from Buddhist philosophy, we advocate a broader approach: an ‘ecology of attending’ that centers on conceptualizing, designing, and using attention (1) in an embedded way and (2) focused on the alleviating of suffering. With ‘embedded’ we mean that attention is not a neutral, isolated mechanism but a meaning-engendering part of an ‘ecology’ of bodily, sociotechnical and moral frameworks. With ‘focused on the alleviation of suffering’ we mean that we explicitly move away from the (often implicit) conception of attention as a tool for gratifying desires. We analyze existing inquiries in these directions and urge them to be intensified and integrated. As to the design and function of our technological environment, we propose three questions for further research: How can technology help to acknowledge us as ‘ecological’ beings, rather than as self-sufficient individuals? How can technology help to raise awareness of our moral framework? And how can technology increase the conditions for ‘attending’ to the alleviation of suffering, by substituting our covert self-driven moral framework with an ecologically attending one? We believe in the urgency of transforming the inhumane attention economy sociotechnical system into a humane ecology of attending, and in our ability to contribute to it.

We endorse policymakers’ efforts to address the negative consequences of the attention economy’s technology but add that these approaches are often limited in their criticism of the systemic context of human attention. Starting from Buddhist philosophy, we advocate a broader approach: an ‘ecology of attending’ that centers on conceptualizing, designing, and using attention (1) in an embedded way and (2) focused on the alleviating of suffering. With ‘embedded’ we mean that attention is not a neutral, isolated mechanism but a meaning-engendering part of an ‘ecology’ of bodily, sociotechnical and moral frameworks. With ‘focused on the alleviation of suffering’ we mean that we explicitly move away from the (often implicit) conception of attention as a tool for gratifying desires. We analyze existing inquiries in these directions and urge them to be intensified and integrated. As to the design and function of our technological environment, we propose three questions for further research: How can technology help to acknowledge us as ‘ecological’ beings, rather than as self-sufficient individuals? How can technology help to raise awareness of our moral framework? And how can technology increase the conditions for ‘attending’ to the alleviation of suffering, by substituting our covert self-driven moral framework with an ecologically attending one? We believe in the urgency of transforming the inhumane attention economy sociotechnical system into a humane ecology of attending, and in our ability to contribute to it.

Analysing human cognition and decision-making has become highly relevant in information systems (IS) research. Yet, although the notion of cognitive biases has been studied for more than 40 years in psychology and other related fields, IS researchers have only recently expressed explicit interest in this phenomenon. Even more nascent is the IS stream that emphasizes the usage and understanding of biases in the favor of humanistic outcomes (e.g., the well-being of individuals) beyond previous scientific endeavors to pursue instrumental goals (e.g., the profit of companies). This fact is reflected in the recent emergence and call for digital nudges - influences that rely on heuristics and biases to guide individuals to beneficial decisions through modest adjustments of the digital choice environments. To advance the emergent research in this field, this thesis targets one of the major bias categories: the social bias (i.e., systematic errors that result from an individual’s interpretation of social cues). Within four articles, the thesis addresses the role of social cues as digital nudges in various IS usage contexts. The first two articles investigate how directly-traceable social cues can overcome service adoption hurdles: Precisely, the first article investigates how employing a verbal (i.e., platform self-disclosure) and a nonverbal social cue (i.e., message interactivity) in a conversational agent (i.e., chatbot) influence users to voluntary self-disclose private information (i.e., e-mail addresses). Moreover, the results revealed that the analysed social cues do not have individual effects, but in fact boost each other through their interaction. The second article deals with the application of various directly-traceable social cues (e.g., pictures of human avatars) as well as the role of personalized recommendations in financial advisory services to improve investors’ financial well-being. The results demonstrate that not only directly-traceable social cues but also recommendations can increase a user’s perceived social presence during the interaction, which in turn influences potential investors to invest higher amounts. The third article continues with recommendations as social cues, yet analyses them from an indirectly-traceable perspective and is devoted to investigating whether the source of the recommendation (i.e., seller or other customers) influences the acceptance of the recommendation in augmented reality applications to help customers in finding the best product for their needs. The findings indicate that customer recommendations reduce a customer’s perceived fit uncertainty of a product, resulting in a higher intention to purchase of a product that previous customers recommended. However, customers refrain from adhering to an automatically-generated recommendation despite recent technological advances that may provide more personalized and thus more suitable recommendations than generic customer recommendations. The fourth and last article examines the impact of displaying sold-out products on campaign success in reward-based crowdfunding. The valuable information indicate how potential backers make use of displayed sold-out product as social cues to derive information for their decision-making from previous backing behavior. In addition, the findings also showed that sold-out products do not have an impact on their own, however, their effect is also influenced by other factors in the environment, namely discount amount and the number of backers (i.e., another social cue). Thus, the article provides learnings for project creators on the design of reward option menus. Overall, this thesis showcases the variety and importance of social cues in numerous applications and is, therefore, to be understood as a first approach to expanding the understudied research field. Furthermore, the results enrich previous research and elucidate various underlying explanatory mechanisms of how and why biased decision-making takes place and how these mechanisms may be used to nudge users in directions beneficial for them and for the employer of these nudges. The overarching contributions of this thesis for research consists of (1) investigating the existence and effects of various social cues on user decision-making, and (2) probing social cues in several IS usage contexts with their unique circumstances and influences, not only in a vacuum but also in conjunction with other interacting variables. Additionally, this thesis provides interesting and sometimes even counterintuitive recommendations as well as actionable and generalizable guidelines on social cues that practitioners can easily apply to various contexts.

A close reading of the three Bhavanakramah texts, written by Kamalasila, reveals that their author was aware of two competing concepts of meditation prevalent in Tibet at the time of their composition. The two concepts of meditation,associated with the Sanskrit words bhavana and dhyana, can be related respectively to the Indian and Chinese sides of the well-known debates at bSam yas. The account of the Mahayana path outlined in these texts implies an acceptance of the precedence of bhavana over dhyana. In this paper I argue that Kamalasila advocated bhavana – a conception of meditation which encompasses non-conceptual dhyana, but which also includes a discernment of reality that is conceptual in nature. Such conceptual discernment should not be understood simply as a process of ordinary rational understanding but rather as constituting a special kind of meditative wisdom. A failure to recognize the subtle differences between Kamalasila’s employment of the terms dhyana and bhavana, along with his advocacy of the latter, could easily lead to mistranslation and, with this, a basic misunderstanding of his position. In particular, it could lead to a conception of insight that is overly intellectual in nature. Given the historically important role that these texts played in the formation of Tibetan Buddhism, the implications of such a misconception could be far-reaching. This paper attempts to clarify the key meditation terminology found in the Bhavanakramas as well as demonstrate the rationale for using ‘meditation’ as the default translation for bhavana.

The present article aims to explain Kamala??la’s understanding of the nature of insight, specifically considering it as the ‘discernment of reality’ -- a technical term identified with insight in the author’s well known Bh?van?krama? texts. I approach my analysis of bh?ta-pratyavek?? from three different angles. I begin by providing a rationale for its translation. This is followed by an account of Kamala??la’s reading of key passages in the La?k?vat?ra S?tra describing the process to which the term refers. Here the aim is to illustrate Kamala??la’s understanding of bh?ta-pratyavek?? as it is actually experienced in meditation. The final section examines bh?ta-pratyavek?? in relation to other important technical terminology employed in the course of making arguments against his historical rival in debate, the Ch’an monk Mo ho yen. By providing these three different perspectives on the same process it is my hope that both scholars and practitioners will be able to more fully comprehend and benefit from the instructions provided by the ancient master Kamala??la.

This paper aims to lay bare the underlying logical structure of early Buddhist moral thinking. It argues that moral vocabulary in the Pali Suttas varies depending on the kind of agent under discussion and that this variance reflects an understanding that the phenomenology of moral experience also differs on the same basis. An attempt is made to spell this out in terms of attachment. The overall picture of Buddhist ethics that emerges is that of an agent-based moral contextualism. This account does not imply that the prescription for moral conduct differs according to class of agent, but rather that the correct description of moral experience does. Further it implies that the descriptions of the moral experiences of different classes of agent differ phenomenologically, rather than in terms of overt behavioral characteristics. While most of the discussion is centered on the distinction between ordinary persons and disciples in higher training, the paper concludes with a brief exploration of the problematic moral experience of the arahat.

The present article aims to explain Kamala??la’s understanding of the nature of insight, specifically considering it as the ‘discernment of reality’ -- a technical term identified with insight in the author’s well known Bh?van?krama? texts. I approach my analysis of bh?ta-pratyavek?? from three different angles. I begin by providing a rationale for its translation. This is followed by an account of Kamala??la’s reading of key passages in the La?k?vat?ra S?tra describing the process to which the term refers. Here the aim is to illustrate Kamala??la’s understanding of bh?ta-pratyavek?? as it is actually experienced in meditation. The final section examines bh?ta-pratyavek?? in relation to other important technical terminology employed in the course of making arguments against his historical rival in debate, the Ch’an monk Mo ho yen. By providing these three different perspectives on the same process it is my hope that both scholars and practitioners will be able to more fully comprehend and benefit from the instructions provided by the ancient master Kamala??la.