Adam Matysiak

This article serves as an introduction to a theoretical standpoint in the interpretation of romanticism which, developed in the 20th and 21st centuries by the philosophers Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank (who sometimes call themselves the Heidelberg School), is little-known in Poland. At the centre of their research lies a philosophy of subjectivity, especially the notion of ‘self-consciousness’. Henrich devotes an important analysis to this issue in his essay Fichte’s Original Insight. It presents the central notion of this text, self-consciousness, form the perspective of the function of ‘I’ in literature. In the first part, the importance of self-consciousness and its explication in Fichte’s theory of knowledge are presented as important for early German romanticism. The author shows that the difficulty of making such consciousness explicit was a major cause for misunderstandings concerning Fichte’s philosophy. At the same time, this makes the theory of knowledge an interesting perspective on the problem of expressing subjectivity in language. Moreover, a cautious reading of romantic authors (Novalis, Friedrich Hölderlin), highlights the importance of self-consciousness in the formation of their poetics. In the second part issues connected to contemporary philosophy of mind are related to selected projects within literary theory on the grounds of inquiries concerning self-consciousness. The author argues that Henrich’s perspective envisions a sphere of subjectivity that makes for a valuable supplement or alternative for media theory, psychoanalysis, or deconstruction.

The article offers a brief introduction to the Polish translation of Sybille Krämer’s Symbolische Erkenntnis bei Leibniz (Symbolic Cognition in Leibniz). I situate the author’s argument in the context of both her research into the idea of formalisation and a wider discussion within Leibniz scholarship concerning the status of signs and symbolic representation in the philosophy and logic of the author of The Monadology. Further, I discuss Krämer’s analysis of the notion of expressio (expression). Her perspective allows for a better understanding of the difficulties Leibniz encountered in his discussion with Antoine Arnauld. Subsequently, I argue that her analysis avoids the attribution of strong ontological assumptions to Leibniz’s understanding of expression, contrary to what can be seen in the Polish reception of the philosopher. I conclude with pointing out the importance of Krämer’s research into Leibniz for the later development of the notions of cultural techniques and notational iconicity.

The article answers the question: to what degree is Johann Friedrich Herbart’s tendency to unify the object of psychology (subsequently abandoning faculty psychology) relies on developing intuitions of Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s theory of knowledge? In the first part, I discuss the topic of the article and justify the choice of Herbartian psychology as the object of investigation. In the second part, I present Herbart’s basic psychological texts. I present ideas stemming from the philosophical tradition, which Herbart introduces into his psychology: especially Fichte’s critique of the faculty theory and Kant’s conviction, that a theory is scientific only inasmuch as it is mathematized. I argue that postulating mathematization of psychology brings Herbart to a critique of faculty psychology, subsequently closer to a Fichtean perspective. In the third part I present a theory of consciousness, underlying Herbart’s critique, which cannot be reduced to the concepts of pre-Kantian psychology and metaphysics. I point out the origins of such theory in Fichte’s theory of knowledge, especially in his analyses of representation. I discuss Herbart’s critique of Fichte interconnecting the notions of representation and drive. I argue as well, that the notion of representation as analysed in Fichte’s theoretical philosophy remains important for Herbartian psychology. It allows transforming the the object of psychology into a system of dynamically and reciprocally conditioning rules. This change of structure allows to present psychic phenomena in quantitative categories, allowing for mathematizing psychology. I shortly discuss Herbart’s method of relations. I point out its connection to his theory of consciousness, but also its strong metaphysical implications. In the fourth part of the article, I briefly discuss such implications of Herbart’s psychology: the abandonment of the ego for the simple notion of the soul. I conclude with a question about the potential relation between Herbart’s concept of the soul and problems posed within German early romanticism.