Adam Takacs

This paper deals with the question of historical facticity in the phenomenological tradition. I argue that taking historicity into consideration in its factical constitution means transgressing the realm of the primordial or existential temporality. Following Ricoeur’s discussion of the idea of the “referential status of the past,” the question of the material foundation of historical meaning-formation, i.e., relation between temporality and materiality will be brought into the forefront of phenomenological investigations. It is with this context in mind that I argue that exploring the conditions of historicity with regard to its factical and material determinations should assume a realist position in phenomenology.

Husserl?s transcendental turn can be best regarded as a turn in his phenomenological models of intentionality. While in the Logical Investigations, he maintains a conception according to which intentionality is a structure of cognitive directedness in which objectification plays a formative role, in his later works the intentional relation is considered as a structure of consciousness founded on a sphere of purely subjective interiority. This paper 42 argues that if Husserl had extended the scope of his early phenomenological research to the problems of object formation in the domain of historical and cultural sciences, the radical subjectively oriented transformation of his theory of intentionality would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. We also argue that in Simmel?s theory of historical cognition and culture one can detect the elements of a theory of intentionality that can account for what is missing in Husserl, namely the attention devoted to the specific constitution of social and cultural objects. It is precisely the objective mediation through exteriorization and symbolization deployed in social and cultural values, and in historical time that constitutes the specificity of these objects which also conditions subjective experiencing, rather than remains dependent on it. nema

Existentialism and existentialist thinkers enjoyed sustained interest in Hungary under communist rule. From the late 1940s to the late 1980s, this branch of “bourgeois philosophy” never ceased to generate renewed attention. However, this reception was not subsumed into the ideological orthodoxy, nor was it simply destined to fuel Marxist–Leninist criticism. Whereas Georg Lukács’s polemics with existentialism in the 1940s set the agenda to embrace a highly critical reception, it was precisely Sartre’s influence in the 1960s that had opened the door for a more open-minded Marxist reading of existentialist thinkers in Hungary. This paper seeks to reconstruct the intellectual motifs and contexts that underlie this uncommon development. In focusing predominantly on the period of the 1960–1980s, I am particularly interested in exploring Lukács’s role in the changing attitude towards existentialism in Hungary; the controversies between various Marxist approaches dealing with existentialist thinkers and the ways which the influence of Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Camus in literary circles influenced the tenor of their philosophical reception. Through this exploration, I will seek to provide a deep insight into one of the richest intellectual landscapes of the philosophical culture in state socialist Hungary.

Cet article porte sur la question des conditions historiques et sociales de la démocratie, objet de réflexion permanent dans les écrits politiques de Lukács, et singulièrement entre 1945 et 1951, quand il s’engage dans les débats, en Hongrie et à l’échelle européenne, sur la situation politique de l’après-guerre. C’est aussi sous cet angle que Lukács développe ses idées en faveur d’une nouvelle forme de démocratie sociale. On reconstitue ici les arguments historiques et théoriques de Lukács contre la démocratie représentative libérale et et l’on présente la conception inédite de la démocratie socialiste qu’il défend. Mais on analyse aussi l’évaluation lukácsienne du fascisme et son rôle fondamental dans le discrédit de la « réalité politique » de la démocratie traditionnelle.