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78Experience and naturalismEuropean Journal of Philosophy 32 (4): 1334-1352. 2024.Much of contemporary metaethics revolves around the issue of “naturalism.” However, there is little agreement on what “naturalism” is or why it should be of significance. In this paper, I aim to rectify this situation by providing a set of necessary conditions on what positions ought to count as “naturalistic.” A metaethical view should count as an instance of naturalism only if it claims that there can be evidence for normative claims that is both public and spatiotemporal. I argue that, unlike…Read more
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2589Reviving the Philosophical Dialogue with Large Language ModelsTeaching Philosophy 47 (2): 143-171. 2024.Many philosophers have argued that large language models (LLMs) subvert the traditional undergraduate philosophy paper. For the enthusiastic, LLMs merely subvert the traditional idea that students ought to write philosophy papers “entirely on their own.” For the more pessimistic, LLMs merely facilitate plagiarism. We believe that these controversies neglect a more basic crisis. We argue that, because one can, with minimal philosophical effort, use LLMs to produce outputs that at least “look like…Read more
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220Fallibilism, closure, and pragmatic encroachmentPhilosophical Studies 173 (10): 2745-2757. 2016.I argue that fallibilism, single-premise epistemic closure, and one formulation of the “knowledge-action principle” are inconsistent. I will consider a possible way to avoid this incompatibility, by advocating a pragmatic constraint on belief in general, rather than just knowledge. But I will conclude that this is not a promising option for defusing the problem. I do not argue here for any one way of resolving the inconsistency.
Stanford University
PhD, 2023
Areas of Specialization
| Meta-Ethics |
| General Philosophy of Science |
| Ethics of Artificial Intelligence |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Education |
| Epistemology |