Adrián Herranz

Neo-republicans claim that domination is an interpersonal dependence relationship. Others reply that structures should be more central to republican arguments. This paper analyses these criticisms. Neo-republicans respond that structures can indirectly facilitate interpersonal domination. However, we require a picture of how structures are in place, are reproduced, and impact individual behaviour. I use the idea of emergence to conceptualize this. Moreover, this idea illustrates how certain social macro-phenomena create disempowerment over and above interpersonal relations. Thus, I argue that emergent structures sometimes give rise to systemic domination, where an agent lacks freedom in relation to a diffuse multiplicity of agents.

This paper discusses three theses of the neo-republican analysis of the market. According to the first, one of the advantages of the market is its impersonality, meaning that no one needs to be tied to others because there are multiple possible partners. If freedom is identified with the lack of personal dependence on the uncontrolled power of third parties, then the market promotes free and horizontal relations. According to the second thesis, market exchanges have something distinctive to preserve freedom because they allow participants to operate through offers instead of penalties. The paper examines various possible meanings of ‘dependence' and ‘independence' and argues, against the traditional interpretation, that personal dependence and penalties are significant aspects but not necessary conditions for domination. We can be exposed to uncontrolled power, thus to domination, even if we have multiple partners to turn to and without anyone being able to threaten or penalise us into accepting a deal. Finally, the third thesis asserts that market competition can nullify domination. The paper argues that domination could exist even with perfect competition. Nevertheless, it concludes by claiming that while we cannot take the three discussed arguments at face value, we must recognise their grain of truth. The market could disperse decision-making capacity, generating new opportunities and efficiency; however, to put it in a slogan: no decentralisation suffices without the effective dispersion of power.

One of the most relevant manifestations of precarious work is the dualization of the labour market, which involves a sharp difference between the unprotected workers who have a high risk of being unemployed and the protected workers who do not. As a result, it is plausible to think that there is some conflict of interest between groups of workers. Nonetheless, I argue that an adequate political theory must account for whether there are underlying affinities and capacity for collective action between the two groups. To explore this possibility, I first present the republican conception of the common good and then the labour model derived from it. Finally, I explain that, even in their current situation, these groups of workers still maintain deep shared interests.

Precarious work is a growing and alarming phenomenon. This paper analyses two of its distinctive normative features. First, precarity increases the risks workers face, blurring their capacity for prospection and lessening their security in accessing the opportunities associated with their jobs. Second, precarious work challenges workers’ collective action capacity. I will argue that both features threaten workers’ republican freedom. I develop the second point by presenting a conception of solidarity between workers and then showing how precarious work erodes it. On the one hand, when the labour market is dualised, precarity is distributed unevenly and the risks undergone by groups of workers are different. Thus, dual labour markets create a potential conflict of interest between the preferences of different groups, insiders and outsiders. On the other hand, various economic changes hinder workers from acting based on shared purposes due to increased coordination costs. To the extent that workers’ power depends on their bonds and collective action, primarily through unions, the eclipse of their solidarity leaves them powerless and thus increases their domination. Finally, I consider various scenarios that could boost workers’ collective power.

This paper addresses a neglected question in republican political philosophy: what are the conditions for a set of arguments to be considered republican? While republicanism traditionally confers a fundamental role to the democratic ideal of participation in decision-making, recent contributions argue that freedom could be promoted by facilitating exit where possible. The strong version of the latter argument states that when exit is possible, it constitutes the most important contribution to republican freedom, and it preserves the goal of isolating individual choices, i.e. it precludes collective decision-making from interfering with them, and so it intends to limit the scope of public concern considered legitimate. I examine this argument to discuss the boundaries and varieties of republicanism: (i) the boundaries establish that an argument should be couched and substantively articulated in distinctively republican terms; (ii) the strong version of the exit argument does not fall within the boundaries because it is in tension with core republican commitments to self-government and civic virtues; (iii) once we abide by the boundaries we may encounter a diversity of proposals differing on the more concrete level of institutional design and empirical assumptions – these are the varieties of republicanism.

En este artículo propongo una justificación de la democracia, y de la autoridad política derivada de ella, a partir del ideal republicano de libertad como no-dominación. Argumento que los procedimientos democráticos tienen valor por sí mismos porque son mecanismos de decisión donde hay libertad de forma recíproca. Después muestro que la autoridad debe ser adecuadamente controlada para evitar que exista dominación, razón por la cual tiene que concebirse como una relación fiduciaria, en la que los gobernantes actúan como agentes de la ciudadanía. Finalmente, establezco la necesidad de que los gobernantes cumplan con deberes fiduciarios y que los ciudadanos desarrollen virtudes cívicas. In this article I propose a justification of democracy, and of the political authority derived from it, based on the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination. I argue that democratic procedures have value in themselves because they are decision-making mechanisms where there is freedom on a reciprocal basis. I then show that political authority must be adequately controlled in order to avoid the existence of domination. This is why it must be conceived as a fiduciary relationship, in which the rulers act as agents of the citizenry. Finally, I establish the need for rulers to comply with fiduciary duties and for citizens to develop civic virtues.