•  9
    Bodily structure and body representation
    Synthese 1-30. forthcoming.
    This paper is concerned with representational explanations of how one experiences and acts with one’s body as an integrated whole. On the standard view, accounts of bodily experience and action must posit a corresponding representational structure: a representation of the body as an integrated whole. The aim of this paper is to show why we should instead favour the minimal view: given the nature of the body, and representation of its parts, accounts of the structure of bodily experience and acti…Read more
  •  52
    The concept of a structural affordance
    Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (2): 94-107. 2012.
    I provide an analysis of the concept of an “affordance” that enables one to conceive of “structural affordance” as a kind of affordance relation that might hold between an agent and its body. I then review research in the science of humanoid bodily movement to indicate the empirical reality of structural affordance.
  •  51
    Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness
    with Andrea Serino, Marcello Costantini, Alisa Mandrigin, Ana Tajadura-Jimenez, and Christophe Lopez
    Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4): 1239-1252. 2013.
  •  54
    Acting on (bodily) experience
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1). 2009.
    The complexities of bodily experience are outlined; its spatial phenomenology is specified as the explanatory target. The mereological structure of body representation is discussed; it is claimed that global spatial representations of the body are not necessary, as structural features of the actual body can be exploited in partial internal representation. The spatial structure of bodily experience is discussed; a structural affordance theory is introduced; it is claimed that bodily experience an…Read more
  •  34
    I tend to think of myself as bodily. Probably, so do you. Philosophically this takes some explaining. A candidate explanation is this: The bodily self is a physical agent. Knowledge of oneself as bodily is fundamentally knowledge of oneself as agentive; such knowledge is grounded in both experience of oneself as instantiating a bodily structure that affords a limited range of actions; and experience of oneself as a physical agent that tries to perform a limited range of actions over time. By con…Read more
  •  292
    Comment: Minimal conditions for the simplest form of self-consciousness
    In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Henningsen (eds.), The embodied self: Dimensions, coherence, disorders, Schattauer. 2010.
    Commentary on: Olaf Blanke, Thomas Metzinger, Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 13, Issue 1, January 2009, Pages 7-13, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003
  •  92
    Mental Activity & the Sense of Ownership
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 881-896. 2015.
    I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that cognitive accounts are p…Read more
  •  70
    Eric Schwitzgebel: Perplexities of consciousness (review)
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3): 497-501. 2014.
    A glance at the contents of this book might be enough to persuade that it is absolutely required reading for anyone interested in the study of consciousness. The discussion is replete with insight into a number of neglected topics: colour in dream experience (chapter 1), echolocation in auditory experience (chapter 4) and closed-eye visualisations (chapter 8). More familiar themes such as the spatial qualities presented in visual experience (chapter 2), visual imagery (chapter 3), the introspect…Read more