Adrian Stencel

What is a biological individual? This is a question that has been of interest to biologists and philosophers for a long time. The usual response is an attempt either to find a single, unifying concept (a monistic stance) or to justify the existence of multiple concepts, for instance, by referring to scientific practice (a pluralistic stance). In this paper, I adopt a pluralistic stance and focus on evolutionary studies. I argue that in the context of evolutionary biology we need to distinguish between two kinds of evolutionary individuals, based on the concept of common interest. I decouple this into common interest by necessity (CIN) and common interest by contingency (CIC), and argue that this division corresponds to two kinds of evolutionary individuals. To situate the framework I thus develop within the context of ongoing discussions, I then compare it with frameworks corresponding to other concepts commonly found in the relevant literature, such as those concerning units of selection and agency. The conclusion is that the ontology of evolutionary biology is more complex than often assumed, and that we should distinguish: units of selection, agents, and two kinds of evolutionary individuals.

This paper presents the philosophical implications of the position that we call mereological perspectivism. Mereological perspectivism asserts that determining whether a composite biological object constitutes a single unit (an individual) necessarily depends on the selection of privileged parts of the composite. First, we show how mereological perspectivism is used in several debates in philosophy of biology (biological individuality, ecosystem individuality). Second, we show the implications of mereological perspectivism for the general discussions on scientific perspectivism. Finally, we show how it can illuminate the debates about biological essentialism.

We propose that top‐down coercive mechanisms have played a role in the origin and maintenance of the Major Transitions in Evolution (MTE). Top‐down coercion has potentially been underappreciated due to the lack of a conceptual framework. Therefore, we provide a formalized top‐down coercion framework for the MTE. Our conceptualization of top‐down biological coercion is a loss of potential due to a constraint from the top‐down. We also present three case studies of coercive top‐down mechanisms in the evolution of eukaryotic cells, multicellularity and eusocial insect colonies. The MTE project studies the origin and maintenance of new levels of individuality in the biological hierarchy. Previously, the MTE has been conceived as a bottom‐up process. Our coercion framework provides new empirical questions regarding the origin of transitions and helps reframe discussions of fitness in the MTE.

According to the mainstream position in the bioethical definition of death debate, death is to be equated with the cessation of an organism. Given such a perspective, some bioethicists uphold the position that brain-dead patients are dead, while others claim that they are alive. Regardless of the specific opinion on the status of brain-dead patients, the mere bioethical concept of death, according to many bioethicists, has the merit of being unanimous and univocal, as well as grounded in biology. In the present article, we challenge such a thesis. We provide evidence that theoretical biology operates with a plurality of equally valid organismic concepts, which imply different conclusions regarding the organismal status of a brain-dead patient. Moreover, the theoretical biology concepts of an organism are very distant from the view on an organism that appears by way of bioethicists theorizing on death. We conclude that if death is to be understood as the cessation of an organism, there is no single correct answer to the question of whether a brain-dead patient is alive or dead.

Symbiotic associations have been studied extensively in recent years, focusing mainly on the potential benefits to the host. However, understanding the role played by microorganisms in the physiology and fitness of the host, an aspect of the subject that had been neglected for a long time, has now become an important goal of symbiotic studies. Among the interesting philosophical questions are the following: how should we study the impact of symbiosis on the fitness of symbiotic microorganisms? What framework should scientists use, and on what philosophical assumptions should such research be based? In other words, when does comparing fitness make sense? In this paper, I develop such a framework, and argue that these requirements comprise: (i) phenotypically similar individuals put in the same (ii) sub-environment and contrast it with another popular approach. Finally, I apply this to the symbiosis between the Euprymna scolopes squid and Vibrio fischeri bacteria to show how scientists should evaluate the fitness of symbiotic microorganisms.

One of the current problems in microbiology concerns the understanding of fitness in host-symbiont systems. A great deal of research and conceptual work has analysed how the host benefits from such associations; however, very little of this work has attempted to take the microbial perspective. Nevertheless, some scientists have argued that we should conduct more comparative studies of both microorganisms that interact with a host and their free-living counterparts in order to determine whether or not symbiosis is beneficial for these microorganisms. In this paper, by means of analysing heritable symbiosis as a case study, I intend to provide a different perspective on this subject. Mainly, I argue that asking how the fitness of a given microorganism was changed during the evolution of heritable symbiosis may be theoretically unjustified at both the early and late stages of this process. The reason for this, I argue, is that, during the evolution of heritable symbiosis, the fitness of a microorganism becomes incommensurable with that of its free-living counterparts because their contexts become radically different; therefore, comparing their fitness makes little sense. My analysis is driven by the use of the ecological concept of fitness; accordingly, my conclusions are bound to this specific interpretation of fitness.

The current strategy of searching for an effective treatment for COVID-19 relies mainly on repurposing existing therapies developed to target other diseases. Conflicting results have emerged in regard to the efficacy of several tested compounds but later results were negative. The number of conducted and ongoing trials and the urgent need for a treatment pose the risk that false-positive results will be incorrectly interpreted as evidence for treatments’ efficacy and a ground for drug approval. Our purpose is twofold. First, we show that the number of drug-repurposing trials can explain the false-positive results. Second, we assess the evidence for treatments’ efficacy from the perspective of evidential pluralism and argue that considering mechanistic evidence is particularly needed in cases when the evidence from clinical trials is conflicting or of low quality. Our analysis is an application of the program of Evidence Based Medicine Plus to the drug repurposing trials for COVID. Our study shows that if decision-makers applied EBM+, authorizing the use of ineffective treatments would be less likely. We analyze the example of trials assessing the efficacy of hydroxychloroquine as a treatment for COVID-19 and mechanistic evidence in favor of and against its therapeutic power to draw a lesson for decision-makers and drug agencies on how excessive hypothesis testing can lead to spurious findings and how studying negative mechanistic evidence can be helpful in discriminating genuine from spurious results.

This paper introduces the reconstitutor as a comprehensive unit of heredity within the context of evolutionary research. A reconstitutor is the structure resulting from a set of relationships between different elements or processes that are actively involved in the recreation of a specific phenotypic variant in each generation regardless of the biomolecular basis of the elements or whether they stand in a continuous line of ancestry. Firstly, we justify the necessity of introducing the reconstitutor by showing the limitations of other evolutionary conceptions of the unit of heredity, such as the replicator, the reproducer, and the Darwinian individual. We argue that these conceptions are based on the requirement of lineage formation, which we argue to be unnecessary for the existence of evolutionary heredity. In the second part, we introduce the reconstitutor, which we base on the concept of Stability of Traits, and illustrate how it covers cases of hereditary phenomena not covered by the previous accounts. Secondly, we illustrate how the reconstitutor could serve as a platform to rethink ecological inheritance and other forms of inheritance that have been recently introduced under the song/singer model of evolution.

An understanding of the factors behind the evolution of multicellularity is one of today’s frontiers in evolutionary biology. This is because multicellular organisms are made of one subset of cells with the capacity to transmit genes to the next generation and another subset responsible for maintaining the functionality of the organism, but incapable of transmitting genes to the next generation. The question arises: why do somatic cells sacrifice their lives for the sake of germline cells? How is germ/soma separation maintained? One conventional answer refers to inclusive fitness theory, according to which somatic cells sacrifice themselves altruistically, because in so doing they enhance the transmission of their genes by virtue of their genetic relatedness to germline cells. In the present article we will argue that this explanation ignores the key role of policing mechanisms in maintaining the germ/soma divide. Based on the pervasiveness of the latter, we argue that the role of altruistic mechanisms in the evolution of multicellularity is limited and that our understanding of this evolution must be enriched through the consideration of coercion mechanisms.

The aim of the present paper is to explore whether seasonal outbreaks of infectious diseases may be linked to changes in host microbiomes. This is a very important issue, because one way to have more control over seasonal outbreaks is to understand the factors that underlie them. In this paper, I will evaluate the relevance of the microbiome as one of such factors. The paper is based on two pillars of reasoning. Firstly, on the idea that microbiomes play an important role in their hosts’ defence against infectious diseases. Secondly, on the idea that microbiomes are not stable, but change seasonally. These two ideas are combined in order to argue that seasonal changes in a given microbiome may influence the functionality of the host's immune system and consequently make it easier for infectious agents to infect the host at certain times of year. I will argue that, while this is only a theoretical possibility, certain studies may back up such claims. Furthermore, I will show that this does not necessarily contradict other hypotheses aimed at explaining seasonal outbreaks; in fact, it may even enhance them.

Given one conception of biological individuality (evolutionary, physiological, etc.), can a holobiont – that is the host + its symbiotic (mutualistic, commensalist and parasitic) microbiome – be simultaneously a biological individual and an ecological community? Herein, we support this possibility by arguing that the notion of biological individuality is part‐dependent. In our account, the individuality of a biological ensemble should not only be determined by the conception of biological individuality in use, but also by the biological characteristics of the part of the ensemble under investigation. In the specific case of holobionts, evaluations of their individuality should be made either host‐relative or microbe‐relative. We support the claim that biological individuality is part‐dependent by drawing upon recent empirical evidence regarding the physiology of hosts and microbes, and the recent characterization of the ‘demibiont’. Our account shows that contemporary disagreements about the individuality of the holobiont derive from an incorrect understanding of the ontology of biological individuality. We show that collaboration between philosophers and biologists can be very fruitful in attempts to solve some contemporary biological debates.

Multicellular organisms contain numerous symbiotic microorganisms, collectively called microbiomes. Recently, microbiomic research has shown that these microorganisms are responsible for the proper functioning of many of the systems (digestive, immune, nervous, etc.) of multicellular organisms. This has inclined some scholars to argue that it is about time to reconceptualise the organism and to develop a concept that would place the greatest emphasis on the vital role of microorganisms in the life of plants and animals. We believe that, unfortunately, there is a problem with this suggestion, since there is no such thing as a universal concept of the organism which could constitute a basis for all biological sciences. Rather, the opposite is true: numerous alternative definitions exist. Therefore, comprehending how microbiomics is changing our understanding of organisms may be a very complex matter. In this paper we will demonstrate that this pluralism proves that claims about a change in our understanding of organisms can be treated as both true and untrue. Mainly, we assert that the existing concepts differ substantially, and that only some of them have to be reconsidered in order to incorporate the discoveries of microbiomics, while others are already flexible enough to do so. Taking into account the plurality of conceptualisations within different branches of modern biology, we will conduct our discussion using the developmental and the cooperation–conflict concepts of the organism. Then we will explain our results by referring to the recent philosophical debate on the nature of the concept of the organism within biology.

If there is a single discipline of science calling the basic concepts of biology into question, it is without doubt microbiology. Indeed, developments in microbiology have recently forced us to rethink such fundamental concepts as the organism, individual, and genome. In this paper I show how microorganisms are changing our understanding of natural aggregations and develop the concept of a Darwinian population to embrace these discoveries. I start by showing that it is hard to set the boundaries of a Darwinian population, and I suggest thinking of a Darwinian population as a relative property of a Darwinian individual. Then I argue, in contrast to the commonly held view, that Darwinian populations are multispecies units, and that in order to accept the multispecies account of Darwinian populations we have to separate fitness from natural selection. Finally, I show how all these ideas provide a theoretical framework leading to a more precise understanding of the ecology of endosymbiosis than is afforded by poetic metaphors such as ‘slavery’.