Adrian Villalba

In their recent article Solones, Solo Reproduction and Vice, Muralidharan and Savulescu successfully dismantle the “yuck factor” surrounding solo reproduction, and they argue that accusations of narcissism or hubris are insufficient grounds for prohibition. However, by framing the debate primarily through the lens of individual virtue and immediate harm to the offspring, they overlook a more profound consequentialist challenge. This response argues that the primary ethical danger of solo reproduction is not moral vice but ecological risk. Drawing on total and preference utilitarianism, I contend that while solo reproduction is not inherently immoral, its normalization poses a threat to the “Big Genome” which is the shared genetic patrimony of humanity. A reduction in genetic diversity risks compromising our species’ adaptability and resilience to pathogens and capacity for future medical innovation. Thus, while we should not ban the practice, bioethics must actively discourage it in favor of preserving the genetic commons.

The rapid advancement of assisted reproductive technologies has not only expanded the possibilities of human reproduction but also introduced crucial ethical and legal challenges, particularly in the case of posthumous conception. Existing legal frameworks, such as the one-year limit on using cryopreserved sperm in some European countries, often fail to address the emotional and practical needs of surviving partners, exposing significant gaps in current policies. This paper argues that reproductive autonomy should extend beyond death, ensuring that individuals’ explicit wishes regarding the use of their gametes or embryos are respected. To bridge this regulatory and ethical gap, we propose the development of reproductive wills, a legal mechanism designed to safeguard postmortem reproductive autonomy. By allowing individuals to specify their reproductive intentions in advance, reproductive wills provide a structured approach to balancing personal autonomy with the rights and interests of surviving partners and potential offspring.

Mitochondrial replacement therapy has been developed in order to prevent the transmission of mitochondrial mutations, yet it raises ethical concerns, particularly regarding the involvement of third-party DNA and the risks associated with donor procedures. This paper explores an alternative approach using synthetic DNA (synDNA) to construct mitochondrial organelles, thereby bypassing the need for donor oocytes and bypassing risks to donors. We argue that those who support mitochondrial replacement techniques as an ethically acceptable means of preventing the transmission of mitochondrial disease should consider the use of synthetic mitochondria as a preferable ethical alternative, should it prove technically viable. That this will be viable is more than we can demonstrate here. However, progress in synDNA technology suggests that it is not unreasonable to think that synthetic mitochondria creation is feasible, and perhaps even probable.

Mitochondrial replacement therapy has been developed in order to prevent the transmission of mitochondrial mutations, yet it raises ethical concerns, particularly regarding the involvement of third-party DNA and the risks associated with donor procedures. This paper explores an alternative approach using synthetic DNA (synDNA) to construct mitochondrial organelles, thereby bypassing the need for donor oocytes and bypassing risks to donors. We argue that those who support mitochondrial replacement techniques as an ethically acceptable means of preventing the transmission of mitochondrial disease should consider the use of synthetic mitochondria as a preferable ethical alternative, should it prove technically viable. That this will be viable is more than we can demonstrate here. However, progress in synDNA technology suggests that it is not unreasonable to think that synthetic mitochondria creation is feasible, and perhaps even probable.

INVOcell is an in vivo fertilisation device marketed as an alternative to in vitro fertilisation treatment. In this paper, we explore the ethical implications that arise when this device is framed as a type or process of ‘gestation’. We anticipate several effects that may be of ethical interest: marketing in vivo fertilisation as being comparable to traditional gestation may be misleading and even harmful to its users, but on the other hand, it captures a potential need to acknowledge and be more inclusive of those who wish to identify diverse reproductive experiences as gestative experiences. In light of these insights, we articulate the concept of ‘simulated gestation’ as a novel framework to explain, and potentially accommodate, the diverse ways in which assisted reproductive technologies are shaping people's ideas about—and desires for—gestation.

In this paper, we discuss the ethical concerns that may arise from the synthesis of human DNA. To date, only small stretches of DNA have been constructed, but the prospect of generating human genomes is becoming feasible. At the same time, the significance of genes for identity, health and reproduction is coming under increased scrutiny. We examine the implications of DNA synthesis and its impact on debates over the relationship with our DNA and the ownership of our genes, its potential to disrupt common understandings of reproduction and privacy, and the way in which synthetic DNA challenges traditional associations between genes and identity. We explore the degree to which synthetic DNA may further undermine overgeneticised accounts of identity, health, reproduction, parenthood and privacy that are prevalent in the public domain and in some areas of policy-making. While avoiding making normative claims of our own, we conclude that there is a need for reflection on the ethical implications of these developing technologies before they are on us.

Artificial gametes, derived from stem cells, have the potential to enable in vitro fertilization of embryos. Currently, artificial gametes are only being generated in laboratory animals; however, considerable efforts are underway to develop artificial gametes using human cell sources. These artificial gametes are being proposed as a means to address infertility through assisted reproductive technologies. Nonetheless, the availability of artificial gametes obtained from adult organisms can potentially expand the possibilities of reproduction. Various groups, such as same-sex couples, post-menopausal women, and deceased donors, could potentially utilize artificial gametes to conceive genetically related offspring. The advent of artificial gametes raises significant bioethical questions. Should all these reproductive scenarios be accepted? How can we delineate the range of future reproductive choices? A normative bioethical framework may be necessary to establish a consensus regarding the use of human artificial gametes. This review aims to present the current state of research on the biological roadmap for generating artificial gametes, while also summarizing proposed approaches to establish a normative framework that delineates ethically acceptable paths for reproduction.

In this article, I explore the ethical dimensions of same-sex reproduction achieved through epigenome editing—an innovative and transformative technique. For the first time, I analyse the potential normativity of this disruptive approach for reproductive purposes, focusing on its implications for lesbian couples seeking genetically related offspring. Epigenome editing offers a compelling solution to the complex ethical challenges posed by traditional gene editing, as it sidesteps genome modifications and potential long-term genetic consequences. The focus of this article is to systematically analyse the bioethical issues related to the use of epigenome editing for same-sex reproduction. I critically assess the ethical acceptability of epigenome editing with reproductive purposes from multiple angles, considering harm perspectives, the comparison of ethical issues related to gene and epigenome editing, and feminist theories. This analysis reveals that epigenome editing emerges as an ethically acceptable means for lesbian couples to have genetically related children. Moreover, the experiments of a reproductive use of epigenome editing discussed in this article transcend bioethics, shedding light on the broader societal implications of same-sex reproduction. It challenges established notions of biological reproduction and prompts a reevaluation of how we define the human embryo, while poses some issues in the context of gender self-identification and family structures. In a world that increasingly values inclusivity and diversity, this article aims to reveal a progressive pathway for reproductive medicine and bioethics, as well as underscores the need for further philosophical research in this emerging and fertile domain.

The notion of the human embryo is not immutable. Various scientific and technological breakthroughs in reproductive biology have compelled us to revisit the definition of the human embryo during the past 2 decades. Somatic cell nuclear transfer, oocyte haploidisation and, more recently, human stem cell-derived embryo models have challenged this scientific term, which has both ethical and legal repercussions. Here, we offer a legal perspective to identify a universally accepted definition of ‘embryo’ which could help to ease and unify the regulation of such entities in different countries.

Louise Brown's birth in 1978 heralded a new era not just in reproductive technology, but in the relationship between science, cells, and society. For the first time, human embryos could be created, selected, studied, manipulated, frozen, altered, or destroyed, outside the human body. But with this possibility came a plethora of ethical questions. Is it acceptable to destroy a human embryo for the purpose of research? Or to create an embryo with the specific purpose of destroying it for research? In an attempt to construct ethical and legal frameworks for the new era of cellular reprogramming, legislators and ethicists have tried to distinguish between different kinds of biological entity. We treat cells differently depending on whether they are human or animal, somatic cells or gametes, and on whether they are embryos or not. But this approach to the ethics of cellular reprogramming is doomed to failure for the simple reason that cellular reprogramming in itself destroys the distinctions that the law requires to function. In this article, we explore the historical trajectory of cellular reprogramming and its relationship with ethics and society. We suggest that the early hype of embryo research has not obviously fulfilled expectations, but since new avenues of research are continuously opening, it is hard to say definitely that these promises have been broken. We explore the forthcoming challenges posed by the creation of DNA from scratch in the laboratory, and the implications of this for understandings of identity, privacy, and reproduction. We conclude that while ethics used to seek answers in biological facts, this is no longer possible, and a new approach is required.

The recent publications reported in 2022 reveal the possibility of obtaining mouse embryos without the need for egg or sperm. These ‘artificial embryos’ can recapitulate some stages of development ex utero – from neurulation to organogenesis – without implantation. Synthetic mouse embryos might serve as a valuable model to gain further insights into early developmental stages. Indeed, it is expected for these models to be replicated by employing human cells. This promising research raises ethical issues and expands the horizon of ethics in regard to the development of the human embryo. From this point of view, we state some of the new open venues for bioethical research.