Radical Enactive Cognition challenges teleosemantic representationalism while proposing a naturalistic, content-free account of basic intentionality – “Ur-intentionality” – based solely on teleofunctional resources such as information-as-covariance and natural selection, a view known as Teleosemiotics. This paper argues that this appropriation is insufficient to ground content-free intentionality. Two problems for functional information-as-covariance are identified: the Determinacy Problem and t…
Read moreRadical Enactive Cognition challenges teleosemantic representationalism while proposing a naturalistic, content-free account of basic intentionality – “Ur-intentionality” – based solely on teleofunctional resources such as information-as-covariance and natural selection, a view known as Teleosemiotics. This paper argues that this appropriation is insufficient to ground content-free intentionality. Two problems for functional information-as-covariance are identified: the Determinacy Problem and the Distality Problem. Furthermore, teleofunctionalism fails to prevent Ur-intentionality from collapsing into a form of stimulus-response behaviorism, which Radical Enactivism itself deems non-cognitive. An enactive stimulus-response account is developed to show that teleofunctional mechanisms can explain adaptive behavior without invoking intentionality. The paper concludes that these issues pose a serious and previously overlooked challenge to non-representational, selectionist theories of cognition – the Hard Problem of Intentionality – and points to possible ways to deal with the problem.
