Adrien Barton

We provide a theoretical foundation for a formal ontology of artifacts based on the notion of a realizable entity: a property that can be realized in associated processes of a specific correlated type in which the bearer participates. This realizable-centered approach to artifacts aims to accommodate a wide range of artifacts, from technical artifacts (e.g., screwdrivers) to artworks (including ready-made artworks) and spiritual artifacts (e.g., amulets), making it applicable across diverse fields such as engineering, art, anthropology and archeology. It is motivated by limitations of function-based accounts of artifacts and the needs for a meticulous analysis of their intentional dimension. To articulate various usages of the term “artifact,” we introduce two key notions: canonical artifact (an entity intentionally produced for a specific purpose) and usefact (an entity intended to be used for some accidental purpose). We provide a realizable-based characterization of both, classifying intentions as a subtype of realizable entities. We argue that our realizable-centered approach is more general than three prominent function-based theories of artifacts: designer-based, etiological and systemic. We further demonstrate that our framework can be adapted to Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), highlighting its flexibility and broad applicability.

The relevance of analytic metaphysics has come under criticism: Ladyman and Ross, for instance, have suggested do discontinue the field. French and McKenzie have argued in defense of analytic metaphysics that it develops tools that could turn out to be useful for philosophy of physics. In this article, we show first that this heuristic defense of metaphysics can be extended to the scientific field of applied ontology, which uses constructs from analytic metaphysics. Second, we elaborate on a parallel by French and McKenzie between mathematics and metaphysics to show that the whole field of analytic metaphysics, being useful not only for philosophy but also for science, should continue to exist as a largely autonomous field.

We propose an axiomatic ontological framework for both informational templates and the substantial informational entities (named “fillers”) that can comply with such templates. The mereological structure of a filler is provided by its slots, following seminal work by Bennett and the mereology of slots approach by Tarbouriech et al. Templates are composed of placeholders satisfying an extensional mereology. The parthood relation between placeholders is mirrored into the parthood between slots of the fillers compliant with those placeholders, where if a filler x complies with a placeholder a, the relation of mirroring is an isomorphism between a subset of slots of x and the template-parts of a. Some placeholders are mandatory and are mirrored into slots that need to be filled by a non-empty filler, whereas others are optional and are mirrored into slots that can be filled by an empty filler. We discuss mereological sum among placeholders and slots, order considerations, the distinction between empty fillers and empty concretizations (such as spaces or silences), the notion of semantic compliance and applications to clinical documents, relational databases and linguistics.

Ontologies enable knowledge sharing and interdisciplinary collaboration by providing standardized, structured vocabularies for diverse communities. While logical axioms are a cornerstone of ontology design, natural language elements such as annotations are equally critical for conveying intended meaning and ensuring consistent term usage. This paper explores how meaning is represented in ontologies and how it can be effectively represented and communicated, addressing challenges such as indeterminacy of reference and meaning holism. To this end, instead of following the conventional approach of beginning with existing ontologies and working toward alignment or modularization, this article proposes a reversal of perspective: Taking the ontological term as the starting point and introducing a new structure, named “ontological unit,” characterized by: A term-centered design; enhanced characterization of both formal and natural language statements; and an operationalizable definition of communicated meaning based on general assertions. By formalizing the meaning of ontological units, this work seeks to enhance the semantic robustness of terms, improving their clarity and accessibility across domains. Furthermore, it may offer a more effective foundation for ontology generation and significantly improve support for key maintenance tasks such as reuse and versioning. This article aims to establish the theoretical groundwork for the proposed approach and to lay the foundations for future applications in applied ontologies.

Artifacts remain nebulous entities, notwithstanding their relevance to various domains such as engineering, art and archeology. In this paper we investigate the interconnection between artifacts and realizable entities, as illustrated by dispositions, functions, and roles within the framework of the upper ontology Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). More concretely, we propose the notions of canonical artifact (something that is intentionally produced for some purpose) and usefact (something that is intended to be used for some non-original purpose) which can correspond to various usages of the term “artifact”. We also characterize them in terms of intentional realizable entities and novel realizable entities: material canonical artifacts and material usefacts can be analyzed in terms of novel intentional realizable entities and a special kind of non-novel intentional realizable entities, respectively.

In this paper we provide an ontological analysis of so-called “artifactual functions” by deploying a realizable-centered approach to artifacts which we have recently developed within the framework of the upper ontology Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). We argue that, insofar as material artifacts are concerned, the term “artifactual function” can refer to at least two kinds of realizable entities: novel intentional dispositions and usefactual realized entities. They inhere, respectively, in what we previously called “canonical artifacts” and “usefacts”. We show how this approach can help to clarify functions in BFO, whose current elucidation includes reference to the term “artifact”. In our framework, having an artifactual function implies being an artifact, but not vice versa; in other words, there are artifacts that lack an artifactual function.

The notion of transparency regularly comes up in discussions about the secondary uses of health data. Few studies, however, examine the impact of the presence or absence of transparency on members of the public. This literature review responds to this gap in the scientific literature. It is the result of a secondary analysis of 124 texts from an exploratory review on transparency, following the PRISMAS-ScR guidelines. The results help to identify negative or positive impacts and associate these with certain communication components relating to secondary uses of health data. They also make it possible to identify the components associated with communication deemed transparent or opaque by stakeholders. Transparency, and more specifically continuity of communication, is strongly associated with increased trust and social acceptability, whereas members of the public generally perceive a lack of transparency negatively. This literature review also deepens our understanding of the potential negative impacts of transparent communication.

In 2013, Bennett proposed a mereological theory in which the parthood relation is defined on the basis of two primitive relations: a is a part of b iff a fills a slot owned by b. However, this theory has issues counting how many parts an entity has. We explore the various counting problems and propose a new theory to solve them. Keeping the core idea of Bennett’s slots, this theory introduces mereological relations between slots. This theory enables us to solve all known counting problems and to go beyond the limits of Bennett’s theory by theorising expected features of mereological theories: supplementation principles and mereological sum and fusion. The theory is illustrated on ontological issues on the nature of structural universals and informational entities.

BackgroundThe advent of learning healthcare systems (LHSs) raises an important implementation challenge concerning how to request and manage consent to support secondary use of data in learning cycles, particularly research activities. Current consent models in Quebec were not established with the context of LHSs in mind and do not support the agility and transparency required to obtain consent from all involved, especially the citizens. Therefore, a new approach to consent is needed. Previous work identified the meta-consent model as a promising alternative to fulfill the requirements of LHSs, particularly large-scale deployments. We elicited the public’s attitude toward the meta-consent model to evaluate if the model could be understood by the citizens and would be deemed acceptable to prepare for its possible implementation in Quebec.MethodsEight focus groups, with a total of 63 members of the general public from various backgrounds were conducted in Quebec, Canada, in 2019. Explicit attention was given to literacy levels, language spoken at home and rural vs urban settings. We assessed attitudes, concerns and facilitators regarding key components of the meta-consent model: predefined categories to personalized consent requests, a dynamic web-based infrastructure to record meta-consent, and default settings. To analyse the discussions, a thematic content analysis was performed using a qualitative software.ResultsOur findings showed that participants were supportive of this new approach of consent as it promotes transparency and offers autonomy for the management of their health data. Key facilitators were identified to be considered in the implementation of a meta-consent model in the Quebec LHSs: information and transparency, awareness campaigns, development of educational tools, collaboration of front-line healthcare professionals, default settings deemed acceptable by the society as well as close partnerships with recognized and trusted institutions.ConclusionsThis qualitative study reveals the openness of a sample of the Quebec population regarding the meta-consent model for secondary use of health data for research. This first exploratory study conducted with the public is an important step in guiding decision-makers in the next phases of implementing the various strategies to support access and use of health data in Quebec.

The massive increase of data generated by heterogeneous sources requires the development of computer tools enabling their semantic interoperability. Applied ontologies aim at fulfilling such needs. We will show in this article the central role that philosophical ontology can play for applied ontology, with a focus on biomedical ontologies; and reciprocally, how applied ontology can enlighten some classical issues in philosophical ontology, by considering the following question: Is disease a natural kind?

The notion of affordance remains elusive, notwithstanding its importance for the representation of agency, cognition, and behaviors. This paper lays down a foundation for an ontology of affordances by elaborating the idea of “core affordance” which would serve as a common ground for explaining existing diverse conceptions of affordances and their interrelationships. For this purpose, it analyzes M. T. Turvey’s dispositional theory of affordances in light of a formal ontology of dispositions. Consequently, two kinds of so-called “core affordances” are proposed: specific and general ones. Inspired directly by Turvey’s original account, a specific core affordance is intimately connected to a specific agent, as it is reciprocal with a counterpart effectivity (which is a disposition) of this agent within the agent-environment system. On the opposite, a general core affordance does not depend on individual agents; rather, its realization involves an action by an instance of a determinate class of agents. The utility of such core affordances is illustrated by examining how they can be leveraged to formalize other major accounts of affordances. Additionally, it is briefly outlined how core affordances can be employed to analyze three notions that are closely allied with affordances: the environment, image schemas, and intentions.

La pertinence de la métaphysique analytique a fait l'objet de critiques : Ladyman et Ross, par exemple, ont suggéré d'abandonner ce domaine. French et McKenzie ont défendu la métaphysique analytique en affirmant qu'elle développe des outils qui pourraient s'avérer utiles pour la philosophie de la physique. Dans cet article, nous montrons dans un premier temps que cette défense heuristique de la métaphysique peut être étendue au domaine scientifique de l'ontologie appliquée, qui utilise des théories et outils issus de la métaphysique analytique. Dans un deuxième temps, nous développons le parallèle que font French et McKenzie entre les mathématiques et la métaphysique pour montrer que l'ensemble du domaine de la métaphysique analytique, étant donné son utilité non seulement pour la philosophie mais également pour la science, devrait continuer à exister en tant que domaine largement autonome.

Risk is an ubiquitous entity in the biomedical domain. Thus, a coherent ontological characterization of risk, which can be used by informatical tools named "applied ontologies", is necessary to help with the exchange and the collection of data for clinical and research uses. We analyze some definitions of risk and draw two general characteristics that risks and dispositions share. We thus suggest that a risk is a disposition which has an undesirable realization for an agent. This definition conciliates the objective dimension and the subjective dimension of risk : a risk exist independantly of our knowledge about it, but the status of risk of a given disposition for an agent depends of the preferences of this agent.

The relevance of analytic metaphysics has come under criticism: Ladyman & Ross, for instance, have suggested do discontinue the field. French & McKenzie have argued in defense of analytic metaphysics that it develops tools that could turn out to be useful for philosophy of physics. In this article, we show first that this heuristic defense of metaphysics can be extended to the scientific field of applied ontology, which uses constructs from analytic metaphysics. Second, we elaborate on a parallel by French & McKenzie between mathematics and metaphysics to show that the whole field of analytic metaphysics, being useful not only for philosophy but also for science, should continue to exist as a largely autonomous field.

I investigate whether tobacco health warnings’ interference with autonomy is ethically justifiable in order to deter people from smoking. I dissociate first the informational role and the persuasive role of tobacco health warnings and show that both roles enable typical addicted smokers to better rule themselves, fostering their autonomy. The fact that some messages address people’s non-deliberative faculties is therefore compensated by a larger positive influence on their autonomy. However, misleading messages are not ethically justified and should be avoided. Tobacco health warnings’ effect on autonomy highlights an important difference between libertarian paternalism and classical paternalism.