•  11
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2): 486-496. 2021.
  •  20
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2): 459-463. 2021.
  •  18
    Proleptic Reasons
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11. 2016.
    Sometimes we engage in a pursuit before we can fully access its value. When we embark upon, for example, the project of coming to appreciate classical music, we make a foray into a new domain of value. The chapter introduces a new kind of reason—a proleptic reason—to rationalize such large-scale transformative pursuits. The proleptic reasoner is aware of the defect in her appreciation of some value, and feels the need to improve. It is explained that the work done by proleptic reasons cannot be …Read more
  •  37
    Socrates says that everyone desires the good. Does he mean that people desire what appears to them to be good? Or does he mean that they desire what really is good? This article argues, with reference passages in the Meno and Gorgias, that these alternatives are less opposed than they seem: each identifies something Socrates takes to be a necessary but insufficient condition on desiring. If what we desire must both be and appear to us to be good, then people desire a subset of the things they ta…Read more
  •  4
    Aspiration by Agnes Callard locates standing assumptions in the theory of rationality, moral psychology and autonomy that preclude the possibility of working to acquire new values. The book also explains what changes need to be made if we are to make room for this form of agency, which I call aspiration.
  •  40
    Liberal education and the possibility of valuational progress
    Social Philosophy and Policy 34 (2): 1-22. 2017.
  •  1
    Ignorance and Akrasia-Denial in the Protagoras
    Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 47 31-80. 2014.
  •  45
    Enkratēs Phronimos
    Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (1): 31-63. 2017.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 1 Seiten: 31-63.
  •  60
    The Weaker Reason
    The Harvard Review of Philosophy 22 68-83. 2015.