Agnes Callard

Sometimes we engage in a pursuit before we can fully access its value. When we embark upon, for example, the project of coming to appreciate classical music, we make a foray into a new domain of value. The chapter introduces a new kind of reason—a proleptic reason—to rationalize such large-scale transformative pursuits. The proleptic reasoner is aware of the defect in her appreciation of some value, and feels the need to improve. It is explained that the work done by proleptic reasons cannot be done by more familiar kinds of reasons. The implications of proleptic rationality for reasons-internalism are considered. Internalists hold that what I have reason to do can be arrived at by a procedurally rational extrapolation from my current desires. However, because the act of learning some new form of valuation cannot be analyzed as satisfying the values one already has, proleptic reasons are not internal.

This chapter argues that Socrates does not, in fact, deny the possibility of _akrasia_ in the _Protagoras_. Instead, he offers a new conception of _akrasia_. On the standard conception, akratics ϕ, while believing that it is bad to ϕ. On Socrates' conception, akratics ϕ, believing it is good to ϕ, but falsely taking themselves to believe that it is bad to ϕ. Socrates' innovation comes in his understanding of the nature of that false self-ascription: akratics mistake a belief that ϕ-ing is good for what is in fact a meresimulacrum (_phantasma_) that ϕ-ing is good. The chapter first offers a new reading of Socrates' famous ‘ridiculous’ argument (355a-357e), on which simulacrum-belief confusion emerges as the Socratic account of _akrasia_. It then applies Socrates' analysis of _akrasia_ as simulacrum-belief confusion to Plato's own vivid description of _akrasia_ in Alcibiades' speech in the _Symposium_, thereby defending the Socratic account as viable and psychologically realistic. Finally, it identifies Socrates' real target in the _Protagoras_: he is trying to refute, not the phenomenon of _akrasia_, but the defective account of knowledge (‘the container view’) that produces the standard conception of _akrasia_.

Central to Aristotelian ethics is the process of habituation by which agents acquire virtue. Aristotle holds that we become virtuous by performing virtuous actions—but he also holds that in order to perform virtuous actions, one must be virtuous. I explain that the Aristotelian account of habituation is not a closed circle, but rather a positive feedback loop relying on Aristotle’s division of the soul into an affective and intellectual part. When I act virtuously, my intellectual part shapes my affective part, regulating my feelings; and my affective part, thus improved, can act on my intellectual part, making me receptive to increases in my ethical knowledge; increases which in turn improve the ability of my intellect to regulate my feelings; and so on.

Practical reason is the means by which beliefs and desires come together to produce actions. Practical rationality is difficult because we have many beliefs and many desires, and they often pull us in conflicting directions. The theory of practical reason must explain the fact that desires can conflict with one another, and the fact that we can act against our all‐things‐considered judgment (weakness of will, akrasia, and incontinence). The standard explanation of these facts invokes some form of partitioning among desires. Davidson's view creates, by contrast, a partition within practical reason itself. He distinguishes between forms of rationality that are constitutive of action, and forms of rationality that are normative standard from which action can fall short. Davidson's “principle of continence,” a rule against weakness of will, is such a principle: it is required for acting well, but not for acting.

Sometimes we engage in a pursuit before we can fully access its value. When we embark upon, for example, the project of coming to appreciate classical music, we make a foray into a new domain of value. The chapter introduces a new kind of reason—a proleptic reason—to rationalize such large-scale transformative pursuits. The proleptic reasoner is aware of the defect in her appreciation of some value, and feels the need to improve. It is explained that the work done by proleptic reasons cannot be done by more familiar kinds of reasons. The implications of proleptic rationality for reasons-internalism are considered. Internalists hold that what I have reason to do can be arrived at by a procedurally rational extrapolation from my current desires. However, because the act of learning some new form of valuation cannot be analyzed as satisfying the values one already has, proleptic reasons are not internal.

Socrates says that everyone desires the good. Does he mean that people desire what appears to them to be good? Or does he mean that they desire what really is good? This article argues, with reference passages in the Meno and Gorgias, that these alternatives are less opposed than they seem: each identifies something Socrates takes to be a necessary but insufficient condition on desiring. If what we desire must both be and appear to us to be good, then people desire a subset of the things they take themselves to desire, and a subset of the things that really are good. Pointing this out to people incites them to inquire about the good, since they will be motivated to discover which appearances are mistaken and which goods they have missed out on. This explains why Socrates so frequently asserts that everyone desires the good: it serves his protreptic purposes.

Abstract:This essay discusses two ways in which an agent can make progress with respect to value: self-cultivation and aspiration. The self-cultivator becomes a more coherent version of the person she was before, acquiring beliefs or desires or habits or skills that serve her antecedent valuational condition. The aspirant, by contrast, acquires new values. The existence of aspiration is under pressure from those who would assimilate it either to self-cultivation, or to a change in value that is done to a person rather than a change that is her own work. I show that those two options cannot be exhaustive by discussing liberal arts education; it is, I argue, paradigmatically aspirational.