•  1
    A Case for Political Epistemic Trust
    In Kevin Vallier & Michael Weber (eds.), Social Trust: Foundational and Philosophical Issues, Routledge. pp. 220-241. 2021.
    There is a widely recognized dilemma of political epistemic trust. While the public needs to rely on the testimonies of epistemic authorities (e.g. politicians, policymakers, and scientists), it is risky to do so. One source of risk is self-interest. Epistemic authorities are prone to abuse the trust placed in them by misinforming the public for material and social gain. To reap the benefits of trust and mitigate the risk of abuse, liberal political theorists adopt the strategy of cultivating vi…Read more
  •  17
    The Legitimacy of Groups: Toward a We-Reasoning View
    Analyse & Kritik 42 (2): 343-368. 2020.
    In liberal political philosophy, a prevalent view holds that groups are typically voluntary associations. Members of voluntary associations can accept, revise or reject group practices as a matter of choice. In this article, I challenge this view. Appealing to the concept of joint commitment developed in philosophy of social science, I argue that individuals who jointly commit their wills to a goal or a belief form a ‘We’-group. Members of ‘We’-groups are under an obligation to defer to ‘Our’ wi…Read more
  •  669
    Why Moral Reasoning Is Insufficient for Moral Progress
    Journal of Political Philosophy 28 (1): 73-96. 2020.
    A lively debate in the literature on moral progress concerns the role of practical reasoning: Does it enable or subvert moral progress? Rationalists believe that moral reasoning enables moral progress, because it helps enhance objectivity in thinking, overcome unruly sentiments, and open our minds to new possibilities. By contrast, skeptics argue that moral reasoning subverts moral progress. Citing growing empirical research on bias, they show that objectivity is an illusion and that moral reaso…Read more