Ahmad Rajabi

With reference to previous research on the relation between Heidegger’s thought and Neoplatonism, this investigation seeks to show concisely how—despite the profound distance between the finitude of Dasein and Plotinus’ doctrine of the divine Nous—there exists a fundamental correspondence regarding their ontological structure. This correspondence may be described as a phenomenological principle of the necessary precedence of the pre- determinate and pre-present horizon over the ecstatic openness. That is to say, there must already be a primordial horizon through which openness to beings as presence becomes possible at all. By examining this structure in both the early and later Heidegger, and through a phenomenological approach to Plotinus’s doctrine of the Nous’ self- determination in its turning toward the One, the paper argues that a common fundamental paradigm of rationality can be discerned, i.e. a mode of thinking that is no longer metaphysical in the onto-theological sense, yet capable of unifying within itself the two essential moments of ecstatic openness and self-determination.

In this paper, I aim to demonstrate what the construct of God means in Heidegger’s thought, how it relates to the structure of fundamental ontology, and in what way—given Heidegger’s principal claim in his critique of metaphysics as onto-theology—it leads to failure and self-subversion, thereby rendering his philosophical "turn" both necessary and justifiable. The inquiry proceeds in three stages: first, an interpretation of Heidegger’s critique of the metaphysical construct of God as pure presence, under which the self-referential and reflective structure of presence reduces the sameness of Being and intellect to their equality. Second, an interpretation of the construct of God based on temporality, as developed in Heidegger’s pre-turn understanding of temporality as the Clearing (Lichtung) and origin of ontology. By positing existential sameness in the structural unity of Dasein’s existence as temporality, Heidegger remains entangled in the reflective model of pure presence. Thus, for him, the construct of God retains validity and meaning only within the realm of faith, not philosophy. The third part explores the failure of existential sameness and the necessity of Heidegger’s transcendence —after the turn— from temporality as the origin of ontology toward the precedence of the Clearing over Dasein, and the resulting transformation in his understanding of divinity.

This cross-cultural study undertakes a comparative analysis of Hegel's concept of Geist as Absolute Immanent Totality and Ibn 'Arabi's mystical doctrine of the Unity of Being, characterized by absolute Transcendence and Hiddenness. By establishing a con- nection with Plato's notion of "the One" as "beyond Being" (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας), which aligns with negative theology where the One surpasses all definition, this research critiques Hegel's totality, questioning its status as the absolute and examining the philo- sophical necessity of transcending it to reach "the One." This critique not only highlights the limitations of Hegelian thought but also elucidates the philosophical underpinnings of absolute hiddenness in Islamic mysticism. Ultimately, this study seeks to bridge the gap between philosophy and mysticism, demonstrating an argumentative framework for inte- grating mystical insight into philosophical discourse.

This cross-cultural study undertakes a comparative analysis of Hegel's concept of Geist as Absolute Immanent Totality and Ibn 'Arabi's mystical doctrine of the Unity of Being, characterized by absolute Transcendence and Hiddenness. By establishing a con- nection with Plato's notion of "the One" as "beyond Being" (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας), which aligns with negative theology where the One surpasses all definition, this research critiques Hegel's totality, questioning its status as the absolute and examining the philo- sophical necessity of transcending it to reach "the One." This critique not only highlights the limitations of Hegelian thought but also elucidates the philosophical underpinnings of absolute hiddenness in Islamic mysticism. Ultimately, this study seeks to bridge the gap between philosophy and mysticism, demonstrating an argumentative framework for inte- grating mystical insight into philosophical discourse.

Abstract: In this paper, the fundamental role of time in the possibility of the synthesis of the two sides of synthetic a priori judgment or pure synthesis, i.e. the pure intuition and the pure concept, will be discussed, in order to reveal the structural unity between them based on their common ground. The possibility of the pure synthesis indicates the possibility of unifying time as the pure comprehensive intuition on the one hand and pure Ego as the transcendental unity of apperception on the other. The unity of apperception on its part is the ground of the unity of all concepts of the understanding. The transcendental imagination unifies pure intuition and pure concept, thus the sought structural unity appears in the structure of the transcendental imagination as the mediation between receptivity of the intuition and spontaneity of the understanding. We attempt in this paper to disclose the possibility of this mediation and thus – with reference to Heidegger’s interpretation of the Kantian transcendental imagination - the original and unspoken structural unity between time and the transcendental Ego on the basis of the fundamental structure of pure intuition of time as self-affection or spontaneous receptivity. According to this structure, Kant’s transcendental philosophy can be founded on the subjectivity of finite subject.

In the lecture History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena Heidegger levels an immanent phenomenological criticism at Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. In the lecture, Heidegger accuses Husserl that he neglects to raise two fundamental questions for the phenomenology: the question concerning the specific manner of being of the intentional acts in particular and the manner of being as such in general. By his criticism, Heidegger returns to the starting point of Husserl‘s phenomenology, i.e. the shift from natural attitude to transcendental attitude, and thereby reaching his own understanding of the matter of phenomenology. As is well known, Heidegger substitutes the Dasein for the transcendental consciousness and refuses the Husserl’s epoché and his transcendental reduction. In the following paper, on the contrary, we attempt to interpret Heidegger’s criticism in another way, which is that Heidegger adopts not only the transcendental reduction but also the absolute transcendental subjectivity. To put it more precisely, Heidegger radicalizes the absoluteness of the absolute transcendental subjectivity in Husserl’s Philosophy so much that he will be able to eliminate the Husserl’s natural attitude as a non-phenomenological and dogmatic starting point for the phenomenology. Accordingly, we claim that Heidegger’s Dasein is substituted for the absoluteness of subjectivity and the finitude of human existence simultaneously.

In Being and Time, Heidegger does not specifically thematize the concept of finitude, but he assumes a specific ontological meaning for this concept which is made briefly explicit in the explanation of the priority of future in the authentic timeliness as the “originary finitude of timeliness”. In this paper, on the basis of the phenomenological absolute precedence of Dasein over all beings, the concept of originary finitude will be distinguished from the ordinary and ontical conception of finitude. The ontical conception of finitude is primarily related to the fact, that Dasein is situated in the middle of beings. The distinction between the ordinary and originary finitude is emphasized on the basis of the fundamental distinction between timeliness and Being within-time. The last distinction makes the primary difference between Being-in-the-world and Being within-the-world ontologically possible. Accordingly, the distinction between ontical and ontological finitude enables us to disclose the specific ontological meaning of finitude as the origin of timeliness by the interpretation of the relation between the exsistential analysis of death and the disclosedness of Dasein. The originary finitude will be reached in relation with the authentic future in timeliness and will be finally regarded as the condition of the possibility of the disclosedness and encountering.

In this paper, I attempt to interpret Gadamer’s critical approach to Heidegger’s conception of tradition and language of metaphysics. This interpretation is based on finding the ground of this critique in their different understandings concerning the problem of the finitude of truth. That problem signifies the unavailability of the ground of the phenomenality of phenomena and the impossibility of founding of the ontological truth on the absolute presence in its immediacy or total mediation. According to a brief interpretation of the finitude of the event of truth in Heidegger’s later thought with reference to the basic concept of “facticity”, I attempt to reveal how Gadamer essentially modifies the Heideggerian central idea of abyss, i.e. the concealment of event of truth, and its unavailability for metaphysical concepts, and how he negates the transcending origin of Heidegger’s later thinking concerning the metaphysics and thereby leads the finitude of truth back to traditionally metaphysical concepts. It will be illuminated firstly through Gadamer’s interpretation of facticity as belonging to tradition in his theory of history of influence with reference to Hegel, i.e. the identification of truth with “the whole” and understanding of this whole as history; secondly through the interpretation of the finitude of truth as a permanent unfinished process of total unification in the dialogue between our understanding and the historical tradition with reference to the concepts of “perspective” and “horizon” in Husserl’s phenomenology of perception.

In this paper, I attempt to explain the systematic position of the Divine within Heidegger’s thought in a necessary relation with the ontological difference and the initial origin of Phenomenology To achieve this, it is necessary to overcome the dichotomy Heidegger posits between the metaphysical God and the divine God. On the one hand, Heidegger’s conception of the metaphysical God is essentially related to the Aristotelian-Scholastic notion of ‘arche’ as the highest being; and thus, it doesn't embrace the negative approach to ‘arche’ in the Platonic tradition. On the other hand, Heidegger's attempt for the expression of the appearance of God entangles himself in a fideistic approach which has no relation with the ontological difference; thereby contradicting the criteria of his own thinking. The criticism of these two approaches, creates the necessity of a more fundamental understanding of the Divine according to the ontological difference and the origin of appearance in an implicit reference to the Platonic ‘arche beyond Being’ in the sense of a negative understanding of ‘arche’ as concealment, absence and nothingness.

This paper attempts to pursue the critique of Platonic Chorismos relating to Heidegger’s later thought and thereby to reveal what kind of necessity is involved in the difference, priority and transcendence of ‘the clearing’ (Lichtung) or the Being as such, as the origin of the ontological difference, with regard to the Being of beings and the understanding of Being according to the problem of Phenomenology, i.e. the possibility of appearance and phenomenality. This necessity will be first considered by interpretation of the difference and priority of ‘the clearing’ with regard to the status of phenomenological Apriori in Heidegger’s earlier and later thought by his referring to Plato’s Doctrine of Recollection; then, Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas, especially the Idea of the Good, will be pursued too in three periods in Heidegger’s thought in order to disclose the transcendence and separation of ‘the clearing’ from Being and appearance, and consequently, the concealment and unavailability of ‘the clearing’ at least in a deep nexus with Plato’s Allegories of Sun and Cave; a connection that has to be emphasized in contrast to Heidegger’s own position against Plato’s Doctrine of Truth.

In this paper, I attempt to reread and interpret some aspects of the ontological doctrine of Iranian philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā according to the radical critique of the whole history of metaphysics and ontology, which the German philosopher Martin Heidegger declares emphatically in his destruction of the history of metaphysics. Heidegger concentrates his criticism under the title Ontotheology and thereby indicates the lack of an explicit understanding of the problem of ontological difference, which shows itself in the reduction of the Being of beings to an absolute and first being as an absolute intellect. I try to explain how the ontological doctrine of Mullā Ṣadrā, i.e. the “Priority of the Being” could be confronted with this criticism, and which potential answers could his philosophy have according to the basic ontological challenge that the concept of the Being – and consequently the ontological concepts in general – cannot be reduced ontotheologically to a causal relation to the first and highest being or to a reflection and an abstraction of the human subject. To disclose these potential answers, I discuss two specific aspects of Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontology. First his attempt to overcome the scholastic distinction between essence and existence and secondly his different ontological understanding of the specific and unique universality of the Being.

This intercultural study attempts to find a bridge between Heidegger’s criticism of metaphysics as Ontotheology, his search for overcoming it in his later thinking about the hiddenness of Being itself, and Ibn ‘Arabi’s mystical doctrine of unity of Being— which is likewise characterized as the absolute hiddenness—through a return to their common ground in Platonic negative theology. Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s allegory of the Sun and the role of the Good beyond Being, and the unsaid correspondence between Heidegger’s “Being itself” and the Neoplatonic “One” build the bridge to the analysis of absoluteness as absolute hiddenness in Islamic mysticism. Through this interpretation, the Islamic philosophical tradition could be faced with Heidegger’s accusation of Ontotheology, potentially discovering possibilities for a philosophically relevant dialogue with Heidegger’s thought.