Ahmed Alwishah

RésuméL'objectif de cet article est de produire une étude complète et systématique de la doctrine avicennienne de la conscience de soi et de la connaissance chez les animaux. Dans la première partie, j'explique comment, selon Avicenne, la conscience de soi chez l'animal, contrairement à la conscience de soi chez l'homme, est considérée comme indirecte, mélangée et intermittente – la conscience animale étant, dans sa vision, issue de la faculté estimative. Aussi la seconde partie porte-t-elle sur la fonction cognitive de la faculté estimative chez les animaux et sur la manière dont cette fonction se rapporte à la conscience de soi. Pour Avicenne, la faculté estimative sert à distinguer notre corps et ses parties des objets extérieurs, et a pour rôle de connecter le soi à ses activités perceptives. Il s'ensuit que la conscience de soi chez l'animal, contrairement à la conscience de soi chez l'homme, est essentiellement connectée au corps. Dans la troisième partie de l'article, je montre qu'Avicenne, tout en refusant aux animaux la conscience de leur conscience de soi, affirme expressément qu'ils sont capables de percevoir leur identité individuelle mais que, contrairement aux êtres humains, ils le font de façon accidentelle, cette conscience étant une partie de leur conscience perceptive.

In accordance with the purpose of the series Traditio Praesocratica, the present volume, the first in the series, contains the most complete collection ever assembled of the documentary evidence on Thales of Miletus. Approximately 600 texts, dating from the sixth century BCE to the fourteenth century CE, are presented in chronological order, both in the original language (Greek, Latin, Arabic and Persian) and in a facing English translation. The original-language texts are reprinted (with corrections) from Georg W hrle's edition (2009). Several texts discovered since the publication of the 2009 edition are included. The English translations were made by Richard McKirahan from the original texts. Differences between the German and the English translations are noted. An index of names and extensive glossaries and word indexes of the texts and translations are provided.

The late Professor Hossein Ziai's interests focused on the Illuminationist (Ishrāqī) tradition. Dedicated to his memory, this volume deals with the post-Avicennan philosophical tradition in Iran, and in particular the Illuminationist school and later philosophers, such as those associated with the School of Isfahan, who were fundamentally influenced by it. The focus of various chapters is on translations, editions, and close expositions of rationalist works in areas such as epistemology, logic and metaphysics rather than mysticism more generally, and also on specific texts rather than themes or studies of individual philosophers. The purpose of the volume is to introduce new texts into the modern canon of Islamic and Iranian philosophy. Various texts in this volume have not been previously translated nor have they been the subject of significant Western scholarship.

Al-Taftāzānī introduces the Liar Paradox, in a commentary on al-Rāzī, in a short passage that is part of a polemic against the ethical rationalism of the Muʿtazila. In this essay, we consider his remarks and their place in the history of the Liar Paradox in Arabic Logic. In the passage, al-Taftāzānī introduces Liar Cycles into the tradition, gives the paradox a puzzling name—the fallacy of the “irrational root” —which became standard, and suggests a connection between the paradox and what it tells us about truth and falsehood, and arguments for divine voluntarism and what they tell us about the nature of goodness and badness. On this last point, we also discuss a passage from al-Rāzī, which suggests similar connections.

We describe the earliest occurrences of the Liar Paradox in the Arabic tradition. e early Mutakallimūn claim the Liar Sentence is both true and false; they also associate the Liar with problems concerning plural subjects, which is somewhat puzzling. Abharī (1200-1265) ascribes an unsatisfiable truth condition to the Liar Sentence—as he puts it, its being true is the conjunction of its being true and false—and so concludes that the sentence is not true. Tūsī (1201-1274) argues that self-referential sentences, like the Liar, are not truth-apt, and defends this claim by appealing to a correspondence theory of truth. Translations of the texts are provided as an appendix.

This volume of essays by scholars in ancient Greek, medieval, and Arabic philosophy examines the full range of Aristotle's influence upon the Arabic tradition. It explores central themes from Aristotle's corpus, including logic, rhetoric and poetics, physics and meteorology, psychology, metaphysics, ethics and politics, and examines how these themes are investigated and developed by Arabic philosophers including al-Kindî, al-Fârâbî, Avicenna, al-Ghazâlî, Ibn Bâjja and Averroes. The volume also includes essays which explicitly focus upon the historical reception of Aristotle, from the time of the Greek and Syriac transmission of his texts into the Islamic world to the period of their integration and assimilation into Arabic philosophy. This rich and wide-ranging collection will appeal to all those who are interested in the themes, development and context of Aristotle's enduring legacy within the Arabic tradition.