Aidan B. Penn

I show that in cases of risk, agent-centered prerogatives generate apparent conflicts between two compelling principles: Objective-Subjective Link (if you know that an option is objectively permissible, then it’s subjectively permissible), and a version of Ex Ante Pareto (if an option gives everyone affected a worse prospect than an available alternative, and all else is equal, then it’s subjectively impermissible). Some might think that these conflicts provide a new argument against prerogatives. Others might think that these conflicts support rejecting one of these principles. I argue, instead, that these conflicts are merely apparent: one’s prerogatives depend in a particular way on one’s uncertainty such that they’re compatible with both principles. The upshot is a better understanding both of principles like Objective-Subjective Link and Ex Ante Pareto, and of how prerogatives apply under risk.