Akshay Gupta

The ‘fine-tuning’ of the universe has led many individuals to infer the existence of a designer, a multiverse, or something else that can account for it. Yet, proponents of a view known as single-universe naturalism have certain responses they can make to block the inference from fine-tuning to a designer or multiverse. In this paper, I argue that these responses fail to block this inference. For instance, I raise and develop the uncertainty problem, which pertains to single-universe naturalists who deny that we can assign any probability to fine-tuning. I also argue that there are problems with other responses that single-universe naturalists can make to try to account for fine-tuning, such as the response that the universe’s constants are necessary or the response that there are no probabilistic mechanisms responsible for fine-tuning.

The Bhagavad Gītā is a highly influential Hindu text. There are two prominent broad interpretations of the Gītā. One interpretation, known as the ladder approach, states that the Gītā privileges one yoga system over others, while also holding that other yoga systems are effective to a certain degree. A second interpretation, known as the wheel approach, states that all the yoga systems of the Gītā are equally effective. In this paper, I defend a particular ladder approach that takes the yoga of devotion (bhakti-yoga) to be the most effective yoga system. Specifically, I argue that this view best aligns with the various verses of the Gītā, specifically verses 6.46–47. I also address the challenges a devotional ladder approach faces. After doing so, I conclude that a devotional ladder approach is the best interpretation of the Gītā.

Black theology is a contemporary mode of theology that critically engages with specific theological motifs in order to affirm the humanity of blacks and emancipate them from white racism. At present, much black theological discourse occurs in Christian contexts, and thus, Hindu religious traditions are bereft of the socially transformative insights that such discourse produces. However, in this paper, I demonstrate that black theological motifs are present within Hindu theological frameworks as well. Specifically, I construct a distinctively Hindu black theology by drawing upon certain theological motifs present within the theological framework of the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta tradition. After constructing this black theology, I demonstrate its socio-theological implications and explain how it can fulfil the black theological aim of liberating blacks from white racism.

In this paper, I draw attention to various doctrines common to different Vedāntic traditions. In particular, I pay close attention to the doctrine of beginningless _karman_. I also note that this doctrine seems to stand in tension with Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments (LCAs) and Kalām Cosmological Arguments (KCAs). This tension arises because defenders of these arguments argue that an infinite causal regress or an actual infinite cannot be physically instantiated and because the doctrine of beginningless _karman_ seems to imply that such a regress or actual infinite can be physically instantiated. I address this tension by showing that not all interpretations of beginningless _karman_ involve an infinite causal regress or an actual infinite. I close this paper by highlighting a few features that Vedāntic traditions have that make them more resistant to some objections to LCAs and KCAs.

Traditionally, the problem of evil, in its various formulations, has been one of the strongest objections against perfect being theism. In the voluminous literature on this problem, the motif of evil has usually been discussed with respect to human flourishing. In recent decades more focused attention has been paid to animal suffering and the philosophical problems that such suffering poses for perfect being theists. However, this growing body of literature, in Anglo-American philosophical milieus, is largely aimed at sketching a specifically Christian or Christianity-inflected theodicy that would reconcile animal suffering with the existence of an omni-God. In contrast, there are few, if any, systematic attempts to put forth a Hindu theodicy that aims to offer morally justifiable reasons that God has for allowing animal suffering. In this article, we address this scholarly lacuna by illustrating how a Hindu perfect being theist might respond to the problem of animal suffering.

Debates about God’s personhood, or lack thereof, are central to philosophy of religion. This paper aims to advance these debates by presenting the “greatness of personhood argument” for God’s personhood and a dilemma for those who deny God’s personhood. I also consider various objections to this argument and this dilemma and argue that they fail. Notably, my reasoning in defence of personal theism is cross-cultural insofar as personal theists across various religious traditions can use it. Thus, this paper defends personal theism in a manner that can bring Western and non-Western theists into closer dialogue regarding the topic of God’s personhood.

In this paper, we defend universalism, which we understand to be the thesis that all individuals will eventually attain communion with God, in a Vedāntic context. We first outline the specific ontological commitments that our view requires, such as the doctrines of karman and reincarnation, and we note one Vedāntic tradition that holds to all these commitments. We then outline the conceptual merits of our view. We also argue that certain objections to universalism do not undermine our view, as reincarnation and karman provide a means for all individuals to eventually freely choose to devote themselves to God, making it extremely likely that all individuals will attain salvation.

The caste system has caused widespread oppression within Hinduism. In this paper, I analyze the Bhagavad Gītā (c. 500 BCE–200 CE) and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (c. 9th century CE), two highly influential Hindu sacred texts, to understand how they conceptualize the relationship between caste and devotion (bhakti). I argue that there is a societal framework that does not maintain the caste system but which is consistent with these texts' soteriological vision and can be implemented in lieu of such a system. This framework demonstrates that for certain forms of Hindu religiosity, caste is not essential to uphold from a scriptural perspective. Given this framework, the caste system can be challenged and interrogated to a significant extent and alternative societal frameworks can be proposed. I also consider and respond to objections to the framework I put forth.

Within Hindu religious contexts, a guru plays a crucial soteriological role, and is sometimes viewed as being as good as God. Questions of a guru’s sphere of epistemic authority thus have far-reaching socioreligious implications. In this paper, I highlight one such implication within the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition. I then analyze various Caitanya Vaiṣṇava texts in order to precisely define the parameters of a guru’s epistemic authority within this tradition. I suggest that the statements made by gurus within this tradition are of a bipartite nature and describe how an understanding of this bipartite nature can lead to social progress within the tradition. In particular, I highlight how the teachings of the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition can be made consistent with contemporary socially progressive values. I also consider some objections and respond to these.

Abstract:The problem of evil is of significant concern to theologians and to philosophers of religion. Despite the extensive discussion this problem has received in various Anglo-American philosophical circles, relatively liĴ le aĴ ention has been paid to the theodical insights specifically of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa (ca. ninth–tenth centuries ѐ.ђ.). Here, it is sought to address this lacuna by highlighting certain theological insights within the Bhāgavatapurāṇa that offer explanations for the existence of suffering. These insights are also drawn upon in order to formulate a response to the evidential problem of evil. Although this is not an aĴ empt to construct a comprehensive theodicy with these textual materials, it is highlighted how the Bhāgavatapurāṇa can address certain dimensions of the evidential problem for evil, and some pathways are noted for further inquiry into the theodical insights of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa.

Recently, Erik Baldwin and Tyler McNabb have brought Madhva's epistemological framework into active dialogue with Alvin Plantinga's religious epistemology and have argued that individuals within Madhva's tradition cannot make full use of Plantinga's epistemology, according to which, Christian belief resists de jure objections and can also have warrant. While I do not contest this specific claim, I demonstrate that an analysis of Madhva's epistemological framework reveals that this framework has its own resources through which it can resist de jure objections. I address various objections to the rationality of Mādhvic belief and conclude that there are no de jure objections to Mādhvic belief that are independent of de facto objections.