Alan Roberts

In this chapter, I uncritically review early theories of amusement in order to extract key claims for critical assessment in Chapters 10.1007/978-3-030-14382-4_4 and 10.1007/978-3-030-14382-4_5. In Section 1, I defend the essentialist approach to Question 1 from Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-14382-4_1, in Section 2, I review early superiority theories, in Section 3, I review early incongruity theories, in Section 4, I review early release theories and, in Section 5, I review early play theories. Finally, in Section 6, I summarise the key claims of this chapter.

In this chapter, I define the affective component of amusement by critically assessing superiority theories, release theories and play theories. In Section 1, I assess superiority theories to extract a key insight, in Section 2, I assess release theories to extract a key insight, in Section 3, I assess play theories to extract a key insight and, in Section 4, I combine these key insights to define the affective component of amusement. Finally, in Section 5, I summarise the key claims of this chapter.

In this chapter, I define the cognitive component of amusement by critically assessing incongruity theories. In Section 1, I assess Early Incongruity Theory from Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-14382-4_3, in Section 2, I assess unsuccessful refinements of the concept of incongruity, in Section 3, I propose a bisociation refinement of incongruity, in Section 4, I propose a resolution refinement of incongruity and, in Section 5, I combine my bisociation and resolution refinements to define the cognitive component of amusement. Finally, in Section 6, I summarise the key claims of this chapter.

In this thesis, I address the metaphysical question `What is humour?' and the ethical question `When is humour immoral?' Consulting a dictionary reveals a circle of definitions between `amusement', `funniness', and `humour'. So I split the metaphysical question `What is humour?' into three questions: `What is amusement?', `What is funniness?' and `What is humour?' By critically analysing then synthesising recent research in philosophy, psychology and linguistics, I give the following answers: x amuses y if and only if: y is in a non-serious, non-threatened, non-goal-directed state. y simultaneously activates two incompatible interpretations of x via unsound logic. sufficiently increases the psychological arousal of y. x is funny if and only if x merits amusement. x is humour if and only if the function of x is to merit or elicit amusement. Similarly, I split the ethical question `When is humour immoral?' into three questions: `When is amusement immoral?', `How does immorality affect funniness?' and `When is humour immoral?' By using, and, I give the following answers: Amusement is immoral when the correct theory of normative ethics defines, or to be immoral. Immorality negatively affects funniness. Humour-types are not subject to moral evaluation. Humour-tokens are immoral when the correct theory of normative ethics defines them to be immoral. This thesis contributes to the knowledge of the subject in two ways. First, by critically analysing and synthesising recent inter-disciplinary research, provides a more precisely specified definition of amusement than that in the philosophical literature. Second, research on humour, across all disciplines, conflates the three closely related but distinct concepts of humour, amusement and funniness. By providing a linear sequence of definitions,, and avoid the conceptual confusions that commonly occur.

Humour is a funny thing. Everyone knows what humour is but no-one knows exactly how it works. This book addresses the question 'What is humour?' Consulting a dictionary on this question reveals an uninformative circle of definitions that goes from 'humour', to 'amusement', to 'funny' and back to 'humour'. Hence the book starts by untangling this circle of definitions to avoid being tied in conceptual knots. The remainder of the book is then free to lucidly provide a new theory of humour which draws on cutting-edge research in psychology, linguistics and neuroscience. Humour is important to people and so then are philosophical questions about humour. This book provides an understanding of what our sense of humour reveals about us and elucidates joking matters from the dinner table to the comedy club.

Humour is a source of moral concern because some jokes contain both elements of immorality and funniness. This raises the question of whether jokes can be funny despite moral flaws and, more generally, how immorality affects funniness. One answer to this question is comic moralism; the position that immorality negatively affects funniness. Berys Gaut has given a merited-response argument in defence of comic moralism, but Noël Carroll has criticised this argument. In this paper, I defend Gaut's argument from Carroll's criticism. Specifically, I argue that benign appraisal is a necessary condition for amusement, which is a commonly proposed claim across many disciplines.

Humour is a funny thing. Everyone knows what humour is but no-one knows exactly how it works. This is the reason why I decided to write a PhD on the philosophy of humour. Some may see this as an odd mix – after all, philosophy is a weighty discipline and humour a light topic. But humour is a phenomenon that anthropologists have discovered in every known human culture and the average person laughs around 17 times a day. Moreover, although primatologists have observed laughter in apes (and rats), the mental sophistication required for full-blown humour seems to be exclusively human. Surely this makes it a legitimate topic to furrow a few philosophical brows. So humour is human – but plenty of us have not perfected the art quite yet. For those still struggling, here are four rules of thumb for being more humorous.

Humour has been a surprisingly neglected topic in philosophy. However, Noah Greenstein has recently given an intuitive schema for modelling the logical structure of puns. Having this logical structure is indeed what makes a pun punny, but I argue that it is not what makes a pun funny. In order for a pun to be funny, the components comprising its logical structure must be related to one another such that certain conditions are satisfied. By using Graeme Ritchie's linguistic model of jokes, I give these conditions in terms of those components.

Aesthetic Pursuits is Jerrold Levinson’s newest collection of essays and is marketed as a complement to his 2015 volume Musical Concerns. Whereas Musical Concerns was comprised exclusively of essays on music, Aesthetic Pursuits consists of essays on a variety of topics. As the broad title suggests, these topics are relatively disparate and wide-ranging, including issues of film, humour, literature, beauty and the emotions. All the essays, with one exception, were written after 2006 and offer a view into Levinson’s thinking over the last decade. As a result, the collection features a more critical engagement with contemporary aestheticians than his previous volumes.

This paper considers the question of how immoral elements in instances of humour affect funniness. Comic ethicism is the position that each immoral element negatively affects funniness and if their cumulative effect is sufficient, then funniness is eliminated. I focus on Berys Gaut’s central argument in favour of comic ethicism; the merited response argument. In this journal, Noël Carroll has criticized the merited response argument as illegitimately conflating comic merit with moral merit. I argue that the merited response argument, and hence comic ethicism more generally, is vulnerable to Carroll’s criticism only if the comic ethicist fails to distinguish between three closely-related but distinct concepts; humour, amusement and funniness. By providing separate accounts of these three concepts, I explain how Carroll’s criticism is unsuccessful. In summary, accepting my distinctions between humour, amusement and funniness makes it clear that comic ethicism is the right position.