Alba Montes Sánchez

How can imagination, which normally serves to break us free from reality, endow our social imaginaries with powers that can regulate actual social interactions? How can we imagine, properly speaking, together in the first place? And are those forms of imagining together in which we imagine something pertaining to ‘us’ more ‘real’ than others? Or do all collective imaginaries exert the same normative pressures on their members as to what and how they ought to imagine? In this paper, we propose to address these issues by going beyond the standard literature on social imaginary. We argue that what allows imagination to impact our social reality is, first, the way in which beliefs and desires intersect with our imaginings, and secondly, those normative features of imagination that make collective imagination possible and regulate what we can and ought to imagine together. Moreover, we suggest that different types of collective imagination need to be distinguished according to the different degrees and scope to which norms penetrate our shared imaginaries, as well as according to the recognition of those norms. Finally, by critically drawing on research on population genomics, we argue that social imaginaries are those collective imaginations in which imagination is most likely to intermesh with what we wish to be real or in which we imagine communities we wish to belong to.

The contribution of emotions to our knowledge of ourselves remains undertheorized in the philosophical literature on self-knowledge, even among authors who focus on ‘substantial’ self-knowledge. This is a shortcoming because emotions are crucial to obtain the sort of self-knowledge that can play a transformative role in our lives (or engaged self-knowledge). To show this, here I rework Krista Lawlor’s (2009) example of Katherine, a woman who is wondering whether she wants a second child. Lawlor offers and empiricist account of substantial self-knowledge, where purely epistemic self-knowledge, gained through introspection and inference, is enough to satisfy Katherine and “stick” (i.e., halt her investigation). While Lawlor conceives sticking as a mere absence of the motivation to investigate further, in my analysis sticking is an affective phenomenon that involves the epistemic emotion of certainty based on emotional insight, i.e. the right evaluative responses to what one knows. But achieving emotional insight in cases of opaque substantial self-knowledge is not easy. Here, I go beyond Lawlor by proposing that investigating what we value through an imaginative exploration of our emotions and other evaluative attitudes is a particularly promising route.

Shame is one of the most stigmatized and stigmatizing of emotions. Often characterized as an emotion in which the subject holds a global, negative self-assessment, shame is typically understood to mark the subject as being inadequate in some way, and a sizable amount of work on shame focuses on its problematic or unhealthy aspects, effects, or consequences. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Shame reorients readers to a more balanced understanding of what shame is, as well as its value and social function. The contributors recognize shame as a complex, richly layered, conscious or unconscious phenomenon, and the collection offers an understanding of how theories of shame can help or hinder us in understanding ourselves, others, and the world around us. It also highlights how a diverse range of perspectives on shame can enlighten our understanding of both the positive and negative aspects of this powerful emotion. Edited by Cecilea Mun, these chapters by an international group of scholars reflect a broad range of methods, disciplinary perspectives, and both theoretical and practical concerns regarding shame.

Este artículo explora las formas en que la migración afecta al sentimiento de pertenencia del migrante al grupo nacional-cultural a partir de un ensayo autobiográfico del escritor heleno-sueco Theodor Kallifatides. El estudio se basa en los análisis del sentimiento de pertenencia al grupo procedentes de la fenomenología contemporánea. Pese a su gran interés, dichos estudios se fijan o bien en episodios afectivos demasiado circunscritos en el tiempo, o bien en orientaciones afectivas de fondo con contornos demasiado vagos para capturar la especificidad del fenómeno que nos interesa. Apoyándose en el texto de Kallifatides, el artículo esboza algunos elementos específicos del sentimiento de pertenencia que se reconfiguran en la migración, apuntando a los papeles que juegan el reconocimiento y la identidad narrativa, y subrayando los matices, gradaciones y la maleabilidad de dicho sentimiento.

This volume sheds light on the affective dimensions of self-knowledge and the roles that emotions and other affective states play in promoting or obstructing our knowledge of ourselves. It is the first book specifically devoted to the issue of affective self-knowledge. The relation between self-knowledge and human emotions is an often emphasized, but poorly articulated one. While philosophers of emotion tend to give affectivity a central role in making us who we are, the philosophical literature on self-knowledge focuses overwhelmingly on cognitive states and does not give a special place to the emotions. Currently there is little dialogue between both fields or with other philosophical traditions that have important contributions to make to this topic, such as Phenomenology and Asian philosophy. This volume brings together philosophers from the relevant fields to explore two related sets of questions: First, do philosophers of emotion exaggerate the importance of our affective lives in making us who we are? Or is it philosophers of self-knowledge who misunderstand emotions? Second, what is the role of emotions in self-knowledge? What sort of self-knowledge can be secured by paying attention to our emotions? Emotional Self-Knowledge is an essential resource for researchers and advanced students working on philosophy of emotion, philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophical psychology and Phenomenology.

In the many studies of shame that have been carried out in several disciplines during the past years, shame has generally been understood as an emotion that bears importantly on our sense of self and has crucial implications for ethics. While most accounts of shame agree on several core aspects, notably taking shame to be an emotion of negative self-assessment, one main area of disagreement focuses on the question of whether shame is a social or a private emotion: whether it is essentially anxiety about the way others judge us, or rather about our faults or inadequacies as perceived and judged by ourselves. In my view, however, the dichotomy arises as a result of conceiving the moral self in restrictive terms, but phenomenology can offer a more adequate picture, that allows us to take into account and fully articulate both dimensions. Both the social and the private are necessary to understand this emotion and its special relevance for selfhood and ethics. My aim in this paper is therefore to challenge this dichotomy and point towards self-revelation as the essential feature of this emotion.

In Shame and Necessity, Bernard Williams engages in a forceful vindication of the ethical significance of shame. In his view, shame is an extremely productive moral emotion because of the distinctive connection that it establishes between self, others and world, through a self-evaluation that is mediated by an internalized other. In this paper, I examine Williams’ conception of the internalized other and contrast it with other ways of conceiving the role of others in shame. I argue that, although Williams’ views contain many important insights, much is to be gained by conceiving the role of others in Sartrean terms instead. The other’s perspective is not merely internalized; it is constitutive of the kind of selfhood that has a capacity for shame.

In this paper, I explore the experience of shame and its connections to recognition and love as manifested in Shakespeare's King Lear. My main focus in this paper is the ethical relevance of shame. I start from Sartre's account of shame in Being and Nothingness, and I consider Webber's attempt to reformulate it in terms of bad faith. I reject this and propose a way to rethink shame through a study of the workings of recognition in King Lear, following Stanley Cavell's reading of this tragedy. I claim that the experience of shame has a relational structure, which makes it a crucial part of our ethical sensibility. My analysis of King Lear brings out this structure and underlines the ethical significance of shame at this structural level, by highlighting its connection to recognition and love.

Is shame a moral emotion? After the Muhammad cartoons controversy, many Danes argued that freedom of speech should be limited by a sense of decency, that insulting Islam for the sake of insult was shameful. Ten years later, the Danish government’s anti-refugee policy led some to say they were ashamed of being Danish. Here shame is given moral significance as the guardian of decency. However, psychologists like Tangney and Dearing have claimed that shame is morally counter-productive: it makes us react in antisocial ways, covering up our failings, shunning contact with others or lashing out in anger. Some have recently argued that the rise of right-wing populism in many Western nations is fueled by the psychological mechanism of transforming shame into rage. This seems a case of shame backfiring to cause antisocial behavior. In this paper, I seek to illuminate this dilemma by analyzing how self and others relate in shame. I defend that shame is an emotion of social self-consciousness, where one’s own self-assessment is fundamentally mediated by others. It may pull us in moral and immoral directions, but it is anyway part of the sensibilities that make us moral. My central examples, though, are cases of group-based shame. Is shame equally appropriate, and does it have the same significance, when it is group-based? I argue that the conditions of appropriateness change, but the structure of the emotion and its moral significance remains unchanged.

In the many studies of shame that have been carried out in several disciplines during the past years, shame has generally been understood as an emotion that bears importantly on our sense of self and has crucial implications for ethics. While most accounts of shame agree on several core aspects, notably taking shame to be an emotion of negative self-assessment, one main area of disagreement focuses on the question of whether shame is a social or a private emotion: whether it is essentially anxiety about the way others judge us, or rather about our faults or inadequacies as perceived and judged by ourselves. In my view, however, the dichotomy arises as a result of conceiving the moral self in restrictive terms, but phenomenology can offer a more adequate picture, that allows us to take into account and fully articulate both dimensions. Both the social and the private are necessary to understand this emotion and its special relevance for selfhood and ethics. My aim in this paper is therefore to challenge this dichotomy and point towards self-revelation as the essential feature of this emotion

Within emotion theory, envy is generally portrayed as an antisocial emotion because the relation between the envier and the rival is thought to be purely antagonistic. This paper resists this view by arguing that envy presupposes a sense of us. First, we claim that hostile envy is triggered by the envier's sense of impotence combined with her perception that an equality principle has been violated. Second, we introduce the notion of â hetero-induced self-conscious emotionsâ by focusing on the paradigmatic cases of being ashamed or proud of somebody else. We describe envy as a hetero-induced self-conscious emotion by arguing that the impotence felt by the subject grounds the emotion's self-reflexivity and that the rival impacts the subject's self-assessment because the rival is framed by the subject as an in-group member. Finally, we elaborate on the asset at stake in envy. We contend that this is esteem recognition: The envier covets the esteem that her reference group accords to the rival. Because, in envy, the subject conceives of herself as member of a group to which the other is also understood to belong, we conclude that envy is a social emotion insofar as it presupposes a sense of us.

Self-conscious emotions such as shame and pride are emotions that typically focus on the self of the person who feels them. In other words, the intentional object of these emotions is assumed to be the subject that experiences them. Many reasons speak in its favor and yet this account seems to leave a question open: how to cash out those cases in which one genuinely feels ashamed or proud of what someone else does? This paper contends that such cases do not necessarily challenge the idea that shame and pride are about the emoting subject. Rather, we claim that some of the most paradigmatic scenarios of shame and pride induced by others can be accommodated by taking seriously the consideration that, in such cases, the subject “group-identifies” with the other. This is the idea that, in feeling these forms of shame or pride, the subject is conceiving of herself as a member of the same group as the subject acting shamefully or in an admirable way. In other words, these peculiar emotive responses are elicited in the subject insofar as, and to the extent that, she is (or sees herself as being) a member of a group – the group to which those who act shamefully or admirably also belong. By looking into the way in which the notion of group identification can allow for an account of hetero-induced shame and pride, this paper attempts to achieve a sort of mutual enlightenment that brings to light not only an important and generally neglected form of self-conscious emotions, but also relevant features of group identification. In particular, it generates evidence for the idea that group identification is a psychological process that the subject does not have to carry out intentionally in the sense that it is not necessarily triggered by the subject’s conative states like desires or intentions.