Albert Casullo

Timothy Williamson (2013) distinguishes two approaches to introducing the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, bottom-up and top-down, and offers a novel argument in support of the conclusion that the distinction introduced by the bottom-up approach is superficial. This chapter’s goal is to defend four theses. First, Williamson’s argument against the bottom-up distinction faces two serious objections. Its two key premises are unsupported and, moreover, the revisions necessary to support them reveal a crucial gap in the argument. Second, the argument has the unfortunate consequence of obscuring the fact that the primary issues that need to be addressed in order to assess the significance of the distinction are empirical. Third, there are compelling reasons to reject the bottom-up distinction and, moreover, Williamson’s argument against that distinction cannot be extended to the top-down distinction. Fourth, although Williamson also maintains that the top-down distinction is not significant, his supporting argument is not new. It is a variation of the argument presented in Williamson (2007) and both fail for a similar reason.

Kant contends that necessity is a criterion of the a priori—that is, that all knowledge of necessary propositions is a priori. This contention, together with two others that Kant took to be evident—we know some mathematical propositions and such propositions are necessary—leads directly to the conclusion that some knowledge is a priori. Although many contemporary philosophers endorse Kant’s criterion, supporting arguments are hard to come by. Gordon Barnes provides one of the few examples. My purpose in this chapter is to articulate and examine his argument. I have two goals in doing so. The first is to uncover several significant gaps in the argument. The second is to show that it suffers from a common defect in rationalist arguments. If the argument were successful against empiricist accounts of modal knowledge, it would apply with equal force to extant rationalist accounts of such knowledge. Hence, the cost of refuting modal empiricism is modal scepticism.

The distinction between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge has come under attack in the recent literature by Philip Kitcher, John Hawthorne, C. S. Jenkins, and Timothy Williamson. Evaluating the attacks requires answering two questions. First, have they hit their target? Second, are they compelling? My goal is to show that the attacks fail because they miss their target. They miss their target because they fail to correctly articulate the distinction that they attack. I begin by identifying three factors that obscure the concept of a priori knowledge and maintain that the failure to take these factors into account leads to three common errors in attempts to articulate that concept. I go on to argue that the attacks of Kitcher, Hawthorne, Jenkins, and Williamson turn on these errors or variants of them.

The topic of a priori knowledge has been central to analytic philosophy for the past two centuries. It was introduced by Kant in his seminal work Critique of Pure Reason and vigorously dismissed by Quine in Two Dogmas of Empiricism, resulting in an epistemological controversy that remains deeply divided to this day. Casullo's book, based on previously published and unpublished work, systematically addresses questions that have, since Kant, formed the core of the debate. One of his central claims is that the concept of a priori has not been well understood and that many of the apparent differences that underlie much of the contemporary debate are a result of these misunderstandings. Casullo's reformulation of this traditional debate is both original and persuasive, and should appeal to a wide range of philosophers who share an interest in epistemology.

The major divide in contemporary epistemology is between those who embrace and those who reject a priori knowledge. Albert Casullo provides a systematic treatment of the primary epistemological issues associated with the controversy. By freeing the a priori from traditional assumptions about the nature of knowledge and justification, he offers a novel approach to resolving these issues which assigns a prominent role to empirical evidence. He concludes by arguing that traditional approaches to the a priori, which focus primarily on the concepts of necessity and analyticity, are misguided.

The two questions have dominated traditional discussions of a priori knowledge: What is its relationship to necessary truth? What is its relationship to analytic truth? Answering them is not necessary to answer the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge: What is it? Does it exist? This chapter argues that the prominence of questions about the relationship between the a priori and the necessary derives from two traditional views: the rationalist conception of a priori knowledge and Kant’s claim that necessity is a criterion of the a priori. Independent grounds for rejecting both are offered, and it is argued that the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge can be answered without resolving the disputes over its relationship to necessary truth.

This chapter provides a taxonomy of widely endorsed conditions on a priori justification. The conditions fall into two broad categories: epistemic, which includes defeasibility, strength, and source conditions; and nonepistemic, which involves the concepts of analyticity or necessity. Two major claims are argued: nonepistemic conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for a priori justification, and if a theory imposes epistemic conditions on the a priori that differ from those it imposes on the a posteriori, they must be supported by independent argument or rejected as ad hoc. Two defensible conditions on a priori justification emerge; justification by a nonexperiential source, and justification that is not defeasible by experience.

This chapter contends that proponents of the a priori face two major challenges: articulating the experiential/nonexperiential distinction, and providing supporting evidence for the claim that there are nonexperiential sources of justification. It is argued that the most promising approaches to addressing both challenges involve empirical investigation. With respect to the first, “experience” should be viewed as a natural kind term whose extension is fixed by certain paradigms. The underlying nature of the paradigms must be uncovered by empirical investigation. With respect to the second, it is argued that providing compelling support for the a priori involves two related projects: the Articulation Project, whose goal is to more fully articulate the claim that there are nonexperiential sources of justification; and the Empirical Project, whose goal is to provide empirical supporting evidence for the articulated claim.

The leading arguments against the existence of a priori knowledge are addressed. The opposing arguments fall into three broad categories: conceptual arguments, which offer an analysis of the concept of a priori knowledge and allege that no cases of knowledge satisfy the conditions in the analysis; radical empiricist arguments, which offer radical empiricist accounts of knowledge of propositions alleged to be knowable only a priori; and incompatibility arguments, which maintain that a priori knowledge is incompatible with epistemic naturalism. This chapter contends that the negative arguments fail: the conceptual arguments impose implausible conditions on a priori knowledge; the radical empiricist accounts do not establish that the propositions in question are not also known a priori; and the incompatibility arguments fail to show that a priori knowledge is incompatible with either of the two leading forms of epistemic naturalism: philosophical and scientific.

The leading arguments supporting the existence of a priori knowledge fall into three broad categories: conceptual arguments, which offer an analysis of the concept of a priori knowledge and maintain that some knowledge satisfies the conditions in the analysis; criterial arguments, which identify criteria of the a priori, such as necessity, certainty, and irrefutability, and maintain that some knowledge satisfies the criteria; and deficiency arguments, which allege that radical empiricist theories of knowledge are deficient in some respect, and that the only remedy for the deficiency is to embrace the a priori. This chapter contends that these arguments fail: the conceptual arguments involve implausible conceptions of a priori knowledge; the criterial arguments involve false epistemic premises; and the deficiency arguments fail because theories endorsing the a priori suffer from the same deficiencies alleged to plague radical empiricism.

This chapter examines two conceptions of a priori justification: S’s belief that p is justified a priori if and only if S’s belief that p is nonexperientially justified; and S’s belief that p is justified a priori if and only if S’s belief that p is nonexperientially justified and cannot be defeated by experience. Two criteria are introduced to evaluate them: continuity with historical precedent, and coherence with generally accepted concepts and principles in the theory of knowledge. It is argued that although historical precedent does not favor either analysis, several theoretical considerations favor over. coheres better with the standard treatment of related epistemic concepts, highlights the central epistemic question raised by the theory of a priori knowledge, and satisfies a plausible criterion of adequacy regarding a priori justification; it leaves open the possibility of empirical knowledge of propositions knowable a priori.

This chapter addresses two questions: Is there synthetic a priori knowledge? Is the analytic/synthetic distinction cogent? The epistemic significance of the first derives from the assumption that synthetic a priori knowledge raises difficult explanatory problems that are circumvented by analytic a priori knowledge. The epistemic significance of the second derives from the assumption that if the analytic/synthetic distinction is not cogent, then the cogency of the a priori/a posteriori distinction is also doubtful. It is argued that both assumptions are false, and that resolving the controversies surrounding these two questions is not necessary to answer the primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge.

This chapter provides a taxonomy of widely endorsed conditions on a priori justification. The conditions fall into two broad categories: epistemic, which includes defeasibility, strength, and source conditions; and nonepistemic, which involves the concepts of analyticity or necessity. Two major claims are argued: nonepistemic conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for a priori justification, and if a theory imposes epistemic conditions on the a priori that differ from those it imposes on the a posteriori, they must be supported by independent argument or rejected as ad hoc. Two defensible conditions on a priori justification emerge: justification by a nonexperiential source, and justification that is not defeasible by experience.

This chapter articulates the requirements of fallible a priori justification. It distinguishes two senses of fallibility: c-fallibility, justification that does not guarantee truth; and p-fallibility, justification that is defeasible. It argues that although these senses are logically independent of one another, there are some significant relations between them mediated by the concepts of self-revision, overriding defeater, and undermining defeater. It is shown that several alternative fallibilist accounts of a priori justification face difficulties that are avoided by the account defended in Chapter 2.

In “A Priori Knowledge,” Albert Casullo asks whether there is a priori knowledge. He ultimately defines a priori knowledge as true belief with a priori justification, where a belief is a priori justified if it is nonexperientially justified. Armed with this definition, Casullo evaluates several traditional arguments for and against the existence of a priori knowledge. He concludes that the traditional arguments reach an impasse by arguing on a priori grounds that the opposite position is deficient. A successful way to defend a priori knowledge, he argues, would be to find empirical evidence that supports the existence of nonexperiential sources of justification.

E. J. Lowe offers an account of modal knowledge that involves two primary theses. First, the basis of modal knowledge is essential knowledge, and the source of essential knowledge is grasp of essence. Second, all empirical knowledge ultimately depends on some modal knowledge. This article assesses Lowe’s account and defends four conclusions. First, there is a tension in Lowe’s account of grasp of essence; it wavers between an undemanding version, which holds that grasp of essence requires no more than our ordinary understanding of propositions, and a more demanding version, which holds that it requires rational insight into necessary relationships between essences. Second, both versions face serious challenges. Third, Lowe’s account of knowledge of essence does not provide a basis for modal knowledge. Fourth, Lowe’s supporting argument for his second thesis contains two significant gaps and the principles necessary to close the gaps reveal further tensions in his epistemological views.

Kant contends that necessity is a criterion of the a priori—that is, that all knowledge of necessary propositions is a priori. This contention, together with two others that Kant took to be evident—we know some mathematical propositions and such propositions are necessary—leads directly to the conclusion that some knowledge is a priori. Although many contemporary philosophers endorse Kant’s criterion, supporting arguments are hard to come by. Gordon Barnes provides one of the few examples. My purpose in this chapter is to articulate and examine his argument. I have two goals in doing so. The first is to uncover several significant gaps in the argument. The second is to show that it suffers from a common defect in rationalist arguments. If the argument were successful against empiricist accounts of modal knowledge, it would apply with equal force to extant rationalist accounts of such knowledge. Hence, the cost of refuting modal empiricism is modal scepticism.

In Necessary Beings, Bob Hale addresses two questions: What is the source of necessity? What is the source of our knowledge of it? He offers novel responses to them in terms of the metaphysical notion of nature or, more familiarly, essence. In this paper, I address Hale’s response to the first question. My assessment is negative. I argue that his essentialist explanation of the source of necessity suffers from three significant shortcomings. First, Hale’s leading example of an essentialist explanation merely asserts that the nature of an entity explains some necessity, but leaves unexplained how it does so. Second, his essentialist explanation of particular necessities introduces new necessities that remain unexplained. Third, Hale’s version of essentialism presupposes a controversial metaphysical theory of properties, for which he offers no defense.

Christopher Hill contends that the metaphysical modalities can be reductively explained in terms of the subjunctive conditional and that this reductive explanation yields two tests for determining the metaphysical modality of a proposition. He goes on to argue that his reductive account of the metaphysical modalities in conjunction with his account of modal knowledge underwrites the further conclusion that conceivability does not provide a reliable test for metaphysical possibility. I argue (1) that Hill’s reductive explanation of the metaphysical modalities in terms of the subjunctive conditional does not yield a reductive explanation of knowledge of metaphysical modality in terms of knowledge of subjunctive conditionals, and (2) that his account of modal knowledge is at odds with his contention that conceivability does not provide epistemic access to metaphysical possibility.

Empiricist theories of knowledge are attractive for they offer the prospect of a unitary theory of knowledge based on relatively well understood physiological and cognitive processes. Mathematical knowledge, however, has been a traditional stumbling block for such theories. There are three primary features of mathematical knowledge which have led epistemologists to the conclusion that it cannot be accommodated within an empiricist framework: 1) mathematical propositions appear to be immune from empirical disconfirmation; 2) mathematical propositions appear to be known with certainty; and 3) mathematical propositions are necessary. Epistemologists who believe that some nonmathematical propositions, such as logical or ethical propositions, cannot be known a posteriori also typically appeal to the three factors cited above in defending their position. The primary purpose of this paper is to examine whether any of these alleged features of mathematical propositions establishes that knowledge of such propositions cannot be a posteriori.

In recent years empiricism has come under attack. Some argue that the view is incoherent and conclude, on that basis, that some knowledge is a priori. Whatever the merits of such arguments against empiricism, they cannot be parlayed into an argument in support of the a priori unless the latter is not open to those arguments. My primary contention is that the a priori is open to the arguments offered against empiricism. Hence, they do not advance the case for the a priori. I go on to offer an alternative strategy. The leading idea is that, instead of arguing against empiricism, rationalists should marshal empirical support for their position.