Alberto Oya

Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es explorar la manera en que Joaquim Xirau y Miguel de Unamuno concibieron el amor. A pesar de que no hay motivos suficientes para concluir una influencia directa y filosóficamente relevante de Unamuno en la obra de Xirau, sí podemos concluir que la forma en que ambos autores concibieron el amor guarda ciertas similitudes. Así, ambos coinciden en concebir la entrega amorosa como un ejercicio de afirmación individual que trae consigo un incremento de la propia singularidad. También, tanto Unamuno como Xirau conciben la entrega amorosa como un acto que, aún surgiendo del propio individuo y no de como es de hecho el mundo, personifica aquello amado, dejando de ser así visto como un mero objeto y mostrándose bajo una forma personal. Y ambos, aunque de un modo distinto, hacen del relato bíblico acerca de la vida y Resurrección de Cristo un aspecto central de sus maneras de entender el amor. Abstract: The aim of this paper is to explore the way in which Joaquim Xirau and Miguel de Unamuno conceived love. While there is no sufficient reason to believe that Unamuno had a direct and philosophically relevant influence on Xirau’s work, we can conclude that the way in which both authors conceived love bears certain similarities. The two coincide in conceiving a loving giving of oneself as an act of self-affirmation that brings with it an increase in one’s own singularity. Both Unamuno and Xirau also conceive of the act of lovingly giving oneself as an act which, though arising from the individual themselves and not from how the world actually is, personifies that which is loved, thus what is loved ceases to be seen as a mere object and appears under a personal form. Furthermore, and although in a different way, both make the biblical narrative about the life and Resurrection of Christ a central aspect of their ways of understanding love.

This concluding chapter overviews the analysis offered in the previous chapters. Without thereby detracting from the philosophical relevance that the different argumentative steps that compose Marías’s argumentation may have individually, it is stated that the ultimate relevance of Marías’s proposal is to offer a way to justify my (each one’s) conscious hope for Christian Salvation through Resurrection, and with it my hope for Christian Revelation to be true, by appealing to my (each one’s) human reality and on the grounds of its hypothetical possibility, and with no intention of demonstrating, precisely because it is indemonstrable, either the truth or the likelihood that this Salvation will actually occur.

This chapter discusses Marías’s argumentation for affirming that my life (each one’s) presupposes, not as an epistemic attitude of part of I myself, the executive I, but as an intrinsic ontological postulate without which my life itself as radical reality is impossible, the assumption of its own indefinite perduration. This allows Marías to conclude that my (each one’s) conscious hope for personal immortality after my biological death occurs is justified inasmuch as it is a self-affirming exercise, a conscious endorsement of my own human reality, and so a sign of authenticity. Marías’s argumentation is complex, composed of several argumentative steps. The crucial step in Marías’s argumentation is his identification of human happiness with the realisation of living. It is argued that this identification is problematic even under Marías’s premises.

This chapter analyses Marías’s argumentation for concluding that my (each one’s) conscious hope for Christian Salvation through Resurrection is justified as it being a conscious endorsement of my own human reality. The different steps involved in Marías’s argumentation are examined. It is shown that Marías’s argumentation in this regard ultimately relies on the claim that only if the Christian God were to exist and save us through Resurrection would the ontological postulate intrinsic to my life (each one’s) regarding its own indefinite perdurance then be satisfied. It is also shown that Marías’s argumentation involves an argumentative transition from the premises of his Metaphysical Anthropology to the religious interpretation of Christian Revelation. It is argued that such an argumentative step is unproblematic, from both a philosophical and a Christian point of view.

This chapter contrasts Julián Marías’s and Miguel de Unamuno’s positions with regard to Christian Salvation and the call for personal immortality. It is argued that although they should be considered as two distinct and independent philosophical positions, Marías’s argumentation for justifying my (each one’s) conscious hope for Christian Salvation through Resurrection bears some notable resemblances to Unamuno’s reasoning in defence of his own notion of Christian religious faith that are relevant enough to make it reasonable to conclude that Marías formulated his argumentation in dialogue with Unamuno’s position.

This chapter offers a detailed account of Julián Marías’s Metaphysical Anthropology. It begins with a short introduction pointing out that his Metaphysical Anthropology expands on José Ortega y Gasset’s ontological claim that “my life” (“mi vida”) is the “radical reality” (“realidad radical”). The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section (“José Ortega y Gasset: My Life as the Radical Reality), Ortega’s argument for claiming that my life (each one’s) is the fundamental and primary reality is analysed; the second section (“Julián Marías: The Empirical Structure of Human Life”) contains a detailed account of Marías’s Metaphysical Anthropology.

The Platonist view in philosophy of linguistics states that grammars are theories of abstract objects. In this paper I will focus on the Platonist view in philosophy of linguistics as stated in Katz's "An Outline of Platonist Grammar" (1984) and Soames' "Linguistics and Psychology" (1984) and "Semantics and Psychology" (1985). I will begin explaining which are the core ideas of the Platonist view in philosophy of linguistics. Then, I will comment on the argument offered by Katz's in order to argue for the Platonist view. Finally, I will explain Soames' arguments in order to show that psychology and linguistics are conceptually and empirically different.

L’objectiu d’aquesta comunicació és posar de manifest el contingut de l’obra Les fonts de la ciència de l’educació [The Sources of a Science of Education (1929)], on Dewey defensa la possibilitat de dotar de caràcter científic la disciplina de l’educació i respon a alguns dels principals interrogants que aquesta possibilitat suscita. [Referència: OYA, A. “John Dewey: el caràcter científic de l’educació” [“John Dewey: The Scientific Character of Education”]. In Monserrat i Molas, Josep; Roviró, Ignasi, eds. 2019. Col·loquis de Vic (XXIII). L’educació. Barcelona (Spain): Institut d’Estudis Catalans, pp. 45–48 (ISBN: 978–84–9965–495–9).]

El objetivo de este escrito es elucidar el contenido del argumento presentado por el filósofo norteamericano William James (1842-1910) en su “Is Life Worthliving?” [“¿Merece la vida ser vivida?”], conferencia pronunciada el año 1895 en la Harvard Young Men's Christian Association y publicada unos años más tarde, en 1897, en la compilación titulada The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy [La voluntad de creer y otros ensayos en filosofía popular]. Se trata de un argumento de tipo moral cuyo objetivo es defender la obligación moral de la fe religiosa y que, aunque presupone y se construye sobre la supuesta adecuación práctica de la existencia de Dios, es independiente del argumento pragmático defendido en su “The Will to Believe” [“La voluntad de creer”].

This book provides a detailed account of Julián Marías’s metaphysical anthropology with the ultimate aim of offering a coherent and systematic analysis of Marías’s argumentation for claiming that the conscious hope for Christian salvation through resurrection — and with it the hope that Jesus Christ did actually resurrect, and more generally the hope that Christian revelation is true — is justified not because the certainty or the likelihood that this salvation will, as a matter of fact, actually occur, but because this hope amounts to a self-affirming exercise, a conscious endorsement of human reality, and as such a sign of authenticity.

In 1930, the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936) wrote one of his most well-known novels, San Manuel Bueno, mártir [Saint Manuel Bueno, Martyr]. The novel is about the fictional character Manuel Bueno, a catholic priest from a small Spanish village who, despite being unable to believe the Christian claim that there is an after earthly death life, devotes himself to the spiritual care of his people, being thereby sanctified after his death. The aim of this paper is to show that the guideline of San Manuel Bueno, mártir is the expression, in fictional, non-philosophical language, of the conception of religious faith Unamuno had already defended in his major philosophical work, Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y los pueblos [The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations].

In this paper, I will argue that the main contrast between religious fictionalism and other recently developed fictionalist positions in other non-religious fields of enquiry is the sort of personal and affective relationship said to be felt by the religious person between them and God, the feeling of being in a loving and personal communion with God. I will argue that a realist, non-Meingonian artifactual fictionalist understanding of God, along the lines that philosophers such as Schiffer and Thomasson have already defended on non-religious grounds regarding fictional characters, seems to be the most direct way of preserving the possibility of the religious person standing in an actual relation to God while also maintaining a fictionalist understanding of religious faith. Last, I will argue that conceiving of God in these realist artifactual terms, and despite allowing the possibility of the religious person standing in an actual relation to God, fails to preserve a genuine personal relationship between the concrete religious person and God.

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the concept of love —understood in the broad and Christian-inspired sense of love as agape-charis love— in relation to the animes Dragon Ball and Dragon Ball Z. I first comment on the character of Piccolo —and how his friendship with Son Gohan— leads to him losing all his original villainous traits. I argue that the evolution of the character of Piccolo through his friendship with Son Gohan illustrates the philosophical claim that a loving and giving of oneself to the other —far from being a sign of weakness— is a courageous and self-affirming exercise. The result may move the individual to an inner transformative experience that leads to the enjoyment of a renewed and authentic life that is worth living. I then argue that Son Goku’s respectful attitude towards his opponents is ultimately a loving attitude. Last, I argue that it is the inspiring and loving example of Son Goku that ultimately explains why characters such as Vegeta —who are at first presented as villains— end up losing their villainous traits after fighting against Son Goku.

El objetivo de este artículo es explorar la manera en que Joaquim Xirau y Miguel de Unamuno concibieron el amor. A pesar de que no hay motivos suficientes para concluir una influencia directa y filosóficamente relevante de Unamuno en la obra de Xirau, sí podemos concluir que la forma en que ambos autores concibieron el amor guarda ciertas similitudes. Así, ambos coinciden en concebir la entrega amorosa como un ejercicio de afirmación individual que trae consigo un incremento de la propia singularidad. También, tanto Unamuno como Xirau conciben la entrega amorosa como un acto que, aun surgiendo del propio individuo y no de como es de hecho el mundo, personifica aquello amado, dejando de ser así visto como un mero objeto y mostrándose bajo una forma personal. Y ambos, aunque de un modo distinto, hacen del relato bíblico acerca de la vida y Resurrección de Cristo un aspecto central de sus maneras de entender el amor.

El objetivo de este artículo es clarificar la noción de «vida auténtica» tal y como es descrita por Joan Roura-Parella en su última obra Tema y variaciones de la personalidad (1950). Por «vida auténtica» se entiende una vida autogobernada, que permite al individuo realizar su propia singularidad y, por tanto, preservar su autonomía y dignidad como persona. Una vida dominada por factores ajenos al propio individuo, sean cuales sean éstos, es una vida alienada, que no permite el desarrollo del individuo en tanto la persona que es. Se señala la relevancia filosófica de la propuesta de Roura-Parella, que es la de ofrecer una justificación no-evidencial para una forma de vida cristiana, agapística. De acuerdo con Roura-Parella, una forma de vida basada en la entrega amorosa para con el prójimo está justificada en tanto que ésta es el resultado último de nuestra propia condición natural, constituyendo así un acto de afirmación personal y siendo, por tanto, condición necesaria para gozar de una vida auténtica — «la vida alcanza su hondo sentido al salirse de sí misma para darse a los demás» (Roura-Parella, Tema y variaciones de la personalidad, 1950, p. 229). Se señalan las diferencias y semejanzas de la propuesta de Roura-Parella con respecto a las de Miguel de Unamuno y Joaquim Xirau, autores que fueron cercanos a Roura-Parella y quienes, aunque partiendo de razonamientos distintos a los de Roura-Parella, también concibieron la entrega amorosa para con el prójimo como un acto de afirmación personal.

This book offers a comprehensive and accessible characterisation of the first-person shooter videogame genre. After providing an overview of the history of the first-person shooter videogame genre, Alberto Oya comments on the various defining peculiarities of this genre, namely the first-person perspective, the shooting gaming mechanics, the heroic in-game narrative or background story, and multiplayer gaming. Oya also argues that educators can use first-person shooter videogames to encourage their students to reflect on historical and philosophical issues.

Unamuno saw in his defense of religious faith a response to Nietzsche’s criticisms of the Christian, agapeic way of life. To Nietzsche’s claim that engaging in this way of life is something antinatural and life‐denying, insofar as it goes against the (alleged) natural tendency to increase one’s own power, Unamuno responded that an agapeic way of life is precisely a direct expression of this natural tendency. Far from being something that goes against our natural inclinations, Unamuno says, an agapeic way of life is a life‐affirming exercise, something we are led to given our own natural condition. Hence, the aim of this essay is to comment on Unamuno’s criticism of Nietzsche and to point out the philosophical relevance of Unamuno’s attempt to provide a natural foundation for religious faith when assessing Nietzsche’s criticisms of the possibility of carrying out a Christian, agapeic way of life.

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the movie Fight Club, directed by David Fincher, written by Jim Uhls, and first released in the fall of 1999. The movie is based on the homonym novel by Chuck Palahniuk, published in 1996. I will argue that Fight Club is to be understood in primarily existentialist, nonethical, and nonevidential terms, showing the struggle felt by each and every one of us to find a convincing answer to the question of what (if anything) counts as an authentic life that is worth living. Moreover, I will argue that the movie does not merely illustrate the struggle and the existential angst it engenders; it also advances, if not strictly speaking a theoretical answer grounded in an indisputable philosophical reasoning, then at least a practical way to face it. It is only after positively endorsing the claim that absolutely nothing (whatever it may be) externally imposed on a person can give their life ultimate meaning that a person is free to engage in a conscious, laborious, and exhausting attempt at self-affirmation, a full and positive endorsement of one’s own authenticity.

In this paper I will argue that Unamuno was conceiving of God (and ordinary, non-religious fictional characters more generally) in realist, though non-evidentially grounded, terms. I will point out that this way of conceiving of God allowed Unamuno to claim the actual existence of God (though as a fictional, purely humanly created character) and, with this, the possibility of there being an actual relationship between the concrete religious person and God without having to dispense with his own core claim that religious faith is just a subjective, though natural and thus inevitable, human reaction.

Comix Zone (Sega Technical Institute, 1995) is a two-dimensional scrolling beat ‘em up videogame released in 1995 for the Sega Mega Drive (known as Sega Genesis in North America). Comix Zone has two peculiarities which makes it even today an easily distinguishable videogame. These peculiarities are interrelated. First, Comix Zone imitates the aesthetics and visual settings peculiar to comic books, the aim of which is to join the experience of playing a videogame with that of reading a comic; and second, Comix Zone is ultimately grounded on the philosophical claim that fictional characters are actually existing entities, distinct from, and even colliding with, their creator(s). It is pointed out that this claim on the nature of fictional characters was seriously argued for, and put it into literary practice, by the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936).

The aim of this paper is to analyze Charles S. Peirce’s so-called “Neglected Argument for the Reality of God”. Peirce formulated the Neglected Argument as a “nest” of three different but sequentially developed arguments. Taken as a whole, the Neglected Argument aims to show that engaging in a religious way of life, adoring and acting in accordance with the hypothesis of God, is a subjective, non-evidentially grounded though naturally founded human reaction, and that it is this (alleged) natural foundation that makes it reasonable to accept the hypothesis of God as it being actually true, thereby grounding a properly religious way of life. I argue that Peirce’s Neglected Argument lacks of any serious apologetic force since it fails to justify, on independent, non-question-begging grounds, the claim that we are all naturally (and thus inevitably) lead to formulate, and later adore and act in accordance with, the hypothesis of God.