Aldo Stella

This theoretical–speculative text is structured to emphasize both the novel interpretation of the concept of relation and the value of unity, understood not as unification (i.e., as synthesis), but as a compact unity: the unity that belongs solely to the absolute. The extrinsic relation (äusserliche Beziehung) is a mono-dyadic construct, indicating the conjunction of two extreme terms and a middle term that connects them. The immanent synthesis (immanente Synthesis), according to Hegelian intentions, serves as the sublation of the extrinsic relation, since it indissolubly binds the determinations. Only the immediate relation (unmittelbare Verhältniss) indicates that intrinsic bond, which structurally constitutes determinate identity and which must necessarily result in its sublation.

En la literatura sobre economía y gestión han surgido dos tendencias. Por un lado, existe un enfoque «sistémico» que, en consonancia con el paradigma de la complejidad, examina la interacción entre subsistemas, en particular entre las empresas, la sociedad y la naturaleza. Por otro lado, existe un enfoque «humanista», que sitúa a las personas en el centro de la actividad empresarial. Sin embargo, a pesar del papel central que desempeña el concepto de relación en ambos paradigmas, no se ha intentado tematizarlo de forma explícita. Más recientemente, dentro de la perspectiva de la gestión humanista, la propuesta de Melé (2024) ha supuesto una contribución significativa al redefinir la empresa en términos de una antropología filosófica centrada en la persona. En este contexto, el concepto de «grupo relacionado» proporciona una valiosa perspectiva sobre la causa formal de la empresa. Sin embargo, sostenemos que este concepto puede alcanzar su pleno potencial si se integra en una metafísica de la persona que restaure la dimensión teleológica del individuo. Esto requiere un replanteamiento radical del concepto de «relación», entendido como un acto inherente a la persona y no como un status que se da entre personas, lo que permite que emerja la dimensión teleológica del individuo. En conclusión, sostenemos que al basar una teoría de los negocios en una antropología filosófica que da primacía a la persona y al fundamentar a la persona en una metafísica que prioriza la causa final sobre las demás causas, en virtud de un replanteamiento radical del concepto de relación, es posible lograr una mejor comprensión de la naturaleza, el alcance y el propósito de la actividad empresarial.

First, the limits of not only the deductive process, but also the relation of logical consequence, which is its essence, are analysed. We then ask what distinguishes deduction from the petitio principii, in order to arrive at the theme that underlies the whole argument: the theme of truth. It is shown that only absolute truth is authentic truth, because it depends only on itself, so that the claim to determine it is a mere contradiction. The principle of non-contradiction (PNC), as far as it is determined, can therefore only be valid as a relative truth, as a principle that is merely formal, so that it cannot be confused with the ground, which can only be—undeniably—absolute and original.

This chapter introduces the theoretical investigation of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC) that we will undertake in the following chapters. Since the scope of the book is theoretical, not historical-philosophical, we do not aim to reconstruct all the debates and discussions surrounding this principle in the history of philosophy, but to show that modern discussion has mainly focused on the elenctic defence of the principle, without investigating the formulation of the principle itself, i.e., the formal definition of the principle, that appears in Book IV of the Metaphysics, and without problematising the concept of negation, which is essential to its constitution. Instead, as we think that the latter is needed, we will devote the following chapters to it.

The true proof of the principle, according to us, does not appear in Book IV of the Metaphysics, but in the Protrepticus, where the conclusion is not bound to the presupposition, but is freed from it and is absolutely valid. The procedural aspect of proof, which is inevitable, is transcended by the transcendental aspect, which is undeniable, for the reason that formally the truth of the principle holds as the conclusion of the demonstrative process; transcendentally, on the other hand, it is by virtue of the principle that the proof itself arises. The truth that is philosophising, i.e., thinking, in fact allows us to grasp the limit of all that is other than philosophising (thinking), and allows the unconditioned condition to emerge that illuminates thinking itself, i.e., the truth that is the absolute itself.

Aristotle states that the deductive process cannot prove the ‘principle’, i.e., ‘truth’, because deduction takes truth as a given. The principle, called the ‘Principle of Non-Contradiction’ (PNC), can only be proved by a new kind of demonstration: elenchos. The PNC is considered as undeniable because its negation ends up negating itself. We note that the negation that is internal to the principle, because it is essential to its constitution, must be determined in order not to be the negation of nothing. However, what determines it is precisely the contradiction, so that the PNC apparently excludes the contradiction, but in fact requires it precisely in order to deny it.

Numerous thinkers have considered the Principle of Non-Contradiction, but none has clearly identified its inherent limitation: that it is itself only a formal principle. This book shows that negation plays a fundamental role both in the constitution of the principle and in the affirmation of its value, which consists in its undeniability. Since it is a formal negation, it is extrinsic to the negated in such a way that it is configured as a negation only insofar as it is applied to something. On the basis of this analysis, it is shown that it is possible to reverse the usual philosophical perspective: it makes no sense to speak of proof of the principle, but only of proof by virtue of the principle. This book is essential reading for all scholars and researchers of theoretical philosophy and Aristotle.

The present work, employing the tools provided by comparative philosophy, aims to address several fundamental concepts, including the theme of objective reality linked to the theme of subjective experience, and the theme of absolute truth connected to the issue of determined or phenomenal truths. The focal point to be highlighted is that these conceptual nodes indeed appear in early Buddhist philosophy found in the Pāli canon but find significant resonance in Western philosophy, that is, in reflective and critical thought originating in ancient Greece. As an eminently theoretical work, this paper’s objective is to demonstrate how the main assertions found in Buddhist philosophy, primarily the outcome of striking insights expressed through iconic stylistic elements or aphorisms, are articulated through reasoned arguments in Western philosophy. We have endeavored to distill these arguments precisely to elucidate the shared theoretical intention.

The present study, primarily of a theoretical nature, endeavors to accomplish two distinct objectives. First and foremost, it endeavors to engage in a thoughtful examination of the metaphysical significance that Anaximander’s philosophy embodies within the context of the nascent Western philosophical tradition. Furthermore, it aims to investigate how it was contemporaneous Buddhist thought, coeval with Anaximander’s era, that more explicitly elucidated the concept of the “void” as an inherent aspect of authentic existence. This elucidation was articulated through aphoristic discourse rather than being reliant on formal logical reasoning or structured arguments.

La ricerca qui proposta si rivolge al programma di radicale naturalizzazione della mente e, in particolare, alla posizione del monismo materialistico che esso produce. L’articolo si propone di individuare gli assunti fondamentali sui quali tale programma poggia. Un primo assunto identificato e discusso criticamente all’interno del lavoro concerne una concezione corrispondentista della verità. Un secondo assunto fa riferimento ad una concezione secondo la quale lo studio della mente si riduce all’individuazione di relazioni causali e leggi che regolano processi meccanici, mentre si possono considerare scientifiche solo quelle forme di indagine fondate sul principio di chiusura del mondo fisico. L’analisi si conclude sottolineando come il presupposto più significativo si riveli essere la negazione della soggettività e della coscienza, la quale viene ridotta/ricondotta a operazioni inconsce e inintelligenti. In problema rincontrato a questo rispetto è identificato nel fatto di non fare valere la fondamentale distinzione teoretica tra condizione empirica e condizione di intelligibilità.

Culture influences what we attend to, encode, remember and think about. Easterners are said to attend more to the relationship between focal objects and their context while Westerners disentangle focal objects from their context. Simply put, Easterners process information holistically and Westerners analytically. Psychosocial factors, like Fear of Isolation, have been proposed as a possible mechanism for cultural differences in terms of information processing. While East vs. West cultural differences are well researched, the monolithic notion that all Westerners process information analytically was questioned in the research presented below. In this paper, we present a study conducted with two Western cultures and one Eastern where we induced the chronic psychosocial factor: Fear of Isolation, and measured its influence on information processing. We found that Italian participants processed information more holistically than us Americans, and that Italians were more similar to Chinese than us Americans.

In this paper we aim to show an intrinsic contradiction of contemporary Metaphysical Realism by focusing on the relation between the subject and the object. Metaphysical Realism considers facts and objects as being empirical, and therefore they are considered in relation to the subject, while at the same time facts are assumed to belong to an autonomous and independent reality. However, if a real object is considered to be independent from the subject, once it enters in a relation with the latter, a real object must undergo an intrinsic transformation. However, since an object cannot avoid this transformation then recovering the real or “absolute” object from the perceived object is not possible. In this way, the inherent contradiction of the “absolute” as being determined, i.e., defined by virtue of a limit, is revealed.