This paper sketches a theory of normative education according to which we gain normative knowledge by first becoming disposed to correctly assess normative situations. I introduce a distinction between what I shall call ‘perceptive’ and ‘productive’ virtues, arguing that the cultivation of productive virtues is contingent upon the mastery of perceptive ones. After some brief groundwork (§0), I introduce the distinction between the two and explore some unique features that they might exhibit (§1)…
Read moreThis paper sketches a theory of normative education according to which we gain normative knowledge by first becoming disposed to correctly assess normative situations. I introduce a distinction between what I shall call ‘perceptive’ and ‘productive’ virtues, arguing that the cultivation of productive virtues is contingent upon the mastery of perceptive ones. After some brief groundwork (§0), I introduce the distinction between the two and explore some unique features that they might exhibit (§1). I then argue that productive virtues require perceptive ones, and thereafter use this relation to develop a resulting theory of normative education (§2). I evaluate the theory as it applies to three areas of normative philosophy—ethics, epistemology, and aesthetics (§3)—and then conclude with some suggestions about future avenues for further work (§4).
