Alejandro Ordieres

El Tratado de la naturaleza humana sólo encuentra su plena significación en el medio cultural interpretativo en que fue escrito. El presente artículo pretende señalar la fuerte influencia que el sistema newtoniano ejerció en el joven Hume y cómo el rechazo de las causas ocultas y la búsqueda de una causa común observable son la guía que inspira a Hume para buscar los principios de la ciencia del hombre y niega, por ello, el acceso a priori a verdades universales, estableciendo así la observación científica como el único camino posible para la ciencia del hombre. Hume no niega la validez de la inducción ni la posibilidad de alcanzar conocimientos generales sino que toma la propuesta newtoniana para elaborar la ciencia del hombre.

This article covers the different stages of the constitution of the person that goes beyond selfishness and self-affirmation and is formed as the inseparable unity of the metaphysical subject that is expressed in the "Other-in-the same" and "Being-for-the-other". This leads one to say that the person is intrinsically relation and exteriority that is realized in the language that transcends the inner self. This relationship, considered internally as a footprint, and in the exterior as visage, invokes a third party that establishes and holds it. The person is shown as an asymmetrical relationship that I call triadic.

The Treatise of Human Nature finds its full meaning in the interpretative cultural environment in which it was written. This article aims to point out the strong influence that the Newtonian system exerted in the young Hume and how the rejection of hidden causes and the search for an observable common cause are the guide that inspires Hume to look for the principles of the science of man denying, therefore, an a priori access to universal truths, establishing the scientific observation as the only possible way for the science of man. Hume does not deny the validity of induction and the possibility of reaching general knowledge but takes newtonian proposal to develop the science of man.

This article raises the need of a historical approach to philosophical texts taking as an example the case of the ethics proposal of David Hume. It shows the interest of Hume that wants to participate actively in the intellectual dialogue of his time and his intention to integrate the scientific method into the moral sciences and how his critique of reason must be understood in this light. To do this, it is quickly mention the intellectual atmosphere of the time and the positions in conflict in the philosophical debate of the 18th century: relativistic skepticism, radical rationalism and naive sentimentality, noting that, deep down, Hume cannot be excluded completely from any of these positions but not typecast in any of them.