Aleksandar Risteski

The title of the book in English is Metaphysics of Feeling: The Problem of Qualia from the View of Peirce’s Pragmatism. The book is written in Serbian language. In it, I examine the relationship between Peirce’s understanding of qualia and contemporary theories of qualia. An aporetic analysis of contemporary accounts suggests that they share common ontological and epistemological commitments, which, in Peircean terms, can be described as the expressions of "the spirit of Cartesianism" and "the spirit of nominalism". Peirce’s concept of quale is closely related to his concept of Firstness. This suggests that his understanding of qualia is not derived from previously made ontological commitments, but is instead part of his broader attempt to develop an ontological and phenomenological account of reality and knowledge. It is also a product of his critical reaction to problems he associates with the Cartesian and nominalist worldview – features that can be largely recognized in the contemporary philosophy of mind. In the book, I suggest that Peirce’s concept of qualia can be further clarified and developed through the framework of New Phenomenology (Neue Phänomenologie) of Hermann Schmitz, and such key concepts like introjectionism, atmosphere, and situation.

In this paper I will address the validity of Schopenhauer’s criticism of the Christian attitude towards suicide. According to the philosopher, suicide is morally and axiologically neutral act that cannot be morally condemned. Aside of that, the Christian condemnations of suicide are not only hypocritical, but also historically and hermeneutically unfounded. In order to address the validity of these objections, I will focus on the fundamental suppositions of Schopenhauer’s ethics and the metaphysics of Will, as well as his understanding of Christianity. Finally, I will try to determine the eventual meeting points between Christian and Schopenhauer’s views on suicide, but also a standpoint to critically assess the philosopher’s axiological views.

In this paper, I will focus on Peirce’s views on aesthetics and some of its anthropological implications. Though Peirce never developed a systematic account of aesthetics, he was aware of its importance for ethics and logic (C.P. 8.225–8.256). The paper addresses Peirce’s notion in C.P. 5.314–315, that a “man is the thought”, from the view of his aesthetics. My intention is to show that Peirce’s views on the “qualities of feeling” and on aesthetic experience in general may have interesting philosophic-anthropological implications.

Peirce’s Relationship Towards Aesthetics (Summary): In this paper, I will examine Peirce’s relationship towards aesthetics. The topic is significant not only for his concept of aesthetics, but also for illuminating the general character of his thought. Specifically, I will focus on Peirce’s understanding of the problem of immediacy, his view of aesthetics as the science of ideals, and the importance of the phenomenological concept of Firstness in relation to his concept of aesthetics and its subject matter.

In this paper I will address the specifics of Peirce’s concept of qualia. Peirce is the first philosopher to ever use the term qualia as philosophical, but his understanding of it differs considerably from the contemporary philosophy of mind. There are certain tendencies to present Peirce in this regard as a forerunner of contemporary debates. Although such an interpretation is not unfounded, I believe that it does not do full justice to the significance of the concept for Peirce’s thought. I will try to elucidate its importance with an adequate web of synonyms, that is, the other important concepts in Peirce’s philosophy. The main idea of the paper is that Peirce’s concept of qualia is not a technical term meant to tackle a finite group of problems within an already accepted ontology, but one of the concepts that Peirce uses to build his ontology.

In this paper the author will assess Plato’s tripartite psychology in the light of his metaphysical account of μέγιστα γένη and One and Many, in order to further clarify the structure of his “dualism”. By doing so, the author will try to show that the tripartition is not a metaphysical conundrum of Plato’s thought and that it cannot be read in the light of Cartesian substance dualism, which is a noticeable approach in contemporary discussions. Aside of that, Plato and Descartes are often understood as the main advocates of the substance dualism. Since the author finds the approach misleading, the aim of the paper is to point out the fundamental differences between the two, foremost by paying attention to the role of body in conceptual determination of soul.

In this paper my intention is to tackle a few issues concerning some interpretations of Plotinus' "philosophy of mind". Firstly, I will address the validity of the idea that Plotinus was "the first Cartesian", advocated by John Dillon and E.K. Emilsson. The idea has been mostly defended on the assumption that Plotinus had anticipated the substance dualism. However, the mind-body dualism evident in Plotinus' philosophy is in no way identical or similar to the Cartesian, since the basic premises of Plotinus' metaphysics do not make room for such notions. Another argument is the philosophical use of introspection by both Plotinus and Descartes. However, I would argue that it is exactly the way of employing the method of introspection what introduces a big difference between the two philosophers. Secondly, I will address the idea of Plotinus as a herald of post-Cartesian non-reductionist notions on the mind-body relationship. I argue that Plotinus and his theory of consciousness cannot be interpreted as a variation of the non-reductionst theories, since Plotinus' "philosophy of mind" in a way transcends the scope of the reductionists vs non-reductionists debates. In fact, non-reductionists share more similarities to Cartesian views, than Plotinus'. Hence comparing Plotinus' philosophy to post-Cartesian non-reductionism does not differ much from comparing it to Cartesian dualism. The conclusion of the paper is that philosophy of mind can find studying Plotinus' philosophy very rewarding. However, in paying attention to Plotinus and ancient philosophers in general, we should not miss to pay attention to the scientific and philosophical paradigms of our time that condition the way we approach a problem and anticipate a possible solution to it.

In this paper, the author will attempt to analyze some of the basic concepts in Leibniz’s Monadology from the perspective of the contemporary philosophy of the mind. The aim of the paper is to suggest that the traditional understanding of Leibniz as a pluralist or parallelist, though not completely untrue, is not always completely revealing and fruitful concerning its possible value for the philosophy of the mind. By analyzing some of the core concepts, the author will attempt to approach the mind-body problem from a rather different angle, suggesting that the mind-body problem is to be regarded as an epistemological one, that is, it concerns how we know and speak of matter and nature.

To Doubt in Our Hearts: The Substance Dualism in the Light of Peirce’s Criticism of "the Spirit of Cartesianism" In this article, the author addresses the problem of Cartesian dualism through the prism of Peirce’s criticism of the "spirit of Cartesianism". The faith in the intuitive knowledge and the strong emphasis on individualism Peirce sees as its two main features, therefore, they are the focus of the paper. The underlying idea is to show that, in the light of the pragmatic critique, the Cartesian substance dualism appears to be foremost an epistemological and methodological problem, and not a metaphysical problem of disparate substances.