Aleksander Ostapiuk

Most economists argue that economics should be more pluralistic and often criticize the monistic nature of neoclassical economics (NE). My paper runs against the grain. I propose ‘heliocentric economics’ to show that NE’s dominance has advantages over pluralistic heterodox approaches. Heliocentric economics contributes to two discussions on pluralism in economics. The first discussion (descriptive) concerns whether economics is pluralistic. Heliocentric economics depicts economics as a patchwork of approaches (pluralism) but with the dominance of NE (monism). I demonstrate how NE’s axiomatic assumptions (optimization, methodological individualism and equilibrium) have defined the mainstream paradigm in economics till now. The second discussion (normative) concerns how pluralism should function. Heliocentric economics combines the advantages of monism and pluralism. First, NE’s dominant paradigm serves as a benchmark that enables communication. Second, if critical dialogue exists thanks to pluralistic heterodox approaches, NE’s dominance can benefit economics

The article aims to show that the paradigm in economics will not change significantly despite descriptive criticism because of axiomatic assumptions. To demonstrate this I analyze Becker's economic approach using Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes. I indicate the hard core (instrumental rationality, utility maximization, equilibrium), as well as the protective belt that makes the hard core immune from descriptive criticism. Because of its tautological nature, Becker's approach is considered a degenerative programme. This conclusion is extended to neoclassical economics where the tautologicality of rationality and utility leads to various problems. Ultimately, the immunization strategy hinders paradigm change in economics

Although neoclassical economics faces frequent criticism, it remains the dominant paradigm, largely due to its immunisation strategies that rely on unfalsifiable concepts of utility and rationality. In this paper, I use Karl Popper’s philosophy to assess whether these strategies are justified. Firstly, I reconstruct Popper’s ideas on immunisation strategies, situational analysis, the rationality principle, and the metaphysical research programme. Next, I examine how neoclassical economics’ immunisation strategies counter critiques from behavioural economics. I conclude that neoclassical economics’ method does not produce empirical conjectures. I assess and evaluate this finding in relation to the “rationality principle”, as it parallels neoclassical economics’ optimisation axiom. Furthermore, I explore Popper’s relevance in the context of neoclassical economics’ recent incorporation of behavioural economics’ insights to show that my analysis is not purely historical.

This paper compares the capability approach (CA) and libertarian paternalism (LP) to see whether they are compatible. The comparison focuses on rationality, wellbeing, and freedom. The main theoretical framework is Sen’s ‘reason to value’ (RtV). The relevance of this to CA, and LP is analysed, and whether the primacy that CA and LP both accord to reason leads to paternalism is examined. Although the principal focus is on Sen’s, Sunstein’s and Thaler’s original ideas, their key concepts are analysed in the context of the contemporary critical literature on the topic. This critical analysis not only makes it possible to assess whether CA and LP are compatible, but also to see how they perceive rationality, wellbeing, and freedom. The critical analysis further differentiates the various interpretations of RtV in the literature and explains how CA and LP function.

Despite the conclusions from the contemporary philosophy of science, many economists cherish the ideal of positive science. Therefore, value-free economics is still the central paradigm in economics. The first aim of the paper is to investigate economics' axiomatic assumptions from an epistemological perspective. The critical analysis of the literature shows that the positive-normative dichotomy is exaggerated. Moreover, value-free economics is based on normative foundations that have a negative impact on individuals and society. The paper's second aim is to show that economics' normativity is not a problem because the discussion concerning values is possible and unavoidable. In this context, Weber and other methodologists are investigated. The conclusion of the paper is that science can thrive without strict methodological rules thanks to institutional mechanisms. Therefore, economists could learn from artists who accept the world without absolute rules. This perspective opens the possibility for methodological pluralism and normative approaches.

The phenomenon of weakness of will – not doing what we perceive as the best action – is not recognized by neoclassical economics due to the axiomatic assumptions of the revealed preference theory (RPT) that people do what is best for them. However, present bias shows that people have different preferences over time. As they cannot be compared by the utility measurements, economists need to normatively decide between selves (short- versus long-term preferences). A problem is that neoclassical economists perceive RPT as value-free and incorporate present bias within the economic framework. The axiomatic assumption that people do what is best for them leads to theoretical and practical dilemmas. This work examines weakness of will to resolve some shortcomings of RPT. The concept of intention is used to provide multiple self conception with the framework to decide between selves, which had not been done before. The paper concludes that individuals should not always follow their revealed preferences (desires) but the intentions (reason) because the latter indicates what people really want

The books’ goal is to answer the question: Do the weaknesses of value-free economics imply the need for a paradigm shift? The author synthesizes criticisms from different perspectives (descriptive and methodological). Special attention is paid to choices over time, because in this area value-free economics has the most problems. In that context, the enriched concept of multiple self is proposed and investigated. However, it is not enough to present the criticisms towards value-free economics. For scientists, a bad paradigm is better than no paradigm. Therefore, the author considers whether value-based economics with normative approaches such as economics of happiness, capability approach, libertarian paternalism, and the concept of multiple self can be the alternative paradigm for value-free economics. This book is essential reading to everyone interested in the current state of economics as a discipline

The goal of this article is to show that instrumental rationality and utility that have been used in economics for many years does not work well. What is presented in the article is how significant the influence of utilitarianism has been on economics and why the economists get rid of humans’ goals and motivations. It is shown in the article that the human who decides in present is absolutely different from the human who decides over time. Many economists neglected this problem because they wanted to have an effective and simple model. Becker’s economic method is presented as a dead end to which economics has been brought to. It is impossible to connect different selves of one human being by using the utility measure. The works of Schelling and J.S. Mill are used to explain this impossibility. The conclusion of this article is that instrumental rationality and utility have affected economics significantly. But, this simplified view on human nature is no longer valid. Hence, economics needs to think not only about the means but also about the human goals. Economics needs to rebuff relativism and show people how to achieve well-being. If we want to help people with their self-governance, we will have to choose reason over emotions.

The goal of the article is to substantiate that despite the criticism the paradigm in economics will not change because of the axiomatic assumptions of value-free economics. How these assumptions work is demonstrated on the example of Gary Becker’s economic approach which is analyzed from the perspective of scientific research programme. The author indicates hard core of economic approach and the protective belt which makes hard core immune from any criticism. This immunity leads economists to believe that they are objective scientists and, consequently, it results in epistemological hubris. Due to its tautological nature, economic approach is considered to be a degenerative programme. This conclusion is extended on value-free economics. In spite of these problems, many economists still believe in positive economics and they dismiss normative approaches. It has a negative influence on people. The conclusion of the article is that thanks to axiomatic assumptions economists do not have objective and ironclad methodology and they should accept normative values in their research.