•  4
    Epistemic Vice and Motivation
    In Michel Croce & Maria Silvia Vaccarezza (eds.), Connecting Virtues, Wiley. 2018.
    This article argues that intellectual character vices involve non‐instrumental motives to oppose, antagonise, or avoid things that are epistemically good in themselves. This view has been the recent target of criticism based on alleged counterexamples presenting epistemically vicious individuals who are virtuously motivated or at least lack suitable epistemically bad motivations. The paper first presents these examples and shows that they do not undermine the motivational approach. Finally, havi…Read more
  •  2
    Nietzsche on the Diachronic Will and the Problem of Morality
    European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3): 652-675. 2012.
    In this paper I offer an innovative interpretation of Nietzsche's metaethical theory of value which shows him to be a kind of constitutivist. For Nietzsche, I argue, valuing is a conative attitude which institutes values, rather than tracking what is independently of value. What is characteristic of those acts of willing which institute values is that they are owned or authored. Nietzsche makes this point using the vocabulary of self‐mastery. One crucial feature of those who have achieved this f…Read more
  •  78
    There are differences between human beings, and some of these differences are, for many, a matter of identity. Some people are men, and some are white. Some people are poor, others are wealthy. These identity-constituting differences are deeply connected with different kinds of injustices. Susan Hekman's main contention in The Future of Differences is that a new epistemology is required if we are to acknowledge all these differences (p. 27) and, consequently, address these injustices.
  •  27
  •  24
    In the article I argue that intellectual arrogance can be an individual, collective and even corporate vice. I show that arrogance is in all these cases underpinned by defensive positive evaluations of epistemic features of the evaluator in the service of buttressing its illegitimate social dominance. Individual arrogance as superbia or as hubris stems from attitudes biased by the motive of self-enhancement. Collective arrogance is underpinned by positive defensive attitudes to a one’s social id…Read more
  •  23
    Speech in non-ideal conditions: On silence and being silenced
    In Laura Caponetto & Paolo Labinaz (eds.), Sbisà on Speech as Action, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 2147483647-2147483647. 2023.
    In this chapter I show that idealizing assumptions can obscure conversational dynamics because they neglect power differentials that are crucial enablers of the successful performance of some speech acts (see, Sbisà, 2020). I examine how silencing is promoted by conversational norms that would defeasibly entitle linguistic agents to presume that silence indicates acceptance. I focus on Goldberg’s (2020) discussion of these phenomena. Goldberg argues in support of a norm of no silent rejections c…Read more
  •  11
    Precis: the mismeasure of the self
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 2022.
    In this precis of The Mismeasure of the Self I summarise and motivate the attitudinal framework adopted in the book. I defend an account of intellectual humility as a virtue of self-evaluation based on attitudes to the self motivated by the need for knowledge. I provide brief descriptions of some intellectual vices of inferiority and superiority and explain that they are underpinned by attitudes serving either ego-defensive or social adjustive functions. Finally, I detail some of the harms cause…Read more
  •  29
    Arrogance, Anger and Debate
    Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2): 213-227. 2018.
    Alessandra Tanesini ABSTRACT: Arrogance has widespread negative consequences for epistemic practices. Arrogant people tend to intimidate and humiliate other agents, and to ignore or dismiss their views. They have a propensity to mansplain. They are also angry. In this paper I explain why anger is a common manifestation of arrogance in order to understand the...
  •  21
    Contemporary Debates in Epistemology
    Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227): 303-306. 2007.
  •  12
    Having the measure of self and world: a response to my critics
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 2023.
    In this response I address criticisms raised by Ashton, Battaly, McGlynn and Simion that my account of intellectual humility (hereafter, IH), and of the vices opposed to it, is too internalistic, is insufficiently social and structural, and finally that my proposal for ameliorating vice might be not efficacious.
  •  5
    Wendy Brown, Edgework: critical essays on knowledge and politics [Book Review]
    with Peter Hallward, Jon Beasley-Murray, Bob Cannon, and Philip Derbyshire
    Radical Philosophy 139. 2006.
  •  37
    Gay Science (review)
    with Andrew Chitty, David Archard, Adam Beck, Ian Craib, Martin Ryle, David Stevens, Alison Stone, and Robert Alan Brookey
    Radical Philosophy 91 (91). 1998.
  • Introduction
    In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives, Routledge. 2020.
  •  10
    Emotion and Rationality
    with Mark Lance
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 30 (sup1): 275-295. 2004.
    This paper is concerned with the roles played by emotions in rationality, a topic which has been generally, but unjustifiably, ignored by epistemologists. Silence on this matter is, we believe, indicative of the overly narrow view that epistemologists have had of their field. Whatever else we might accomplish by considering the rational role of emotions, we hope to motivate a number of questions and philosophical contexts not commonly considered by epistemologists.Everyone knows that rationality…Read more
  •  8
    Replies to Vrinda Dalmiya and Stacey McElroy-HeLtzel
    Journal of Philosophical Research 47 95-99. 2022.
    In this response I address concerns raised by Dalmiya (2022) and McElroy-Heltzel (2022) about features of the account of intellectual humility developed in The Mismeasure of the Self (2021). I focus on the worries that humility is insufficiently relational, compatible with apathy, and potentially ineffective in the service of liberatory projects. I conclude with a brief discussion of the measurement of humility.
  •  17
    Precis of the Mismeasure of the Self
    Journal of Philosophical Research 47 61-66. 2022.
    In this precis, I offer an overview of The Mismeasure of the Self (2021). The book provides accounts of the psychology and epistemology of virtues and vices of self-evaluation such as humility, arrogance, servility, vanity and timidity. I adopt the social psychological framework of attitudes to explain that these virtues and vices are underpinned by clusters of mental states that are the product of motivated cognition, and which, in turn, promote motivated reasoning. I show that each virtue and …Read more
  •  32
    Scaffolding knowledge
    Philosophical Issues 32 (1): 367-381. 2022.
    In this article I argue that often propositional knowledge is acquired and retained by extensive reliance on physical and social scaffolds that create an environment or niche conducive to knowledge. It is incumbent on epistemologists to subject these aids to epistemic assessments. I show that several of the activities involved in the creation of niches within which inquiry can thrive are carried out by whole cultures. New generations benefit from inheriting these niches whilst being able to impr…Read more
  •  2
    Ignorance, Arrogance, and Privilege: Vice Epistemology and the Epistemology of Ignorance
    In Ian James Kidd, Quassim Cassam & Heather Battaly (eds.), Vice Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 53-68. 2020.
    At the start of the #metoo protests, many men professed genuine surprise about the prevalence of sexual harassment, whilst many women could not figure out how men could have been so ignorant. Black people have long observed that a similar apparent commitment to ignorance about race is widespread among whites. In a blog post originally written in 2004, the British journalist, Reni EddoLodge, reported that she had given up talking about race to white people because the majority simply refuse …Read more
  •  58
    In this paper I argue that social networking sites (SNSs) are emotion technologies that promote a highly charged emotional environment where intrinsic emotion regulation is significantly weakened, and people's emotions are more strongly modulated by other people and by the technology itself. I show that these features of social media promote a simplistic emotional outlook which is an obstacle to the development and maintenance of virtue. In addition, I focus on the mechanisms that promote group-…Read more
  •  34
    Intellectual Autonomy and Its Vices
    In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy, Routledge. 2021.
    This chapter argues for three related points. First, answerability is the key to intellectual autonomy. However, in order to enjoy that status that befits an intellectually autonomous subject, other epistemic subjects must also recognize that one is answerable for one’s believing. Second, systemic conditions of social oppression impede recognition since they promote situations in which members of oppressed groups are disabled in their attempts to make themselves answerable for their believing. T…Read more
  •  53
    The Mismeasure of the Self is dedicated to vices that blight many lives. They are the vices of superiority, characteristic of those who feel entitled, superior and who have an inflated opinion of themselves, and those of inferiority, typical of those who are riddled with self-doubt and feel inferior. Arrogance, narcissism, haughtiness, and vanity are among the first group. Self-abasement, fatalism, servility, and timidity exemplify the second. This book shows these traits to be to vices of self-…Read more
  •  287
    Passionate Speech: On the Uses and Abuses of Anger in Public Debate
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 89 153-176. 2021.
    Anger dominates debates in the public sphere. In this article I argue that there are diverse forms of anger that merit different responses. My focus is especially on two types of anger that I label respectively arrogant and resistant. The first is the characteristic defensive response of those who unwarrantedly arrogate special privileges for themselves. The second is often a source of insight and a form of moral address. I detail some discursive manifestations of these two types of anger. I sho…Read more
  •  318
    Virtues and Vices in Public and Political Debate
    In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 325-335. 2021.
    In this chapter, after a review of some existent empirical and philosophical literature that suggests that human beings are essentially incapable of changing their mind in response to counter-evidence, I argue that motivation makes a significant difference to individuals’ ability rationally to evaluate information. I rely on empirical work on group deliberation to argue that the motivation to learn from others, as opposed to the desire to win arguments, promotes good quality group deliberation. …Read more
  •  16
    Vices of the Mind, by Quassim Cassam
    Mind 129 (515): 959-964. 2020.
  •  37
    Humility and self-knowledge
    In Mark Alfano, Michael Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility, Routledge. pp. 283-291. 2021.
  •  253
    There is much of interest in Cassam’s ground-breaking Vices of the Mind. This discussion focuses exclusively on one aspect of his view, namely, his account of what it takes to be properly criticisable or blameworthy for one’s epistemic vices. This critical discussion consists of two sections. The first provides an overview of Cassam’s account of responsibility and criticisability for intellectual vices. The second raises a problem for that account whose formulation is due to Battaly and proposes…Read more
  •  296
    Arrogance, polarisation and arguing to win
    In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives, Routledge. pp. 158-174. 2020.
    A number of philosophers have defended the view that seemingly intellectually arrogant behaviours are epistemically beneficial. In this chapter I take issue with most of their conclusions. I argue, for example, that we should not expect steadfastness in one's belief in the face of contrary evidence nor overconfidence in one’s own abilities to promote better evaluation of the available evidence resulting in good-quality group-judgement. These features of individual thinkers are, on the contrary, …Read more