Alessandro De De Cesaris

The paper proposes the notion of “Two-Worlds Model” (TWM) as a theoretical framework in order to analyse some currents in the contemporary debate on technologically mediated experience. According to this model, technologically mediated experience—especially immersive experience—can be described as a form of “digital metempsychosis”—a feeling of being elsewhere. The paper argues that this model is not new in the history of philosophy, and that it is a very common theoretical and cultural strategy, often used to reduce medial differences—differences in the way of being or of experiencing something—as objectual difference. By analysing some specific topics—the most common accounts of immersive experience, the relation between immersivity and presence, and the notion of “cyberspace”—the paper aims at showing the limits of the TWM, in particular when it is used in order to describe technologically mediated experience.

This book offers new critical perspectives on the relationship between the notions of speculation, logic and reality in Hegel's thought as basis for his philosophical account of nature, history, spirit and human experience. The systematic functions of logic and pure thought are explored in their concrete forms and processual progression from subjective spirit to philosophy of right, society, the notion of habit, the idea of work, art, religion and science. Engaging the relation between the Logic and its realisations, this book shows the internal tension that inhabits Hegel's philosophy at the intersection of logical speculation and concrete analysis. The investigation of this tension allows for a hermeneutical approach that demystifies the common view of Hegel's idealism as a form of abstract thought, while allowing for a new assessment of the importance of speculation for a concrete understanding of the world.

Aim of this paper is to analyze Hegel’s notion of “singularity” as it is presented in the third part of the Science of Logic. It is argued that Hegel’s philosophy not only offers a definition of singularity, but also develops a very specific and original account of it. The first part of the paper deals with the Doctrines of Being and of Essence, in order to prove the relationship between objective and subjective Logic and to show how the genesis of Hegel’s notion of Singularity starts from the categories of “Something” and of “Thing”. The second part of the paper deals with Hegel’s account of Concept, of Judgement and of Syllogism and shows how Hegel’s notion of Singularity is the core notion of the whole Begriffslogik. Finally, in the third part is argued that the distinction between singularity and individuality is pivotal in order to understand Hegel’s standpoint on the matter. Hegel does in fact differentiate the two notions and his Logic shows the passage from singularity to individuality and finally to personality. It is also argued, after a thorough analysis, that the holistic-inferentialist approach to Hegel’s notion of individual being is insufficient, since it basically obliterates the originality of Hegel’s contribution to the topic and often doesn’t allow to recognize the specificity of his theory with respect to the tradition.