Alessandro Pinzani

Among the so-called “immaterial aspects” of poverty is the shame traditionally attached to this condition. Our paper starts from empirical researches that registered the voice of poor people with regard to this aspect and proceeds to discuss how these experiences can be descriptively categorized and normatively evaluated. A first major distinction between humiliation and shame will be necessary in order to better understand what precisely people experience and under which circumstances. We will then differentiate between different forms of institutional humiliation: being labelled as a poor or as a person who is not capable to fully care for oneself; being disrespected by the very way in which a social policy is implemented; being disrespected by public officials and by other representative of state institutions; being silenced by politicians and bureaucrats when it comes to taking decisions about social policies. We will discuss how shame and shaming relate to these different forms of humiliation and how both shame and humiliation affect one’s self-esteem by eroding what Rawls called the social basis for self-respect. Finally, we will discuss possible strategies for transforming the poor from object of policies into subject of politics. E. Renault, A. Margalit, M. Nussbaum, A. Honneth, M. Fricker and R. Walker will serve as theoretical references in our analyses.

This paper offers some considerations about the so-called constitutionalism of effectiveness or neoconstitutionalism, however limiting itself to discussing its theoretical aspects, instead of analyzing concrete cases. First, it briefly presents the main principles of neoconstitutionalism, particularly in the formulation of Luis Prieto Sanchís; then, it presents some considerations based on the observations of some of its critics, particularly Juan García Amado. The arguments of these two authors are complemented by some observations by the author and by other authors, who insist on relevant aspects for our discussion.

The paper starts from an expression used by Kant in the Doctrine of Right: Beati possidentes. It then discusses Kant’s arguments for justifying the possession of land by individuals and by political community. Its main hypothesis is the following: If we consider unacceptable the application of the Beati possidentes principle on a global level, then we have a good reason to reject it also on the domestic level. It reaches this conclusion not by pointing out the undesirable consequences of the principle, for this would be an empirical argument resulting from a consequentialist approach. Rather, it chooses a procedimental approach, showing that the way in which land was initially distributed was neither rightful on the domestic nor on the global level.

How much is a moral judgment on a single act influenced by circumstances which have little to do with the nature of the act itself? How much have certain moral judgments to do with the common history and shared experience of a certain group of individuals? Using two cases taken from life (a German musician and a German CEO behaving both in a morally wrong way but with very different consequences from the point of view of moral judgement and with very different reactions from the German public), the article tries to give an answer to these questions, touching issues like: guilt, moral responsibility, collective responsibility, and collective identity.

How much is a moral judgment on a single act influenced by circumstances which have little to do with the nature of the act itself? How much have certain moral judgments to do with the common history and shared experience of a certain group of individuals? Using two cases taken from life (a German musician and a German CEO behaving both in a morally wrong way but with very different consequences from the point of view of moral judgement and with very different reactions from the German public), the article tries to give an answer to these questions, touching issues like: guilt, moral responsibility, collective responsibility, and collective identity.

Este artigo se propõe refletir sobre a possibilidade de uma teoria do respeito social e da solidariedade cívica. Para este, serão utilizados três conceitos introduzidos ou desenvolvidos por vários autores: o conceito de sofrimento socialmente evitável desenvolvido por Barrington Moore jr., a idéia de sociedade decente de Avishai Margalit e, finalmente, o conceito de capability assim como o utilizam Amartya Sem e Martha Nussbaum. Este último será posto em relação a uma teoria da autonomia moral que servirá de base para uma teoria da solidariedade cívica que pretende ser um complemento das teorias da justiça tradicionais, não uma alternativa a elas.This paper aims at refl ecting on the possibility of a theory of social respect and of civic solidarity. To this end, three concepts, which were introduced and developed by various authors, will be used: Barrington Moore jr.’s concept of socially avoidable suffering, Avishai Margalit’s idea of a decent society and, fi nally, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach. The latter will be connected to a theory of moral autonomy that will lay the groundwork for a theory of civic solidarity, which aims at complementing traditional theories of justice, without representing an alternative to them

O artigo trata de um déficit teórico presente no pensamento neo-republicano dos últimos anos, a saber a falta de qualquer discurso relativo à concentração de poder econômico e político nas mãos de uma minoria. Depois de uma breve exposição de algumas variantes do republicanismo contemporâneo , se analisam algumas críticas formuladas por Robert Dahl e Kenneth Baynes . Finalmente, são consideradas as posições de Robert Putnam e Benjamin Barber, a fim de desenvolver algumas considerações sobre a questão de se a responsabilidade pela crise atual da democracia deva ser procurada nas atitudes e nos hábitos individuais, ou, antes, em fatores impessoais como os arranjos institucionais e o contexto social, econômico e político no qual os indivíduos se encontram .This paper is about a theoretical deficit in the neo-republican thought of the last years, namely: the lackof any consideration for the concentration of economic and political power in the hand of a minority.After a short exposition of some versions of contemporary republicanism , the paper will analyzesome critiques advanced by Robert Dahl and Kenneth Baynes . Finally it will consider the positionsof Robert Putnam and Benjamin Barber in order to develop some remarks on the question whether theresponsibility for the present crisis of democracy is to be sought in individual attitudes and habits orrather in impersonal factors such as institutional arrangements and the social, economic, and politicalcontext individuals live in

In this paper, I defend that the concept of systemic suffering represents a useful tool for social criticism. I shall first make some preliminary methodological remarks (1) and present different meanings that have been attributed to the concept of social suffering (2). I will then suggest that we adopt the concept of systemic suffering instead (3). The next step consists in showing how this form of suffering is connected to the existence of non-material aspects that contribute to social reproduction and that can be defined as systemic doctrines (4). Finally, I shall offer some remarks on possible strategies for criticizing systemic suffering (5).