Alessandro Rossi

The two volumes on Wittgenstein and AI aim to trace and suggest Wittgensteinian influences in some of the most cutting-edge areas of research in Artificial Intelligence (such as Computation, Machine Learning, Natural Language Processing and the use of automation in legal settings). The collection is driven by an essentially interdisciplinary approach, featuring articles from philosophers, computer scientists and legal scholars, writing on a broad range of topics in AI. The chapters across these two volumes are grouped into two sets of themes: Mind and Language and Value and Governance. These themes correspond to two major areas of research in the philosophical study of AI: the computational mind and the ethics of artificial intelligence. These volumes make a significant and unprecedented contribution to the question of what Wittgenstein’s philosophy can offer to the ever-growing field of AI. It aims to provide insight for both philosophers and non-philosophers alike, offering reflection on the significance of Wittgenstein’s work for AI, and on the implications of advancements in AI technology for Wittgenstein’s philosophy and philosophy influenced by Wittgenstein. VOLUME II: Wittgenstein and AI (Volume II): Value and Governance. This volume includes chapters on ethical AI, rules in AI, rules and the law, human-AI interaction, the moral implications of robotics and the status of AI art.

On some views, we can be sure that parties to a dispute over the logic of ‘exists’ are not talking past each other if they can characterise ‘exists’ as the only monadic predicate up to logical equivalence obeying a certain set of rules of inference. Otherwise, we ought to be suspicious about the reality of their disagreement. This is what we call a proof- theoretic argument. Pace some critics, who have tried to use proof-theoretic arguments to cast doubts about the reality of disagreements about the logic of ‘exists’, we argue that proof-theoretic arguments can be deployed to establish the reality of several such disagreements. Along the way, we will also utilise this technique to establish similar results about some disagreements over the logic of identity.

Leibniz believed in a God that has the power to create beings and whose existence could be a priori demonstrated. Kant objected that similar demonstrations all presuppose the false claim that existence is a real property. Russell added that if existence were a real property Leibniz should have concluded that God does not actually have the power to create anything at all. First, I show that Leibniz’ conception of existence is incompatible with the one that Russell presupposes. Subsequently, I argue that on Leibniz’ conception of existence Russell’s objection is immediately undermined.