Alessandro Rossi

This preprint presents a conceptual and analytical introduction to Informational Scalar-Tensor Gravity (ISTG), a gravitational framework in which spacetime geometry is non-minimally coupled to a dynamical scalar field N(x), interpreted at the effective level as a measure of informational or negentropic structure. Starting from a Jordan-frame scalar-tensor action, the work examines several limiting regimes of the theory. An environmental screening mechanism is considered as a possible route toward the recovery of General Relativity in high-density environments. In dilute galactic regions, an effectively two-dimensional long-range approximation leads to a logarithmic scalar profile and to an additional gravitational contribution that may approach an inverse-radius behavior over finite radial intervals, providing a possible framework for approximately flat galactic rotation curves. The baryonic Tully-Fisher relation is formulated as a target of the corresponding boundary-value and matching problem rather than as an already established prediction. On cosmological scales, the homogeneous informational field is investigated as a possible dynamical component of late-time cosmic evolution. An asymptotic configuration, termed the Omega State, is introduced as a prospective stationary regime in which the scalar field may behave effectively as a dark-energy-like component, provided that the corresponding background solution constitutes a stable attractor. The preprint also outlines implications for gravitational lensing, post-Newtonian consistency, cosmological structure formation, compact objects, scalarization, gravitational-wave propagation, and perturbative stability. These aspects are presented as theoretical consequences, consistency conditions, or research directions requiring dedicated quantitative analysis rather than as established empirical results. This work is intended as an introductory presentation of the ISTG framework and forms part of a broader research programme in which the conceptual foundations, mathematical structure, phenomenology, and observational consequences of the theory are developed in a subsequent series of technical papers.

The two volumes on Wittgenstein and AI aim to trace and suggest Wittgensteinian influences in some of the most cutting-edge areas of research in Artificial Intelligence (such as Computation, Machine Learning, Natural Language Processing and the use of automation in legal settings). The collection is driven by an essentially interdisciplinary approach, featuring articles from philosophers, computer scientists and legal scholars, writing on a broad range of topics in AI. The chapters across these two volumes are grouped into two sets of themes: Mind and Language and Value and Governance. These themes correspond to two major areas of research in the philosophical study of AI: the computational mind and the ethics of artificial intelligence. These volumes make a significant and unprecedented contribution to the question of what Wittgenstein’s philosophy can offer to the ever-growing field of AI. It aims to provide insight for both philosophers and non-philosophers alike, offering reflection on the significance of Wittgenstein’s work for AI, and on the implications of advancements in AI technology for Wittgenstein’s philosophy and philosophy influenced by Wittgenstein. VOLUME II: Wittgenstein and AI (Volume II): Value and Governance. This volume includes chapters on ethical AI, rules in AI, rules and the law, human-AI interaction, the moral implications of robotics and the status of AI art.

On some views, we can be sure that parties to a dispute over the logic of ‘exists’ are not talking past each other if they can characterise ‘exists’ as the only monadic predicate up to logical equivalence obeying a certain set of rules of inference. Otherwise, we ought to be suspicious about the reality of their disagreement. This is what we call a proof- theoretic argument. Pace some critics, who have tried to use proof-theoretic arguments to cast doubts about the reality of disagreements about the logic of ‘exists’, we argue that proof-theoretic arguments can be deployed to establish the reality of several such disagreements. Along the way, we will also utilise this technique to establish similar results about some disagreements over the logic of identity.

Leibniz believed in a God that has the power to create beings and whose existence could be a priori demonstrated. Kant objected that similar demonstrations all presuppose the false claim that existence is a real property. Russell added that if existence were a real property Leibniz should have concluded that God does not actually have the power to create anything at all. First, I show that Leibniz’ conception of existence is incompatible with the one that Russell presupposes. Subsequently, I argue that on Leibniz’ conception of existence Russell’s objection is immediately undermined.