Alex Anthony

In this paper, I will defend an alternative account of disposition ascriptions influenced by considerations from possible worlds semantics for modals according to which disposition ascriptions express modals relations characterized by a particular restriction on accessible worlds. My focus will be on the "modal problem" for disposition ascriptions (precisely what kind of modality do these claims express?), and the approach I adopt reflects this starting point. Most analyses – like the Simple Conditional Analysis – have explained disposition ascriptions by suggesting schematic truth-conditional equivalences with other modal claims in English. This only indirectly addresses the modal problem – for instance by first drawing a truth conditional equivalence between disposition ascriptions and counterfactuals and then explaining the modal relation expressed by counterfactuals. I will try to give a ‘direct’ answer to the modal question -- that is, to analyse disposition ascriptions in a general possible worlds framework in which we can compare the analysis to actual and possible analyses for other modals – in particular, counterfactuals. The framework I’ll use is a simple version of Angelika Kratzer’s relational analysis of modals. I'll focus on two problems that nicely connect the dispositional and the modal – (a) the challenge of purportedly ‘extrinsic dispositions,’ and (b) the problem of the "granularity" of possibilities we’re quantifying over (are they situation- or world-sized?).

In the last decade there has been a torrent of work at the intersection of philosophy and linguistics on predicates of personal taste, subjective expressions like fun and tasty that are used to express opinions rather than matters of fact. In each section of this paper I discuss a phenomenon that has been largely overlooked in the literature on PPTs. In Section 1, I identify a neglected experiential reading of these adjectives. All other theories of expressions like fun take them to express some standing property, but distributional and compositional considerations suggest that the basic meaning of fun adjectives is experiential. In Section 2, I discuss the relation between fun claims relativized to particular experiencers and their unrelativized counterparts, arguing that previous theories fail to capture the evaluativity unique to the latter. Finally, I argue...