•  12
    Knowledge First and Ockhamism
    In Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford University Press. pp. 1-20. 2015.
    This chapter uses some resources of the knowledge-first approach in epistemology (KFAE), championed by Timothy Williamson and characterized by the idea that epistemology should be done by beginning with the concept of knowledge rather than by beginning with the idea that justification or good evidence or even belief itself is more basic to the subdiscipline, to advance a novel argument in defense of the Ockhamist solution to the perennial problem of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and …Read more
  • Knowledge First and Ockhamism
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 6 1-20. 2015.
  •  349
    Some Evidence is False
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1): 165-172. 2013.
    According to some philosophers who accept a propositional conception of evidence, someone's evidence includes a proposition only if it is true. I argue against this thesis by appealing to the possibility of knowledge from falsehood.