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Two Observations About S5Mathematical Logic Quarterly 23 (36): 485-486. 1976.
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Two Observations About S5Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 23 (36): 485-486. 1977.
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Analyticity and truth in all possible worldsNoûs 17 (2): 281-289. 1983.
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D-Validity in Predicate Logic with Individual ConstantsInternational Logic Review 35 28. 1987.
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An introduction to logicPhilosophia 18 (2-3): 303-308. 1988.
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A note on pleasureJournal of Value Inquiry 25 (October): 367-70. 1991.
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A Formalization Of A Segment I Of Spinoza's EthicsMetalogicon 1 1-14. 1993.
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On the cannot of infallibilitySophia 44 (1): 125-127. 2005.
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Stanley Malinovich, 1933-2004Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78 (5). 2005.
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A note on theological fatalism1Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (2): 143-147. 2007.
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Arithmetic and Logic Incompleteness: the LinkThe Reasoner 2 (3): 6. 2008.
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Sortals and paradoxPhilosophical Studies 22 (3). 1971.
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The Kantian versus FrankfurtAnalysis 60 (3). 2000.
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Discussion: Tractatus 2.063Philosophical Investigations 12 (4): 325-326. 1989.
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Bayne on KripkePhilosophia 19 (4): 455-456. 1989.
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Wittgenstein su linguaggio privato E seguire Una regolaEpistemologia 21 131-142. 1998.
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An Anomaly in the D–N Model of ExplanationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3): 365-367. 1989.
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A note on natural deductionNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15 (2): 349-350. 1974.
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Quine on an alleged non sequiturNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (3): 249-250. 1981.
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The core of the consequence argumentDialectica 57 (4): 423-429. 2003.We suggest that the classical version of the consequence argument contending that freedom and determinism are incompatible subtly misstates the core intuition, which is that if a true conditional and a true antecedent are jointly beyond our control, then so is the consequent. We show however that the improved version no less than the classical implies fatalism.Interestingly, the reasoning, that yields fatalism, undermines a direct argument for the soundness of the improved version. But if fatali…Read more
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Simple and compound statementsLogique Et Analyse 20 (77): 165. 1977.
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Discussion: Tractatus 2.063Philosophical Investigations 12 (4): 325-326. 2008.
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The Kantian versus FrankfurtAnalysis 60 (3): 287-288. 2000.
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The Core of the Consequence ArgumentDialectica 57 (4): 423-429. 2003.We suggest that the classical version of the consequence argument contending that freedom and determinism are incompatible subtly misstates the core intuition, which is that if a true conditional and a true antecedent are jointly beyond our control, then so is the consequent. We show however that the improved version no less than the classical implies fatalism.Interestingly, the reasoning, that yields fatalism, undermines a direct argument for the soundness of the improved version. But if fatali…Read more
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The Hidden FutureSymposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences. forthcoming.
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The Hidden FutureSymposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (1): 9-10. 2018.
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Can It Be that Tully=Cicero?Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences. forthcoming.
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The Force of Truth 1Philosophical Investigations 34 (4): 393-395. 2011.The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded…Read more
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The Force of TruthPhilosophical Investigations 34 (4): 393-395. 2011.The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded…Read more
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Can It Be that Tully=Cicero?Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2): 149-150. 2017.
Ramat Gan, Tel Aviv District, Israel
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |