Alex Ding Zhang

This paper presents a reconstruction of Aristotle’s conceptual architectonics ofparticular justice. It has been noticed that Aristotle’s account of just/unjust action is not informed by an account of the character trait of particularjustice/injustice, and this has sparked serious concern about whether Aristotle’s treatment of particular justice is consistent with his general programme of ethics. In response, I propose that at least on one possible construal, the ‘definitional priority of virtue’ thesis is not prescribed by Aristotle’s agent-centred approach to ethics. Aristotle is thereby justified in ascribing definitional priority to just/unjust states of affairs in his investigation of particular justice, and this conceptual architectonics is both internally coherent and compatible with his agent-centred approach to ethics.

This paper focuses on the development of a concept that profoundly shapes the legal and moral philosophy in the early modern period: Hugo Grotius’ notion of loose obligation, which registers an ought-claim of natural law with a distinct binding force. Loose obligation differs from obligation of natural law strictly speaking insofar as it is non-actionable; but loose obligation also differs from supererogatory counsel insofar as it is non-optional. The notion of loose obligation becomes one pillar of the modern natural law school owing to Pufendorf’s popularization; but since Pufendorf’s reconstruction, its territory is so expanded that it encroaches upon the realm counsel used to occupy. Reexamining Grotius’ conceptual architectonics and its reception helps us see how the ‘jural’ outlook of modern moral philosophy takes shape.