Alex Holcombe

Gruber and Smith (2019) have conducted some interesting virtual reality (VR) experiments, but we think that these experiments fail to illuminate why people think that the present is special. Their experiments attempted to test a suggestion by Hartle (2005) that with VR one might construct scenarios in which people experience the same present twice. If that’s possible, then it could give us a reason to think that when we experience the present as being special, that’s not because it’s objectively so. Instead, our experience of the present being special is a feature of having a psychology like ours. While we are sympathetic to the thought that there is no objective present, we do not think that these experiments give us a reason to think this. That said, VR experiments, such as Gruber and Smith’s, hold much promise for being able to illuminate various aspects of our temporal psychology.

Hoerl & McCormack posit two systems – the temporal updating system and the temporal reasoning system – and suggest that they explain an inherent contradiction in people's naïve theory of time. We suggest there is no contradiction. Something does, however, require explanation: the tension between certain sophisticated beliefs about time, and certain phenomenological states or beliefs about those phenomenological states. The temporal updating mechanism posited by H&M may contribute to this tension.

Contributorship refers to indicating who did what in a project, going beyond a simple list of authors. In scholarly journal articles about a project, the Contributor Roles Taxonomy (CRediT) has become a popular way to provide individual contribution information, often with accompanying machine-readable metadata. While CRediT is used by hundreds of scientific journals, the official version of CRediT exists only in English. To support scientific publishers and researchers writing in other languages, we have created translations of the fourteen CRediT roles and their descriptions into thirty-six languages. To ensure high quality, at least one speaker fluent in the target language drafted the translation, with additional involvement of a second fluent person. Because hundreds of scientific journals publish non-English work, the use of our translations could improve the recognition of the associated researchers’ contributions. We have contacted relevant publishers and academic organizations to make them more aware of CRediT, of our translations, and of contributorship generally. To conclude, we discuss the potential for CRediT and other ontologies to be applied more broadly, for example to facilitate greater recognition of people who are not co-authors but are named in Acknowledgments sections.

In recent years, a disagreement has erupted between two camps of philosophers about the rationality of bias toward the near and bias toward the future. According to the traditional hybrid view, near bias is rationally impermissible, while future bias is either rationally permissible or obligatory. Time neutralists, meanwhile, argue that the hybrid view is untenable. They claim that those who reject near bias should reject both biases and embrace time neutrality. To date, experimental work has focused on future-directed near bias. The primary aim of this paper is to shed light on the debate by investigating past-directed near bias. If people treat the past and future differently with respect to near bias, by being future-directed but not past-directed near biased, then this supports a particular version of the hybrid view: temporal metaphysic hybridism. If people treat the past and future the same with respect to near bias, then this supports a simple version of time neutralism, which explains both future bias and near bias in terms of the functioning of a single mechanism: the anticipatory/retrospectory mechanism. Our results undermine the claim that people are future-directed, but not past-directed, near biased, and hence do not support temporal metaphysic hybridism. They also fail to support simple time-neutralism; instead, they suggest that there are multiple mechanisms that differently shape future- and past-directed preferences.

Temporal non-dynamists hold that there is no temporal passage, but concede that many of us judge that it seems as though time passes. Phenomenal Illusionists suppose that things do seem this way, even though things are not this way. They attempt to explain how it is that we are subject to a pervasive phenomenal illusion. More recently, Cognitive Error Theorists have argued that our experiences do not seem that way; rather, we are subject to an error that leads us mistakenly to believe that our experiences seem that way. Cognitive Error Theory is a relatively new view and little has been said to explain why we make such an error, or where, in the cognitive architecture, such an error might creep in. In this paper we remedy this by offering a number of hypotheses about the source of error. In so doing we aim to show that Cognitive Error Theory is a plausible competitor to Phenomenal Illusion Theory.

Does perceptual experience consist of a single, well-ordered timeline? Many seem to assume that it does, so that for each event, we can report whether it was before, after, or simultaneous with any other event. Few have addressed the issue head on. In addition to reviewing the little available literature on this foundational topic, this chapter goes on to discuss various findings in temporal order judgments and related tasks. From these findings, some have concluded that the brain actively reconstructs the exact timing of visual, auditory, and tactile events based on factors such as perceived distance and the longer travel time of sound compared to light. But this literature is not conclusive. Results reported in older, rather neglected literature suggest that rather than perceived timing being the result of sophisticated temporal reconstruction, perceived timing is often a byproduct of Gestalt-like grouping principles.

Formal recognition of research contributions is critical for career advancement and the allocation of research funding. However, some contributions are mentioned only in the acknowledgments section, which are not indexed by scholarly databases, resulting in little recognition for those involved. We contextualize this shortfall in terms of contributorship, the movement to recognize specific research contributions rather than rely solely on authorship. Broadening the range of recognized individuals is currently advanced largely through reducing authorship restrictions and unbundling manuscripts into smaller elements, such as datasets and protocols, that receive their own attributions. Here we focus on a complementary path, enhancing the contents and metadata of acknowledgments sections. Capitalizing on existing infrastructure and standards, we propose: 1) when acknowledging individuals, authors include ORCIDs (subject to the acknowledgees’ approval) and provide CRediT information where applicable; 2) publishers solicit identities of acknowledgees in a similar way to how they do so for authors in their submission portals; and 3) publishers include metadata of acknowledgees in JATS-XML files. Implementing these steps should encourage scholarly databases to index non-author contributors. The ensuing increase in visibility for research contributors, such as technicians and library professionals, should result in greater recognition of non-author roles.

The authors review how attention helps track and process dynamic events, selecting and integrating information across time and space to produce a continuing identity for a moving, changing target. Rather than a fixed ‘spotlight’ that helps identify a static target, attention needs a mobile window or ‘pointer’ to track a moving target, picking up pieces of evidence along the way to determine not just what the target is, but what it is doing. Behavioural studies show that this dynamic version of attention is model-based, using familiar trajectories to help identify a target and to guide encoding of continuing input from its path. Attention has very coarse temporal resolution for both static and moving targets. However, when the focus of selection is on the move, a given location on a moving target’s path can be selected for extremely brief instants, as little as 50 ms, compared to the typical ‘dwell time’ or minimum duration of attention selection at a fixed location, of 200 ms or more. To determine the path of a moving object, attention must accurately process and sort the onsets and offsets in order to match an offset to the subsequent onset. This aspect of dynamic attention has been called the ‘when’ pathway and patient studies show that it is a qualitatively different system from spatial attention, being completely based in the right parietal lobe for events in both hemifields. Finally, like the salience map of spatial attention, temporal attention may have its own map that guides allocation to upcoming, current, and recent moments to select information at the appropriate time, changing the experience of time as it does so.