•  24
    The History of Philosophical and Formal Logic introduces ideas and thinkers central to the development of philosophical and formal logic. From its Aristotelian origins to the present-day arguments, logic is broken down into four main time periods: Antiquity and the Middle Ages The early modern period High modern period Early 20th century Each new time frame begins with an introductory overview highlighting themes and points of importance. Chapters discuss the significance and reception of influe…Read more
  •  1175
    Branching actualism and cosmological arguments
    Philosophical Studies 180 (7): 1951-1973. 2023.
    We draw out significant consequences of a relatively popular theory of metaphysical modality—branching actualism—for cosmological arguments for God’s existence. According to branching actualism, every possible world shares an initial history with the actual world and diverges only because causal powers (or dispositions, or some such) are differentially exercised. We argue that branching actualism undergirds successful responses to two recent cosmological arguments: the Grim Reaper Kalam argument…Read more
  •  87
    Andrew Loke’s indirect defence of the successive addition argument
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 94 (1): 43-61. 2023.
    In this paper, we consider Andrew Loke’s recent contributions to the successive addition argument. Although he claims to develop the discussion, we conclude that he fails to provide anything that goes beyond the position critiqued by Fellipe Leon. When analysing Loke’s position, we find that his proposals either directly collapse back into those critiqued by Leon, or beg the relevant question at hand. We conclude with some speculations about why this sort of mistake may have arisen.
  •  338
    All the time in the world
    Mind 131 (523): 786-804. 2022.
    The second premise of the Kalām cosmological argument, as defended by William Lane Craig, has two supporting arguments; the Hilbert’s Hotel argument and the suc.
  •  293
    Endless and Infinite
    with Wes Morriston
    Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281): 830-849. 2020.
    It is often said that time must have a beginning because otherwise the series of past events would have the paradoxical features of an actual infinite. In the present paper, we show that, even given a dynamic theory of time, the cardinality of an endless series of events, each of which will occur, is the same as that of a beginningless series of events, each of which has occurred. Both are denumerably infinite. So if an endless series of events is possible, then the possibility of a beginningles…Read more
  •  297
    James Anderson and Greg Welty have resurrected an argument for God’s existence, which we will call the argument from logic. We present three lines of response against the argument, involving the notion of necessity involved, the notion of intentionality involved, and then we pose a dilemma for divine conceptualism. We conclude that the argument faces substantial problems.
  •  38
    This paper establishes two facts. The first is that a recently presented problem for supervaluationism applies equally to the branching-time cousin of the theory. The second fact is that a new version of branching-time supervaluationism avoids this and related problems.
  •  128
    Back to the actual future
    Synthese 197 (5): 2193-2213. 2020.
    The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with an additional factor—the so-called Thin Red Line—which is supposed to represent the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, …Read more
  •  59
    Between Ockhamism and the Thin Red Line
    Diametros 48 55-70. 2016.
    In this paper we will put forward a novel semantics for future contingents. The idea behind the semantics is to be a compromise position between the ‘Ockhamist’ semantics, first put forward by Prior [1966], Thomason [1970] etc., and a version of the Thin Red Line semantics recently proposed by Malpass and Wawer [2012]. The new position is able to represent alternative possibilities in two different ways, as actual or counterfactual, which corresponds to a similar distinction in two-dimensional s…Read more
  •  57
    Synthese special issue introduction
    with Chris Gifford
    Synthese 188 (1): 1-3. 2012.
  •  214
    A future for the thin red line
    Synthese 188 (1): 117-142. 2012.
    The thin red line ( TRL ) is a theory about the semantics of future-contingents. The central idea is that there is such a thing as the ‘actual future’, even in the presence of indeterminism. It is inspired by a famous solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge associated with William of Ockham, in which the freedom of agents is argued to be compatible with God’s omniscience. In the modern branching time setting, the theory of the TRL is widely regarded to suffer from several fundamental pro…Read more
  •  88
    Fara’s Formula and the Supervaluational Thin Red Line
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (2): 267-282. 2013.
    Este artículo se centra en un argumento presentado por Fara (2010) en contra del supervaluacionismo en el contexto de la vaguedad. Muestro cómo dicho argumento es igualmente aplicable al supervaluacionismo de tiempo ramificado (presentado por primera vez por Thomason 1970), pero no a la semántica 'STRL' de Malpass y Wawer (2012), que está estrechamente relacionada