Alex Neill

This acclaimed and accessible anthology is ideal for newcomers to aesthetics or philosophy. Neill and Ridley introduce a wide range of discussions including sentimentality, feminism and aesthetics, appreciation, understanding and nature. Each chapter is accompanied by a clear introduction and suggestions for further reading. This new edition has been fully revised and updated. It includes five new sections on the art of food, rock music and culture, enjoying horror, art and morality and public art. _Arguing about Art_ will appeal to students of art history, literature, and cultural studies as well as philosophy.

Offering a unique 'debate' format, the third edition of_ _the bestselling_ Arguing About Art_ is ideal for newcomers to aesthetics or philosophy of art. This lively collection presents an extensive range of short, clear introductions to each of the discussions which include: sentimentality appreciation interpretation understanding objectivity nature food horror. With revised introductions, updated suggestions for further reading and new sections on pornography and societies without art, _Arguing About Art _provides_ _a stimulating and accessible anthology suitable for those coming to aesthetics for the first time. The book will also appeal to students of art history, literature, and cultural studies.

Offering a unique 'debate' format, the third edition of_ _the bestselling_ Arguing About Art_ is ideal for newcomers to aesthetics or philosophy of art. This lively collection presents an extensive range of short, clear introductions to each of the discussions which include: sentimentality appreciation interpretation understanding objectivity nature food horror. With revised introductions, updated suggestions for further reading and new sections on pornography and societies without art, _Arguing About Art _provides_ _a stimulating and accessible anthology suitable for those coming to aesthetics for the first time. The book will also appeal to students of art history, literature, and cultural studies.

The bleakness of Schopenhauer’s notoriously pessimistic take on the human condition is mitigated to some extent by his recognition of the possibilities of aesthetic experience and of denial of the will-to-live. However, as Schopenhauer himself acknowledges, his account of the latter appears inconsistent with his determinism, and we argue that this is no less the case with regard to his account of the former. After outlining what we take to be the basis and extent of Schopenhauer’s deterministic picture of human beings, we develop and discuss the possibility that the apparent inconsistency of this picture with his accounts of denial of the will-to-live and aesthetic experience may in fact be no more than appearance – the extent, that is, to which the latter may be construed as varieties of experience to which we are essentially passive. We argue that while there is something to this suggestion, there are aspects of Schopenhauer’s conceptions of both aesthetic experience and denial that remain in tension with his determinism. Indeed, we suggest, ultimately Schopenhauer’s deterministic picture of human beings portrays a kind of creature for whom aesthetic experience in general, let alone denial of the will, should simply be impossible. We turn next to Schopenhauer’s conception of the ‘moral’ or ‘transcendental’ freedom of human beings, and consider how the latter may be appealed to in explaining the possibility of aesthetic and ascetic experience in Schopenhauer’s terms. Schopenhauer’s own appeal to transcendental freedom in this context is, we argue, unpersuasive. In the end, we conclude, he leaves wholly mysterious the freedom inherent in his conceptions of aesthetic and ascetic experience

Relational theories of art—paradigmatically, the ‘Institutional’ theory—arose from dissatisfaction with the Wittgenstein-inspired ‘family resemblance’ account of art, and were taken not merely to be preferable in various ways to that account, but actually to falsify it. We argue that this latter thought is rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of the falsification-conditions of a family resemblance account; and we suggest that, once the reasons for this are appreciated, any apparent motivation to engage in relational theorizing about art evaporates.

The discussion in this paper sets out from two thoughts, one a straightforward empirical observation, the other a worry. The observation is that many who do not believe in God nevertheless regard certain pieces of religious music, such as Bach’s B minor Mass, as among the greatest works of art. The worry is that there must be something compromised or incomplete in the atheist’s experience of such works. Taken together, these thoughts would seem to point to the sceptical conclusion that the high regard in which many atheists hold works such as the B minor Mass must itself be compromised, or in some way unwarranted. The majority of the paper is devoted to clarifying the initial worry through the investigation of a series of (failed) attempts to avoid the sceptical conclusion, before — at the end of the paper — we argue that, for at least one sort of atheist, there is, after all, a mode of engagement with great religious music that might afford an experience of it which would underwrite his judgement that the work is, indeed, great

This anthology is intended as a core text for courses in aesthetics or philosophy of art. It contains a wealth of readings from both classic and contemporary sources, and aims to present substantial selections from those texts rather than mere "snippets." Readings are organized historically within four broad themes so that students can see how concepts of art have evolved and been debated. Each reading is introduced by the authors, who suggest connections between the reading and others in the anthology. Unlike other anthologies on the market, The Philosophy of Art is both comprehensive and affordable, making it the ideal book for course use.