Alex Rosenberg

This paper defends the claim that one cannot, with logical consistency, be a theist and embrace the theory of natural selection as an explanation for adaptation. It further illustrates the problems and identifies limitations in van Inwagen’s attempt to do so. Several of these problems revolve around the compatibility of objective chance (of the sort involved in thermodynamic processes, and especially the second law) and the theist’s commitment to omniscience, one that van Inwagen endorses. This problem would not arise on an interpretation of Darwinian theory that avoids a commitment to objective chances. But the role of drift in the theory’s account of the process of evolution makes this commitment unavoidable.

This user-friendly text covers key issues in the philosophy of science in an accessible and philosophically serious way. It will prove valuable to students studying philosophy of science as well as science students. Prize-winning author Alex Rosenberg explores the philosophical problems that science raises by its very nature and method. He skilfully demonstrates that scientific explanation, laws, causation, theory, models, evidence, reductionism, probability, teleology, realism and instrumentalism actually pose the same questions that Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant and their successors have grappled with for centuries.

By combining excerpts from key historical writings with editors’ introductions and further reading material, _Philosophy of Biology: An Anthology_ offers a comprehensive, accessible, and up-to-date collection of the field’s most significant works. Addresses central questions such as ‘What is life?’ and ‘How did it begin?’, and the most current research and arguments on evolution and developmental biology Editorial notes throughout the text define, clarify, and qualify ideas, concepts and arguments Includes material on evolutionary psychology and evolutionary developmental biology not found in other standard philosophy of biology anthologies Further reading material assists novices in delving deeper into research in philosophy of biology.

Hausman’s characterization of the theoretical core of economics, which he labels ‘equilibrium theory’ – utility theory, consumer choice and the theory of the firm – is mistaken as it does not include the proof of the existence of a Pareto-optimal general equilibrium. Hausman’s enumeration of various other ‘general equilibrium’ theories and models in economics understates the role of the Arrow–Debreu (and subsequent proofs of) general equilibrium as the organizing principle of theoretical economics. The paper outlines the role of this proof in various branches of economics, including (new classical) macroeconomics and growth theory. Hausman recognizes the problematical character of Arrow–Debreu general equilibrium, and seeks to restrict its relevance to the rest of economics by invoking the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu ‘anything goes’ theorem. This theorem’s impact on the employment of the Arrow–Debreu model to organize economic theory is limited. Hausman’s unfavorable verdict on the theorem in turn casts doubt on his analysis of economics as a separate science.

I note the multitude of ways in which, beginning with the classic paper by Machamer et al. (Philos Sci 67:1–25, 2000), the mechanists have qualify their methodological dicta, and limit the vulnerability of their claims by strategic vagueness regarding their application. I go on to generalize a version of the mechanist requirement on explanations due to Craver and Kaplan (Philos Sci 78(4):601–627, 2011) in cognitive and systems neuroscience so that it applies broadly across the life sciences in accordance with the view elaborated by Craver and Darden in In Search of Mechanisms (2013). I then go on to explore what ramifications their mechanist requirement on explanations may have for explanatory “dependencies” reported in biology and the special sciences. What this exploration suggests is that mechanism threatens to eliminate instead of underwrite a large number of such “dependencies” reported in higher-levels of biology and the special sciences. I diagnose the source of this threat in mechanism’s demand that explanations identify nested causal differences makers in mechanisms, their components, the components further components, and so forth. Finally, I identify the “love–hate” relationship mechanism must have with functional explanation, and show how it makes mechanism an extremely interesting thesis indeed.

The ‘explanation paradox’ due to Reiss can be resolved by recognizing that economic models that begin with assumptions of rational choice compel explanatory assent because they exploit a pattern of reasoning humans are hardwired to accept as explanatory: what cognitive scientists call the theory of mind. I review recent research in evolutionary anthropology, neuroscience and developmental psychology that substantiates the conclusion that explanations exploiting expectations and preferences (i.e. beliefs and desires) were hard wired into Hominins as the solution to a design problem in early human evolution, and continue to drive our explanatory and predictive expectations even well beyond their domain of effective employment. Economic models employ this explanatory strategy outside the domain of the effective employment of rational choice models. This is the source of our conviction that they explain in spite of their failure to satisfy any reasonable criteria for scientific explanation.

Philosophy of Social Science provides a tightly argued yet accessible introduction to the philosophical foundations of the human sciences, including economics, anthropology, sociology, political science, psychology, history, and the disciplines emerging at the intersections of these subjects with biology. Philosophy is unavoidable for social scientists because the choices they make in answering questions in their disciplines force them to take sides on philosophical matters. Conversely, the philosophy of social science is equally necessary for philosophers since the social and behavior sciences must inform their understanding of human action, norms, and social institutions. The fifth edition retains from previous editions an illuminating interpretation of the enduring relations between the social sciences and philosophy, and reflects on developments in social research over the past two decades that have informed and renewed debate in the philosophy of social science. An expanded discussion of philosophical anthropology and modern and postmodern critical theory is new for this edition.

This is an expanded and thoroughly revised edition of the widely adopted introduction to the philosophical foundations of the human sciences. Ranging from cultural anthropology to mathematical economics, Alexander Rosenberg leads the reader through behaviorism, naturalism, interpretativism about human action, and macrosocial scientific perspectives, illuminating the motivation and strategy of each. Rewritten throughout to increase accessibility, this new edition retains the remarkable achievement of revealing the social sciences' enduring relation to the fundamental problems of philosophy. It includes new discussions of positivism, European philosophy of history, causation, statistical laws, quantitative models, and postempiricist social science, along with a completely updated literature guide that keys chapters to widely anthologized papers.

Any serious student attempting to better understand the nature, methods, and justification of science will value Alex Rosenberg's updated and substantially revised Third Edition of Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction. Weaving lucid explanations with clear analyses, the volume is as a much-used, thematically oriented introduction to the field. New features of the Third Edition include more coverage of the history of the philosophy of science, more fully developed material on the metaphysics of causal and physical necessity, more background on the contrast between empiricism and rationalism in science, and new material on the structure of theoretical science (with expanded coverage of Newtonian and Darwinian theories and models) and the realism/antirealism controversy. Rosenberg also divides the Third Edition into fourteen chapters, aligning each chapter with a week in a standard semester-long course. Updated Discussion Questions, Glossary, Bibliography and Suggested Readings lists at the end of each chapter will make the Third Edition indispensable, either as a comprehensive stand-alone text or alongside the many wide ranging collections of articles and book excerpts currently available.

This comprehensive anthology draws together writings by leading philosophers on the philosophy of science. Each section is prefaced by an introductory essay from the editors, guiding students gently into the topic. Accessible and wide-ranging, the text draws on both contemporary and twentieth century sources. The readings are designed to complement Alex Rosenberg's textbook, _Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction_ (Routledge 2000), but can also serve as a stand-alone volume in any philosophy of science course. Includes readings from the following leading philosophers: Achinstein, Anderson, Bloor, Earman, Feyerabend, Gutting, Hanson, Hempel, Kitcher, Kuhn, Laudan, Leplin, Mackie, McMullin, Nagel, Popper, Quine, Rosenberg, Russell, Salmon, Schlick, Shapere, Van Fraassen.

It is argued that the natural and human vicissitudes of the Northern Hemisphere—or at least western European history between 1315 and 1648—provide a preview of the sort of consequences for humanity and its demography that will result from the serious if not catastrophic climate change that is now anticipated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Game theory suggests that at least some nation-state players in the strategic problem that climate change raises will not choose Nash equilibria that mitigate the problem. The only feasible solution will be the discovery or invention of some non-greenhouse-gas-emitting energy source so cheap that its owner will be indifferent to free-riding by all other users of energy. Recent efforts to develop fusion reactors do not provide much hope for this eventuality.

Do the social sciences employ the same methods as the natural sciences? If not, can they do so? And should they do so, given their aims? These central questions of the philosophy of social science presuppose an accurate identification of the methods of natural science. For much of the twentieth century this presupposition was supplied by the logical positivist philosophy of physical science. The adoption of methods from natural science by many social scientists raised another central question: why had these methods so apparently successful in natural science been apparently far less successful when self‐consciously adapted to the research agendas of the several social sciences? Alternative answers to this last question reflect competing philosophies of social science. On one view, the social sciences have not progressed because social scientists have not yet applied the methods of natural science well enough. Another answer has it that the positivists got the methods of natural science wrong, and that social scientists aping wrong methods have produced sterility in their disciplines. Still another response to this question argues that the social sciences are using the right methods and are succeeding, but that the difficulties they face are so daunting that rapid progress is not to be expected. Finally, a fourth answer which has attracted many philosophers of social science has it that social science has made much progress, but that its progress must be measured by different standards from those applied in natural science. This view reflects the belief that social science ought not to employ the methods of natural science, and that many of its problems stem precisely from the employment of an inappropriate method, reflecting profound philosophical confusion. These differing philosophies of social science must be assessed along the dimensions outlined below.

Privacy is something we all want. We seek privacy to prevent others from securing information about us that is immediately embarrassing, and so causes us pain but not material loss. We also value privacy for strategic reasons in order to prevent others from imposing material and perhaps psychic costs upon us. I use the expression “securing information” so that it covers everything from the immediate sensory data that a voyeur acquires to the financial data a rival may acquire about our businesses. In the degenerate case of the Peeping Tom's invasion of our privacy, suffering is caused just by the voyeur's having acquired the information, even if nothing is ever done with it beyond the voyeur's recalling it from time to time. In all other cases, privacy prevents others from imposing costs or harms on us in ways that require that they secure information about us