•  3
    What Might Be and What Might Have Been
    In Sarah-Jane Conrad & Silvan Imhof (eds.), P. F. Strawson - Ding und Begriff / Object and Concept, De Gruyter. pp. 135-162. 2010.
  •  183
    Explanation by induction?
    Synthese 190 (3): 509-524. 2013.
    Philosophers of mathematics commonly distinguish between explanatory and non-explanatory proofs. An important subclass of mathematical proofs are proofs by induction. Are they explanatory? This paper addresses the question, based on general principles about explanation. First, a recent argument for a negative answer is discussed and rebutted. Second, a case is made for a qualified positive take on the issue.
  •  326
    Without Reason?
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4): 523-541. 2015.
    The argument for modal collapse is partly responsible for the widespread rejection of the so-called Principle of Sufficient Reason in recent times. This paper discusses the PSR against the background of the recent debate about grounding and develops principled reasons for rejecting the argument from modal collapse.
  •  1123
    Priority monism and part/whole dependence
    Philosophical Studies 172 (8): 2025-2031. 2015.
    Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the only independent concrete object. The paper argues that, pace its proponents, Priority monism is in conflict with the dependence of any whole on any of its parts: if the cosmos does not depend on its parts, neither does any smaller composite
  •  8
    A Note on Surplus Content
    Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2): 202-205. 2017.
    ABSTRACTIn the target article, Stephen Yablo appeals crucially to the notion of surplus content. But when he does so, it is by appeal to the notion of mathematical addition and subtraction. In this commentary, I argue that the analogy with mathematical subtraction is underdeveloped and potentially misleading.
  •  7
    As philosophers are keen to say, there is a possible world where Socrates is a carpenter. Plausibly, truths about what might or could not be the case are not basic but grounded in more fundamental features of reality. Steinberg develops this insight into a novel account of the supervenience structure of the modal realm. This study was awardedthe 2012 GAP/ontos award."
  •  8
    Propositionen als ontologische Leichtgewichte
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 75 (1): 56-70. 2021.
    In his recent book 'Pleonastische Propositionen' Matthias Schürmann presents and defends an account of propositions as pleonastic entities. In this paper I challenge one of his main claims, namely that pleonastic propositions are ontologically dependent on thinkers. I argue that Schürmann's dependence claim is in tension with core tenets of a pleonastic account and, hence, unavailable for an elaboration of what it means that pleonastic entities are ontologically lightweight.
  •  54
    Paradigmatic Metaphysics
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2): 403-409. 2020.
    In a series of papers, Christian Nimtz argues for the view that the semantic notion of paradigm termhood lies at the heart of Kripkean philosophy of language and metaphysics. According to Nimtz, th...
  •  56
    How to properly lose direction
    Synthese 198 (5): 4229-4250. 2019.
    One of the central puzzles in ontology concerns the relation between apparently innocent sentences and their ontologically loaded counterparts. In recent work, Agustín Rayo has developed the insight that such cases can be usefully described with the help of the ‘just is’ operator: plausibly, for there to be a table just is for there to be some things arranged tablewise; and for the number of dinosaurs to be Zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs. How does the operator relate to another promin…Read more
  •  40
    Pleonastic propositions and the face value theory
    Synthese 197 (3): 1165-1180. 2020.
    Propositions are a useful tool in philosophical theorizing, even though they are not beyond reasonable nominalistic doubts. Stephen Schiffer’s pleonasticism about propositions is a paradigm example of a realistic account that tries to alleviate such doubts by grounding truths about propositions in ontologically innocent facts. Schiffer maintains two characteristic theses about propositions: first, that they are so-called pleonastic entities whose existence is subject to what he calls something-f…Read more
  • . 2013.
  •  32
    Supervenience: a survey
    In Steinberg Alex (ed.), , . 2013.
  •  54
    Adequate Counterpart Translations
    Mind 127 (506): 547-563. 2018.
    An important motivation for believing in the modal realist’s ontology of other concrete possible worlds and their inhabitants is its theoretical utility, centrally the reduction of ordinary modal talk to counterpart theory as showcased by David Lewis’s 1968 translation scheme. In a recent paper Harold Noonan, following the lead of John Divers, argues that Lewis’s scheme is not strictly adequate by the modal realist’s own lights, and that nothing short of jettisoning de dicto contingency will hel…Read more
  •  34
    The role of possible worlds in philosophy is hard to overestimate. Nevertheless, their nature and existence is very controversial. This is particularly serious, since their standard applications depend on there being sufficiently many of them. The paper develops an account of possible worlds on which it is particularly easy to believe in their existence: an account of possible worlds as pleonastic entities. Pleonastic entities are entities whose existence can be validly inferred from statements …Read more
  •  84
    Defining Global Supervenience
    Erkenntnis 79 (2): 367-380. 2014.
    What does it mean that certain properties globally supervene on others? The paper criticises the now standard way of spelling out the notion in terms of 1–1 correlations between world-domains and proposes a modification that escapes the difficulties. The new definition can secure the additional benefit of resisting an argument to the effect that global supervenience is theoretically dispensable
  •  120
    Pleonastic possible worlds
    Philosophical Studies 164 (3): 767-789. 2013.
    The role of possible worlds in philosophy is hard to overestimate. Nevertheless, their nature and existence is very controversial. This is particularly serious, since their standard applications depend on there being sufficiently many of them. The paper develops an account of possible worlds on which it is particularly easy to believe in their existence: an account of possible worlds as pleonastic entities. Pleonastic entities are entities whose existence can be validly inferred from statements …Read more